

9/11 FAMILIES UNITED TO BANKRUPT TERRORISM

FORESEEABILITY TIME LINE

Foreseeability of the September 11, 2001 Attacks on the U.S. Homeland

Overview

In its work to root out and bankrupt the logistical and funding sources of terrorism, Motley Rice, on behalf of the 9/11 Families United To Bankrupt Terrorism, has compiled significant evidence and information that illustrates a requisite knowledge, years in advance of September 11, 2001, by industry, government, and financiers of terrorism of a likely plot whereby suicidal hijackers would use civilian aircraft as a weapon of mass destruction against high profile domestic landmarks.

We believe the below analysis regarding pre-September 11th terrorist activities and the failure of government and industry to protect the public from these threats may be of value in identifying the systemic deficiencies in government and industry leading up to the attacks. Specifically, the compilation of the referenced information illustrates:

- A decades-long pattern of increased violence and lethality of terrorist attacks against commercial aircraft;
- A number of earlier plots by Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups to use airplanes as guided missiles against high-profile landmarks;
- An inability by government and industry to prevent such an attack from taking place;
- An understanding and acknowledgement of these terrorist activities by financial supporters of Saudi Arabian based charities.

Historical Trends

It is instructive to examine the history of terrorist acts against civilian aircraft in order to better understand the overarching trends of terrorism and challenges in aviation security. Government, industry, and terrorist financiers have long understood the increasing threat of mass terrorist violence from hijacking civilian aircraft and the likely plot scenarios for inflicting maximum loss of life and strategic impact on economic and political centers. Yet, as the world has so dramatically seen, government did not effectively counteract these threats with adequate safety and security measures to prevent a coordinated and large scale hijacking attack from occurring on airliners. Furthermore, there is ample evidence available from government and news sources which illustrates that the aviation industry consistently ignored persistent security threats against American civilian aircraft.

Terrorist hijackings of airliners are not a new problem. During the first fifty years of commercial aviation, there were 1,098 attacks on civilian airliners and the most common form of attack has been hijackings—constituting 87 percent of all attacks on airliners (959 of 1,098 incidents). Paul Wilkinson and Brian Jenkins, Aviation Terrorism and Security, (1999). While the actual number of attacks and hijackings on commercial airliners has declined since the 1970s, the lethality of attacks has dramatically increased. For instance, from 1967-1976, when there were the greatest number of attacks and hijackings of commercial airliners, there were 679 fatalities that occurred

as a result of these acts. However, from 1987-1996, when the number of attacks against airliners were far fewer, there were 1,051 fatalities. *Id. at 18.*

Important to note, however, is the fact that during the same time period when the lethality of attacks was increasing, 1976-1996, the rate of thwarting hijackings and attacks actually decreased:

In North America the rate of thwarting of hijackings over the most recent two decades has been 43 percent and in Western Europe 24 percent (still a better than two-to-one chance of success for the average hijacker, respectively). Yet, in the most recent decade the thwarting rate in North America has dropped to 23 percent and in Western Europe to merely 8 percent.

Id.

When evaluating whether the September 11th attacks could have been foreseen, it is easy to confuse the result of the hijacking with the cause of the hijacking. The reality is that once an aircraft has been hijacked, there is little, if anything, that can be done. Therefore, the question of what is preventable must stem from the cause and not the result. The hijacking of a commercial airliner will always remain a favorite terrorist target because such events are extraordinarily dangerous, always widely televised and invoke tremendous public fear. Following is a chronological time line of events from the onset of airline terrorism through the September 11th, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States. The information highlights the growing threat of increasingly lethal attacks on civilian aircraft. Significantly, the compiled data illustrates the foreseeability and advance knowledge and understanding that financiers of terrorist organizations, government officials and industry experts had regarding the possibility of suicide hijackers commandeering a plane and flying the aircraft into high profile economic and political landmarks as occurred on September 11, 2001.

A Time Line of Terrorism

May 1, 1961

The first hijacking of an American carrier occurred in the United States. A National Airlines Flight from Marathon, Florida to Key West was hijacked. The lone hijacker demanded to be flown to Cuba.

(SOURCE: <http://aviation-safety.net/database/1961/610501-1.htm>; *White House Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism, 1996*)

May 7, 1964

A former member of Philippine Olympic Yachting team boarded a Pacific Airlines plane shot the pilot and co-pilot and crashed the plane.

(SOURCE: <http://aviation-safety.net/database/1964/1964-loss.html>)

July 1968

An El Al Boeing 707 flying from Rome to Tel Aviv was hijacked by three members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine and flown to Algeria. Male Israeli crew and passengers were held hostage until September 1, when Israel and the Algerian government strike a deal to release 16 Arab prisoners in exchange for the freeing of the 12 remaining hostages. The hijackings established an historical precedent: the first terrorist hijacking in which political demands were met. The incident led to a dramatic rise in politically motivated airline hijackings over the ensuing years.

(SOURCE: *The Terrorist Threat to Commercial Aviation, 1989*)

March 31, 1970

The Japanese Red Army carried out a dramatic hijacking of a Japanese Airlines B727. The plot was the first skyjacking to be televised to millions of homes in East Asia. Lasting eighty-five hours, the hijacking transpired at airports in Fukuoka, Japan and Seoul, South Korea. After the Japanese Deputy Minister of Trade successfully offered himself up as hostage in place of the 80 remaining hostages, the plane flew into North Korea, where the attackers were granted political asylum. The plane safely returned to Japan with the crew and government minister on board. Airliner hijackings had entered the television age.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

September 6, 1970

The largest and “most remarkable event in the history of aerial piracy” involving five airliners, five governments (U.S, Germany, Switzerland, Israel, and Britain), and 769 hostages was carried out by the Palestinian Liberation Front. First, a TWA B707 flying from Frankfurt to New York was diverted to Dawson’s Field. Simultaneously, a Swissair DC8 flying from Zurich to New York was hijacked. The third plane commandeered was an El Al B707 flying from New York to Tel Aviv with a stop in Amsterdam. The fourth airliner hijacked that afternoon was a Pan American jumbo jet, which was taken by two men who had failed to get on the El Al New York to Tel Aviv flight. The men directed the jet to Cairo where the passengers were given eight minutes to vacate the plane before the \$20 million aircraft was blown up. Finally, on Wednesday, September 8, the PFLP hijacked a British BOAC VC10 flying from London to Bahrain and Bombay in order to free one of the hijackers who had been captured. Four of the five planes were ultimately destroyed, at a cost of \$52 million.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

September 6, 1970

Members of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) hijacked Pan Am Flight 93, TWA Flight 741 and a Swissair flight, all bound for New York. The same day, members of the PFLP attempted to hijack El Al Flight 219 but were thwarted by air marshals during the flight. On September 9, 1970, a BOAC VC-10 from Bombay to Beirut was hijacked by the PFLP to urge the realization of their demands. The hijackers demanded the release of Palestinian extremists imprisoned in Germany, Switzerland and Israel.

On the Pan Am Flight, two passengers with handguns and grenades ordered the plane to Lebanon and then Egypt. At a stop in Beirut, the plane was loaded with explosives which detonated shortly after landing, leaving little time for passengers and crew to escape. All of the passengers were held hostage until September 12, 1970, when 255 hostages from the four flights were released; however, the terrorists continued to hold 56 passengers. The terrorists also destroyed the three remaining planes. The prisoners were released as a result of negotiations with Britain and several other governments. This series of events has come to be known as “Black September.”

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press)

February 2, 1972

The FAA issues rules requiring air carriers to implement a screening system “acceptable” to the FAA. Aircraft Security; Screening System, 37 Fed. Reg. 2500, 2501 (Feb. 2, 1972)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 121)

March 6, 1972

The FAA required airlines to develop a comprehensive anti-hijacking security program. The very next day, March 6, 1972, TWA was warned that four of its planes would be blown up at six-hour intervals unless \$2 million in ransom was paid. One bomb exploded in a plane—on the ground—in Las Vegas and another was sniffed out by a dog in John F. Kennedy airport.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

March 16, 1972

The FAA issues rules requiring airport operators to implement procedures to control access to air operation areas and to provide law enforcement support. Airport Security, 37 Fed. Reg. 5689, 5690 (March 16, 1972)(to be codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 107).

May 31, 1972

In one of the most violent airline attacks to date, three Japanese Red Army terrorists flew to Tel Aviv's Lod Airport on a flight from Rome. Once in the arrival hall, the terrorists snatched assault rifles and grenades out of their bags, and killed 26 people and wounded 76 others. The sophisticated multi-national coordination of the attack was unprecedented and put western Governments on notice regarding the capability of terrorists to build transnational training and logistical networks in preparing attacks on civil aviation. As General Clutterbuck stated: "Japanese terrorists, trained in Japan, North Korea and Lebanon, had been provided false papers in Germany, Czech weapons in Rome, to board a French aircraft in order to attack international air travelers in Israel."

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

June 1972

Three Japanese Red Army terrorists at Ben Gurion airport in Tel Aviv, Israel used automatic weapons and grenades retrieved from their checked baggage to kill 27 people in the arrival hall.

(SOURCE: Yonah Alexander and Eugue Sochor, Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990)

November 10, 1972

Three escaped convicts hijacked a Southern Airways DC 9 flying out of Birmingham, Alabama. The hijacking lasted 29 hours, and included nine forced stops. After a refueling stop in Detroit, the hijackers circled the city, and the hijackers demanded \$10 million in ransom, or they would crash the plane into the atomic plant at Oak Ridge, Tennessee. The hijackers were eventually apprehended in Havana, Cuba without any deaths.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

September 10, 1974

TWA Flight 355 from Chicago to New York was hijacked by five Croatian terrorists. The 30 hour ordeal included landings in Montreal, Reykjavik, Iceland; and London before terminating in Paris. The entire plot cost \$400, with the purchase of five one-way fares to New York, cooking pots, and plastic putty. The whole affair was watched on TV by millions. No bombs were found.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

October 8, 1974

A TWA airliner en route to Greece from Israel was blown up in flight over the Aegean Sea, killing all 88 aboard. The NAYLP was responsible.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, *Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers*, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

June 27, 1976

Members of the Baader-Meinhof Group and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) seized an Air France airliner and its 258 passengers. They forced the plane to land in Uganda, where on July 3 Israeli commandos successfully rescued the passengers.

(SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, *Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology"*)

January 28, 1978

A single hijacker takes over a flight from Kinston to Wilmington, North Carolina and demands to be flown to Cuba. He is arrested in New Bern, NC.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

March 13, 1978

One hijacker on a United Airlines flight from San Francisco to Seattle demands to be flown to Cuba. He is arrested on the ground in Denver.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

April 1, 1978

A single hijacker on a Piedmont Airlines flight from Richmond to Norfolk, VA demands to be flown to New York. He surrenders on the ground in New York.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 27, 1978

A single hijacker takes over a United Airlines flight from Denver to Seattle and demands to be flown to Canada. The assailant surrenders on the ground in Vancouver, British Columbia.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

December 14, 1978

One hijacker takes over a National Airlines flight from New York to Miami and demands to be flown to Cuba. He is arrested on the ground in Charleston.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

December 21, 1978

A single hijacker on a TWA airplane from St. Louis to Kansas City demands the release of prisoners held by the US Government. He is apprehended on the ground in Marion, Missouri.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

January 27, 1979

A United Airlines flight from Los Angeles to New York is hijacked. The hijacker requested that certain celebrities read a message on live television. He is arrested in New York.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

March 16, 1979

A Continental Airlines flight from Phoenix to Tucson is hijacked. The assailant is arrested in Tucson after demanding to be flown to Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

June 11, 1979

A hijacker on a Delta Air Lines flight from New York to Fort Lauderdale demands to be flown to Cuba. He is arrested in Havana, Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

June 30, 1979

An Eastern Airlines flight from San Juan to Miami is hijacked. The hijacker demands to be flown to Cuba. He is arrested in Miami.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

July 20, 1979

A United Airlines flight from Denver to Omaha is hijacked in mid-air. The assailant demands to be taken to Cuba. He is arrested in Omaha.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 16, 1979

An Eastern Airlines flight from Guatemala City to Miami is hijacked. The assailant demands to be flown to Cuba. He is arrested in Miami.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 22, 1979

A United Airlines flight from Portland to Los Angeles is hijacked. The assailant is arrested in San Francisco.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 30, 1979

A hijacker on a Pacific Southwest Airlines flight from Los Angeles to San Diego demands to be flown to Mexico. He is arrested in Tijuana, Mexico.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

November 24, 1979

A hijacker overtakes an American Airlines flight from San Antonio to El Paso International Airport and demands to be flown to Iran. He is arrested on the ground in El Paso.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

January 15, 1980

A Delta Airlines flight from Atlanta to New York is hijacked and flown to Havana where the hijacker is arrested.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

April 9, 1980

An American Airlines flight from Ontario to Chicago is hijacked and flown to Cuba. The hijacker is arrested in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

April 14, 1980

A Continental Airlines flight from Denver to Ontario is hijacked by a single assailant. He is arrested in Denver.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

May 1, 1980

A Pacific Southwest Airlines flight from Stockton, CA to Los Angeles, CA is hijacked. The single hijacker is arrested in Stockton after demanding to be taken to Iran.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

July 11, 1980

A single hijacker on a Northwest Airlines flight from Seattle to Portland demands money for the release of passengers. He is arrested in Seattle.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

July 22, 1980

A Delta Airlines flight from Miami to San Juan is hijacked. The assailant is arrested in Camaguey, Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 10, 1980

One hijacker takes over an Air Florida flight from Miami to Key West and demands to be flown to Havana. He is arrested in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 13, 1980

Seven hijackers overtake an Air Florida flight from Key West to Miami and demand to be flown to Cuba. They are arrested in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 14, 1980

Two attackers hijack a National Airlines flight from Miami to San Juan and demand to be taken to Cuba. They are arrested in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 16, 1980

Three hijackers take over an Eastern Airlines flight from New York to Miami and demand to be flown to Cuba. They are arrested in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 16, 1980

Six hijackers overtake an Eastern Airlines flight from Miami to Orlando and demand to be flown to Cuba. They are arrested in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 16, 1980

Four hijackers overtake a Republic Airlines flight from Miami to Orlando and demand to be flown to Cuba. They surrender in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 16, 1980

A Delta Airlines flight from San Juan to Miami is hijacked by one assailant who demands to be flown to Cuba. He is arrested in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 18, 1980

A single hijacker on a flight from Melbourne, Australia to Atlanta demands to be taken to Cuba. He is arrested in Atlanta.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 29, 1980

One hundred sixty-eight Cuban refugees storm a Braniff Airways plane in Lima, Peru and demand to be flown to the United States. The hijackers surrender in Lima.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

September 8, 1980

An Eastern Airlines flight from New York to Tampa is hijacked and flown to Cuba. The hijacker surrenders in Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

September 12, 1980

A single hijacker is arrested after overtaking a flight from Newark to Miami. The assailant is arrested in Miami.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

September 14, 1980

An Eastern Airlines flight from Tampa to Miami is hijacked. The hijacker is arrested in Miami after demanding to be flown to Havana.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

September 17, 1980

A Delta Airlines flight from Atlanta to Columbia is hijacked. The hijacker is flown to Havana where he is arrested.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 25, 1980

A Continental Airlines flight from Miami to Houston is hijacked. The hijacker is arrested in Miami after demanding to be flown to Miami.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

1981

In 1981, Egyptian jihadist Ayman Zawahiri said he was discussing with his colleague, Abu Dazuma, a plan to use an airplane and crash it in to the reviewing stand of President Anwar Sadat. "Thus, using planes to target high level targets was not conceived in Kandahar, but rather on the Nile shores in Cairo."

(SOURCE: Mamoun Fandy, *Expert testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, July 9, 2003)

April 10, 1981

An Eastern Airlines flight from New York to Miami is hijacked. The assailant is arrested in Miami.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 5, 1981

A USAir flight from Albany to Buffalo is hijacked and the assailant is arrested in Buffalo after demanding to be taken to the Soviet Union.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 23, 1981

An American Airlines flight from San Juan to New York is hijacked. The hijacker is arrested in New York after demanding to be flown to Canada.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

March 1, 1982

A United Airlines flight from Chicago to Miami is hijacked. The assailant is apprehended in Miami after demanding to be flown to Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

April 5, 1982

A Delta Airlines flight from Chicago to Miami is hijacked and flown to Havana where the hijacker surrenders.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

December 30, 1982

A United Airlines flight from Chicago to Pittsburgh is hijacked. The assailant is apprehended in Pittsburgh after demanding to be flown to Washington.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

January 7, 1983

A Delta Airlines flight from Portland to Boston is hijacked by a man demanding to be flown to Las Vegas. The plane is stormed and the hijacker arrested in Boston.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

January 20, 1983

A Northwest Airlines flight from Seattle to Portland, Oregon is hijacked by a man demanding to be flown to Afghanistan. The plane is stormed in Portland, Oregon and the man arrested. One person is killed.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

April 18, 1983

Syria and Iran sponsored a bombing attack on the U.S. Embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, killing seventeen Americans and forty-six others. The American Ambassador narrowly escaped injury. Iran had ordered five terrorist operatives to carry out the attack, including a Palestinian employee of the embassy. It paid for the bombing with twenty-five thousand dollars especially authorized for the mission. A Syrian intelligence officer wired the two thousand pounds of explosives to make sure it would go off with maximum effect.

(SOURCE: Robert Kupperman and Jeff Kamen, *Final Warning: Averting Disaster in the New Age of Terrorism*, New York: Doubleday)

July 17, 1983

Three hijackers overtake a Delta Airlines flight from Miami to Tampa and are flown to Havana where they are arrested.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 1983

An Air France Boeing 737 was commandeered as it left Vienna and forced to go to Tehran. Its cockpit was blown up on the tarmac of Mehrabad Airport by the hijackers.

(SOURCE: Mohammad Mohaddessin, "Islamic Fundamentalism: The New Global Threat")

August 18, 1983

A Delta Airlines flight from Miami to Tampa is hijacked and flown to Havana where the hijacker is arrested.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

September 22, 1983

An American Airlines flight from New York to St. Thomas is hijacked and flown to Cuba where the hijacker is arrested.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 23, 1983

A Shi'ite Hizballah suicide bomber drove an explosives-laden Mercedes truck into a U.S. Marine barracks housing the Marine Battalion Landing Team. The attack took the lives of 241 American soldiers.

(SOURCE: Yonah Alexander and Eugue Sochor, *Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security*, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990)

December 12, 1983

For the third time in eight months, Hizballah sponsored attacks on American interests in the Middle East when the group carried out six simultaneous bombings of targets in Kuwait, including the U.S. Embassy. The attacks killed five people and injured eighty-six.

(SOURCE: Yonah Alexander and Eugue Sochor, *Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security*, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990)

February 11, 1984

An American Airlines flight from Port-au-Prince, Haiti to New York is hijacked. The assailant surrenders in New York.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

March 28, 1984

A Delta Air Lines flight from New Orleans to Dallas is hijacked and flown to Havana, Cuba. The attacker surrenders after his demands are accepted.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

April 5, 1984

A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Damascus, Syria is hijacked. The attacker demands to be taken to Sweden. The plane diverts to Istanbul, Turkey where the hijacker surrenders.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

Summer 1984

During the Summer Olympic Games in Los Angeles, the FBI uncovered a plot to fly a crop-dusting plane into a filled Olympic stadium.

(SOURCE: Lt. General Mike Canavan, Retired, Testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 23, 2003)

November 5, 1984

A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Jeddah to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is hijacked and flown to Tehran, Iran. The two hijackers are apprehended in Tehran.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

December 31, 1984

An American Airlines flight from St. Croix, Virgin Islands to New York is hijacked by a prisoner under escort. The assailant demands to be taken to Cuba where he surrenders after his demands are accepted.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

1985

A Boeing 727 belonging to the Jordanian airline Alia, is blown up at Beirut airport after being seized by Shi'ite Moslems. Simultaneous attacks using grenades and guns is made on the Rome and Vienna airports, causing the loss of 20 lives and many injuries.

(SOURCE: Yonah Alexander and Eugue Sochor, Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990)

March 17, 1985

A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Jeddah to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is hijacked by one attacker. He is arrested in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. One person is killed.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

June 23, 1985

An Air India Boeing 747 flying out of Toronto and bound for London and New Delhi disintegrates in mid-flight over the Irish Coast with a loss of 329 lives. The evidence gathered by Canadian and Indian authorities points almost conclusively to a Sikh terrorist bomb that had actually been detected in the luggage scan in Toronto but was wrongly identified as a machine malfunction. Two cargo handlers were killed at Tokyo Airport, Japan, when another Sikh bomb exploded in an Air Canada aircraft en-route to India.

(SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology; Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

June 1985

TWA Flight 847. The flight from Athens to Rome was hijacked one half hour into the flight by two men with guns and hand grenades. The terrorists claimed to be members of an Islamic jihad and commandeered the Boeing 727 to Beirut. When Beirut refused them permission to land, the terrorists threatened to crash the plane into the control tower or the presidential palace. The plane landed, refueled and released half a dozen women and children and departed for Algiers. More passengers were released over the course of several trips between Beirut and Algiers. Thirty-nine Americans were held hostage on the plane for seventeen days. All were eventually released except Robert Stephen, a US Navy Diver, who was murdered and hurled from the plane to the tarmac. The plane was eventually blown up.

July 19, 1985

National Security Decision Directive 180 signed by President Ronald Reagan:

International civil aviation is becoming a high visibility target for terrorist activities. Numerous terrorist acts directed against U.S. and other air carriers in recent weeks pose a significant threat to international commerce and our national interests. Recent violent terrorist acts have resulted in the murder, torture and kidnapping of U.S. citizens and the death of hundreds of others. It is imperative to prevent and/or respond to subsequent terrorist acts.

The Department of Transportation, in coordination with the Interagency Working Group on Combating Terrorism and the Technical Support Working Group, will carry out an expanded research and development program covering detection of explosive and incendiary devices, hijack prevention, and other security system enhancements. Projects presently planned will be accelerated and necessary additional projects will be initiated this fiscal year and thereafter.

Enhanced Airline Security Training. The Department of Transportation shall ensure that appropriately enhanced security training and threat awareness briefings are provided for all crewmembers of U.S. air carriers who serve on high-risk flights. The FAA shall further require that for such flights a designated security coordinator is responsible for monitoring security systems and advising the pilot in command that all necessary security requirements have been met prior to departure.

October 7, 1985

Four heavily armed Palestinian Liberation Front terrorists hijack the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro, with some 100 mostly elderly passengers on board in Egyptian waters. The hijackers demand that Israel free 50 Palestinian prisoners. The hijackers kill a disabled American tourist, 69-year old Leon Klinghoffer, and throw his body overboard with his wheelchair. After a two day drama, the Egyptian government provided the hijackers safe passage in exchange for freeing the ship and its passengers. US Navy F-14 fighters later intercept an Egypt Air 737 flying the hijackers to freedom in Tunisia and forced it to land in Sicily where the terrorists were taken into custody by Italian authorities.

November 23, 1985

An Egypt Air airplane bound for Athens to Malta and carrying several U.S. citizens is hijacked by the Abu Nidal Group.

(SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology)

December 27, 1985

A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Karachi, Pakistan to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is hijacked. The attacker is taken down in Riyadh.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database>)

1986

Two years prior to the Pam Am 103 Lockerbie bombing, Libyan President Colonel Muammar Gaddafi attempts to blow up an American airliner over Tel Aviv, Israel. Gaddafi hires a group of Palestinian terrorists to carry out the plot. The target selected is a Pan Am jumbo jet carrying 379 passengers and crew, including 89 Americans. The plot is foiled when Pakistani troops storm the

plane while it is on the ground in Karachi, Pakistan. Twenty-two people, including two American are killed and 100 wounded. All of the terrorists are captured.

(SOURCE: Jon Swain, "Revealed: Gadaffi's Air Massacre Plot," *Sunday Times*, March 28, 2004)

1986

E. Lee Bryan, a White House appointee to the Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA), Scientific Advisory Committee, wrote a paper on the potential dangers of GPS (global positioning systems). He predicted that the accuracy of GPS could be coupled with flight management systems to allow airplanes to fly into buildings.

(SOURCE: Neil Livingstone e-mail to Don Migliori, March 29, 2006).

February 5, 1986

A Delta Airlines flight is hijacked on the ground at Dallas-Forth-Worth Airport and stormed by authorities. The hijacker surrenders without incident.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

February 27, 1986

A Trans World Airlines flight from Miami to New York is hijacked. The hijacker is apprehended in New York.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, *Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

March 30, 1986

A Palestinian splinter group detonates a bomb as TWA Flight 840 approaches Athens airport, killing 4 U.S. citizens.

(SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, *Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology"*)

April 2, 1986

A TWA B727 flying from the United States via Rome to Athens and Cairo suddenly experienced an explosion at 11,000 feet. It was discovered that a six-foot hole had been blown in the side of the jet from a bomb planted under Seat 10F. Four Americans, including a baby, were sucked out of the hole and died. Abu Nidal's terrorist group claimed credit for bombing Flight 840.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, *Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers*, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

September 14, 1986

North Korean agents detonated an explosive device at Seoul's Kimpo Airport, killing five persons and injuring 29 others.

October 5, 1986

Four Abu Nidal terrorists hijacked a Pan Am B747 at Karachi with 390 passengers and 13 crew on board. The pilots of Flight 073 managed to escape, thus immobilizing the plane. But when the generator ran out of fuel at night and the lights went out, the terrorists, thinking they were under attack, began to fire on the passengers, killing 22 of them and injuring 125 before being taken into custody.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, *Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers*, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

December 15, 1986

An Iraqi Airways flight crashes near Arar, Saudi Arabia after being hijacked by 4 assailants who tried to enter the cockpit and threw hand grenades in the passenger cabin and cockpit, causing the pilots to lose control of the airplane. Sixty-three people are killed.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

January 26-29, 1987

The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference of Muslim states and affiliated organizations, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Muslim World League and the World Assembly of Muslim Youth, “categorically condemned all acts of criminal international terrorism and declared the readiness of Islamic states to cooperate among themselves and with the community to eliminate international terrorism.

(SOURCE: *The Fifth Islamic Summit Conference, Kuwait, 26-29 January 1987*)

July 3, 1987

An Alaska Airlines flight from Seattle to Anchorage is hijacked. The assailant demands to be flown to Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 1, 1987

A New York Air flight from Newark to Washington is hijacked. No other information is known.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

November 29, 1987

North Korean agents planted a bomb which detonated aboard Korean Airlines Flight 858, and subsequently crashed in the Indian Ocean.

(SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology”)

December 7, 1987

Forty-four people died when a Pacific Southwest Airlines Flight 1771 crashed after a disgruntled former employee shot the pilots.

1988

At an Islamist conference in Oklahoma, al Qaeda founder Abdullah Azzam announced that the Holy War had only just begun with the fight against the Soviets.

(SOURCE: *Der Spiegel*, “The Prince and the Terror, Inc.,” September 15, 2001)

April 5, 1988

The longest uninterrupted skyjacking, 15 days and 3,200 miles, takes place on Kuwait Airlines Flight 422. The plane was flown from Bangkok, to Mashad, Iran, to Larnaca, Cyprus, and finally, to Algiers. The hijackers, Lebanese Shiites, were intent on freeing 17 terrorists jailed in Kuwait in 1983 for lethal bomb attacks on the U.S. and French embassies. Three of the 17 terrorists were facing death sentences. These same hijackers were involved in at least two other hijacking attempts for the same cause, including TWA 847 in 1985.

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, *Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers*, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

May 1988

The Israeli consulting firm, KPI, Inc., led by Isaac Yeffet, developed an anti-terrorism study for Pan Am Airlines following a series of terrorist attacks on the airline. The FAA Director of Civil Aviation Security was personally advised of the findings shortly after the completion of the review by KPI. The sealed report concluded that:

There is no airline security in the United States. What little is being done to protect passengers is not done well...Guarding American planes in Western Europe against terrorist attack is nothing like the upheaval that will be caused when a concerted attack on the domestic traffic of North America occurs. That attack will surely come, and when it does, the whole security system at America's 531 major airports, will have to undergo radical change.

Regarding Pan Am, KPI noted, "Pan Am is highly vulnerable to most forms of terrorist attack. The fact that no major disaster has occurred is merely providential." In addition, the report concluded that "Local security officers have no sufficient contacts with local security officers or intelligence sources...There is virtually no training program for the security staff, not even at senior office level. The few hours of training which they do get do not afford the elementary expertise required for detecting explosive charges. At some stations there are staff members who have not had any training whatsoever."

(SOURCE: Yonah Alexander and Eugue Sochor, Aerial Piracy and Aviation Security, Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1990)

December 21, 1988

Libyan terrorists blow up Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland, killing 259 people on the plane and 11 people on the ground.

1989

Al Qaeda founder Abdullah Azzam hosts the "First Jihad World Conference" in Brooklyn, New York. During the same period, Islamic radicals met openly at a conference in Kansas City, at which high-ranking leaders of the Palestinian Hamas and the Algerian Islamic Salvation Front also participated.

(SOURCE: Der Spiegel, "The Prince and the Terror, Inc.," September 15, 2001)

March 1989

RAND Corporation terrorism expert Brian Jenkins published his important study 'The Terrorist Threat to Commercial Aviation.' In the study, Jenkins eerily describes the possibility of a suicide hijacking:

The nightmare of governments is that suicidal terrorists will hijack a commercial airliner and, by killing or replacing its crew, crash into a city or some vital facility. It has been threatened in at least one case: In 1977, an airliner believed to have been hijacked, crashed, killing all on board. And in 1987, a homicidal, suicidal ex-employee boarded a commercial airliner where he shot his former boss and brought about the crash of the airliner, killing all 44 on board. Fear of such incidents is offered as a powerful argument for immobilizing hijacked aircraft on the ground at the first opportunity and also, some argue, for armoring the flight deck. What are we likely to see in the future? Perhaps fewer but deadlier and more sophisticated terrorist hijackings.

May 27, 1989

An American Airlines flight from Dallas to Miami is hijacked by a man who demands to be taken to Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

July 1989

In four consecutive weekends, the special operations unit of the New York FBI field office followed four groups of Middle Eastern men from the notorious Alkifah Center to exit 71 off the Long Island Expressway—and they photographed them firing automatic weapons. Of the men photographed on those four weekends, three went on to bomb the World Trade Center, one (Nosair) went on to kill Rabbi Kahane, two went on to plot with the Blind Sheik (the plot to blow up tunnels around Manhattan. The leader of the group, Ali Mohammed, went on to train bin Laden's bodyguards in Khost, Afghanistan and he later did the surveillance for the African Embassy bombings in August 1998. The surveillance of the men was discontinued at the end of summer 1989.

(SOURCE: Claire White, "1000 Years for Revenge: A Conversation with Peter Lance," *Writers Write*, October, 2003.)

August 4, 1989

The President's Commission on Aviation Security and Terrorism report is published. The Commission finds "the Federal Aviation Administration to be a reactive agency—preoccupied with responses to events to the exclusion of adequate contingency planning in anticipation of future threats." In addition, the Commission identified that "most threats to civil aviation have come primarily from Middle-East based terrorist cells and factions."

September 19, 1989

Terrorists bombed French UTA Flight 772, from Brazzaville, Congo to Paris. The plane explodes in mid-air, killing 171.

(SOURCE: <http://aviation-safety.net/database/1989/890919-1.htm>)

November 12, 1989

A Trans World Airlines flight from San Juan to Miami is hijacked. The attacker demands to be taken to Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

November 27, 1989

Latin American drug cartel terrorists bombed Columbia Avianca Flight 203 from Bogota to Cali, Columbia, claiming 107 lives

(SOURCE: <http://aviation-safety.net/database/1989/891127-0.htm>)

December 11, 1989

A Trans World Airlines flight from San Juan to Miami is hijacked. The attacker demands to be taken to Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

December 31, 1989

A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Jeddah to Riyadh, Saudi Arabia is hijacked by a mentally unstable man who demanded to be flown to Cyprus.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

January 16, 1990

An America West Airlines flight from Houston to Las Vegas is hijacked by a man who demands to be taken to Cuba.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

November 5, 1990

Considered the opening round of violence in the rise of global terrorism during the 1990s, Islamic extremist El-Sayid Nosair shoots and kills Rabii Meir Kahane, founder of the conservative Jewish Defense League during a speech in New York City. Upon searching Nosair’s apartment in Cliffside Park, New Jersey, police found 47 boxes of evidence which included: 1400 rounds of ammunition, top secret manuals from the U.S. Special Forces Warfare school in Fort Bragg, NC, maps of the World Trade Center, pictures of the World Trade Center, bomb recipes, and the untranslated sermons and writings describing the Blind Sheikh’s sermons which said that they wanted to hit the edifices of capitalism—“the high world buildings.” Many of the materials were later tied to Ali Mohammed, an FBI double agent with direct ties to al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden and coordinator of the 1998 Africa embassy bombings.

(SOURCE: Claire White, “1000 Years for Revenge: A Conversation with Peter Lance,” *Writers Write*, October, 2003.)

1991

In a critique of the Western civil aviation systems, aviation security expert, Peter St. John, wrote in his book, *Airport Security, and International Terrorism*:

The adage where there is a will, there is a way, can be applied to their [western governments] efforts but in reverse. The Western governments and their aviation industries have had the knowledge and the technology but not the will to enforce El Al-like security procedures. The question is whether a really effective system can be developed that does not jeopardize the efficient running and all-important profit margins of the large airlines. The answer to this question was still not apparent in the late 1980s as terrorists sharply escalated the nature and destructiveness of their attacks on Western civil aviation targets. In the meantime, each airport manager must assess the security threat to his own airport and make sure an adequate level of security is maintained within his own jurisdiction.

In another section of St. John’s book, the author provides a list of ‘Emanating Airports of FAA List of Hijacks,’ 1931-1988. Several American cities were at the top of the list of hijacking targets.

Miami	29
New York	26
Beirut	22
Los Angeles	15
Chicago	13
San Juan	10
Prague	10
Frankfurt	10
Barranquilla	9
Newark	8

(SOURCE: Peter St. John, *Air Piracy, Airport Security, and International Terrorism: winning the war against hijackers*, Westport, CT: Quorum Books, 1991)

1991

By the time bin Laden moves to Sudan in 1991, the CIA had learned that he had used his fortune to train hundreds of Arab veterans of the war in Afghanistan for a worldwide jihad.

(SOURCE: Cofer Black, Former Director of the Counter Terrorism Center, CIA, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

February 10, 1991

A Southwest Airlines flight from Oakland to San Diego is hijacked. The hijacker demanded to be taken to Cuba. The hijacker is overtaken in San Diego.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

November 1991

An unnamed Islamic fundamentalist group plotted to hijack two airplanes outside Spain and fly them into Madrid, where Middle East peace talks were being held. One aircraft was to crash into the Spanish Royal Palace, killing President Bush, Mikhail Gorbachev, and other world leaders. The second plain was intended to crash into a hotel where the Soviet delegation to the conference was staying. Arab intelligence foiled the plot.

(SOURCE: The Times Online, 9/14/01)

1992

The U.S. Government ceases publication of the Red Book manual used to guide and train consular, immigration and customs officers throughout the world in spotting terrorists. The Red Book was complemented by a training film entitled “The Threat is Real.” The Government began publication of the series in the early 1980s.

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 1, January 26, 2004)

1992

Osama bin Laden financed and helped set up at least three terrorist training camps in cooperation with the Sudanese regime. His construction company worked directly with Sudanese military officials to transport and supply terrorists training in such camps. “During the 1992-96 period, he built and equipped 23 training camps for mujahideen. While in Sudan, he also established a supposedly detection proof financial system to support Islamic terrorist activities worldwide.”

(SOURCE: “Who Becomes A Terrorist and Why,” Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.)

1992

Clement Rodney Hampton-El, an American-born Muslim convert later convicted of plotting to destroy New York City landmarks, testified in 1995 that he received the names of U.S. servicemen who were about to complete their tours of duty. He then tried to recruit the veterans as fighters in Osama bin-Laden-sponsored insurgency in Bosnia. Hampton-El’s contact was an employee of the Saudi government, who secretly worked to convert U.S. soldiers to Islam immediately after the Gulf War. Imam Bilal Phillips worked as a proselytization officer for the Saudi air force in a program that converted thousands of active duty U.S. soldiers to Islam and collected the names of thousands more. Hampton-El was called to the Saudi Embassy in December 1992, where he met with Phillips and a member of the Saudi royal family, before being given the list of names at a U.S. military installation the following day. He was told at the meeting that he would be given a \$150,000 budget for training and support in the effort to recruit fighters for Bosnia.

(SOURCE: J.M. Berger, “Al Qaeda tried to recruit Gulf War vets in 1992,” Intelwire.com, January 7, 2004)

September 1992 – March 1993

The Egyptian terrorist organization Vanguard of the Islamic Conquest (Tala'i al-Fath al-Islami) received financial and military aid through members of Saudi intelligence. Leaders of the Vanguard visited Saudi Arabia by invitation, and met with the top aides of Prince Turki bin Faysal, director of the Saudi Intelligence Department. Saudi intelligence furnished members of the Vanguard with detailed maps of certain areas throughout Egypt, particularly instructions for moving their operations to areas of Egypt less frequently targeted by terrorist groups.

(SOURCE: Al-Safir Beirut, 6-2-93)

December 2, 1992

Bin Laden finances Islamic extremists who attacked the Gold Mohur Hotel in Aden, Yemen housing U.S. military personnel.

(SOURCE: Cofer Black, Former Director of the Counter Terrorism Center, CIA, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

December 29, 1992

An Aerocaribbean flight from Havana to Varadero Airport is hijacked and deliberately diverted to Miami by the pilots. The hijacker is apprehended at Miami International Airport.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

Early 1993

Saudi Arabia takes direct control of funding to Abdullah Nuri, a Tajik Sunni leader of the Islamic fundamentalist movement in Tajikistan and across Central Asia. The money and equipment was directed through the Muslim World League which shipped missiles, rifles, ammunition, and large amounts of money into Tajikistan.

(SOURCE: Robert Baer, Statement before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom hearing, "Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat: The Global Propagation of Intolerance," November 18, 2003)

1993

Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, an al Qaeda operative, and later, a CIA source, purchased a cylinder of weapons grade uranium from a former Sudanese government minister who represented "businessmen" from South Africa. Mogadem Salah Abd Al-Mobruk, a lieutenant colonel in the Sudanese Army, had served as Sudan's Minister of Justice during the Numeiri presidency (1969-1983). The sale, al-Fadl said, was made in the office of the Ikhlik Company in the Barake Building in Khartoum. The purchase price was \$1.5 million, and the uranium was tested in a facility in Hilat Koko in Cyprus and later transported to Afghanistan. Al Fadl received \$10,000 in cash for brokering the deal

(SOURCE: Paul L. Williams, 'Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,' 2002)

1993

The CIA learns that Osama bin Laden is channeling funds to Egyptian extremists.

(SOURCE: Cofer Black, Former Director of the Counter Terrorism Center, CIA, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

1993

Bin Laden sent al Qaeda members to Somalia to work as advisors with Somali warlord Aideed in opposing U.S. forces there in support of Operation Restore Hope. Bin Laden publicly claimed responsibility for this activity, and the CIA has confirmed his involvement in Somalia.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

1993

CIA units observing Osama bin Laden began to propose action to reduce his organization's capabilities.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

1993-1995

The former Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security in the Federal Aviation Administration, Cathal Flynn, tells the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States in January 2004:

The investigations stemming from the [1993] World Trade Center attack revealed terrorist interest in civil aviation within the United States. Because of that, and because Middle-East-connected terrorists had a propensity to attack aviation, additional security measures were imposed by security directives and program amendments, at first only for a time around salient events such as the sentencing of World Trade Center terrorists. Later in 1995, the measures were re-implemented with some changes, and kept in effect. The Manila Conspiracy dramatically demonstrated that the terrorist organization that later came to be known as al Qaeda had global reach, determination to commit mass murder and inflict enormous economic damage, willingness to plan and rehearse attacks patiently over a period of months, technical ingenuity in bomb making, and adequate financial backing.

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement of Former Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security in the Federal Aviation Administration Cathal Flynn, January 26, 2004)

February 1993

A bomb is detonated in the parking garage of the World Trade Center in New York City. The central figures in the successful plot were Khalid Sheik Mohammed, Ramzi Yousef and Sheikh Omar Abd al-Rahman, all of whom have been linked to Osama bin Laden.

In June 2002, Khalid Sheik Mohammed confessed to Yosri Fouda, a reporter for the Al-Jazeera network, that he was the "mastermind of the 9-11-01 terrorist attacks." This confession was repeated to U.S. authorities following Khalid Sheik Mohammed's recent arrest in Pakistan.

(SOURCE: Yosri Fouda, Masterminds of Terror)

February 11, 1993

A Lufthansa flight from Frankfurt, Germany to Cairo, Egypt is hijacked. The hijacker demands to be taken to the United States. He is apprehended at New York JFK International Airport.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

May 1993

Al Qaeda financed the travel of more than 300 Afghan war veterans to Sudan after the Pakistani government launched a crackdown against foreign Islamic extremists based in Pakistan.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

May 26, 1993

Cairo's *Al-Ahali* reported that "investigations reveal that over 15 Egyptian and other Arab businessmen helped Saudi millionaire Osama bin Laden to finance Egyptian, Algerian, and Tunisian terrorists. This came to light after the Saudi Government acceded to the Egyptian

government's request to cooperate in confronting terrorist activity and its financiers. Investigations conducted by a joint Egyptian-Saudi Committee have revealed that the financing operations began 10 years ago under the guise of funding the Afghan mujahidin. Egyptian terrorists obtained \$20-30 million to buy equipment, printing presses, and weapons. The money passed through foreign banks in Cairo. It transpired that bin Laden played the role of intermediary in collecting donations for the extremists from Arab and Egyptian businessmen living abroad. The Egyptian security services have received a dossier about bin Laden's contacts with terrorist leaders abroad. The Public Prosecutor's Office and the Military Prosecutor have drawn up a list of 185 people who opened bank accounts in their own names to be used by extremists as a conduit for the funds they receive from abroad.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

June 1993

Osama bin Laden-supported operatives attempt to assassinate Jordan's Crown Prince Abdullah. *(SOURCE: MSNBC.com)*

June 1993

The FBI arrested eight individuals for plotting to bomb a number of New York City landmarks, including the United Nations building and the Lincoln and Holland tunnels.

August 3, 1993

The *Washington Post* reports on the financing activities of a new generation of Islamic militant groups springing up around the world:

After the World Trade Center bombing in February, several regional governments attempted to clamp down in a coordinated fashion on centers of support for these radical war veterans, according to officials. The moves followed pleas from Egypt, Tunisia, Algeria and, indirectly, Israel, they said. These governments believe that support provided to Arab fighters abroad, and related private charity funds, are leaking to the Islamic insurgencies they face at home. The main centers of attention in this clampdown have been Pakistan, Sudan, Croatia and Saudi Arabia. In April, Saudi Arabia announced a ban on private charitable contributions sent overseas without approval from Riyadh's generally pro-Western government. The announcement marked a public reversal of Saudi policy during the 1980s. In those years the Saudi treasury poured at least \$2 billion into the Afghan resistance against communism. Along with other gulf states, Riyadh sent what Western analysts estimate to have been several hundred million dollars annually to the secular Palestine Liberation Organization.

The kingdom also bankrolled Arab volunteer fighters in Afghanistan through its official evangelical charity, the Muslim World League, according to a charity official and others. In addition, the league, which has a reported government budget of about \$30 million annually but also relies on private contributions, funded peaceful institutions associated with Algeria's Islamic movement and Islamic institutions in the Israeli-occupied West Bank.

Now such official funding has been stopped or drastically reduced in some cases, according to many Western and Middle East officials and Islamic activists interviewed, as well as published statements by members of the Saudi royal family. Those interviewed cited several reasons: Riyadh is troubled by vocal

Islamic radicals at home; the Saudi royal family is unnerved by the recent wave of violent Islamic insurgency in Egypt and elsewhere, and Saudi Arabia is furious at Palestinians and Islamic radicals, past recipients of Saudi largess, who criticized Riyadh's handling of the Persian Gulf War.

"They realize they are contributing to the creation of a Muslim movement - training people," said one radical Islamic activist. Added a Muslim World League official, "The government cannot have the same policy all the time for all places. Now it's a different time everywhere."

The April announcement marked an apparent attempt by Riyadh to extend this new outlook to private funding by wealthy Saudis whose activities were earlier encouraged or tolerated.

Some of these private Saudis have themselves become radicalized and support radical movements outside the kingdom, for a variety of reasons. Some oppose their government's undemocratic royal autocracy and see themselves as part of an international Islamic movement battling dictatorships. Others are motivated less by politics than by religious faith, responding in part to the Saudi government's longtime preaching about the righteous imperatives of pure Islamic law, which some Saudi theologians interpret to mean that injustice and secularism should be opposed by force, if necessary. One wealthy Saudi businessman who evidently has adopted this outlook is Osama Binladen, offspring of one of the kingdom's best-known and most prosperous business families. Binladen is a rich radical with a following. "They don't believe in organizations," said Hamza Hasan, an exiled Saudi who edits an anti-government magazine in London. "They think they are a jamaa (an Arabic word that means "group" or "society" and often connotes loose organization but firm commitment to religion)."

The vast majority of the 22 Islamic charities registered in Zagreb, Croatia's capital and a base of support for Bosnia's besieged Muslims, are apolitical humanitarian groups or evangelical societies based in Persian Gulf countries. There is no evidence that these groups support violence. Rather, many provide needed relief to Bosnian Muslims and other civilians amid dangerous conditions. However, among the Islamic charities active in Zagreb are the state-run Iranian Red Crescent, which has been caught sending arms to Bosnian Muslims, as well as the Alkifah Refugee Center of Brooklyn and its sister group, the Services Office, based in Peshawar, Pakistan. These last two have in the recent past sponsored Islamic volunteer fighters, according to Pakistani and Arab activists.

The Peshawar-based Services Office has been for a decade a principal gateway for Arab volunteers seeking to join the Afghan war, according to activists in Peshawar. Abdel Rahman, the radical Egyptian cleric, has met with officials at both the Services Office and the Alkifah Center and has been described as close to them.

Indeed, there is evidence that some of Abdel Rahman's followers accused in the New York cases moved between these centers of support in the United States, Peshawar and Zagreb. One of the main accused in the alleged plot to bomb the U.N. headquarters and other targets, Sudanese-born Siddig Mohammed Siddig Ali, telephoned his sister from New York in May and told her that he was headed

for the Bosnian conflict, according to the sister, Nur Ali, interviewed in Khartoum.

(SOURCE: Steve Coll and Steve LeVine, "Global Network Provides Money," *Washington Post*, August 3, 1993)

1994

The Phoenix FBI field office videotapes two men trying to recruit a Phoenix FBI informant to be a suicide bomber. One of the men is linked to terrorist leader Sheikh Omar Abdul-Rahman.

(SOURCE: *Los Angeles Times*, May 26, 2002; *New York Times*, June 19, 2002.)

1994

Clinton Administration National Security Adviser Anthony Lake says he was first briefed specifically about bin Laden "sometime in 1994." The briefings precede all known references to bin Laden in publicly available U.S. government documents, which first mention the Saudi terrorist in 1995.

(SOURCE: *Sunday Times of London* interview with Anthony Lake, December 2001)

1994

The National Intelligence Council compiles a comprehensive inter-agency intelligence report entitled 'Terror 2000: The Future Face of Terrorism.' Authored by senior U.S. government, private-sector, and international experts on counterterrorism and security, the report describes various terrorist plots, including how hijackers could use airliners to hit high profile national landmarks such as the Pentagon or White House. Complete copies of the report have never been released to the public.

Significantly, the report states:

Targets such as the World Trade Center not only provide the requisite casualties but because of their symbolic nature provide more bang for the buck. In order to maximize their odds for success, terrorist groups will likely consider mounting multiple, simultaneous operations with the aim of overtaxing a government's ability to respond, as well as to demonstrate their professionalism and reach.

(SOURCE: UPI, 9/17/01)

March 8, 1994

A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is hijacked. The three hijackers demand to be taken to Kenya. The plane is stormed by law enforcement officials at Nairobi, Kenya airport.

(SOURCE: *Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database*, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

April 7, 1994

A disgruntled Federal Express pilot used his identification badge to smuggle a spear gun, knife and hammer on board another Federal Express flight where he was riding in the jump seat. He charged the cockpit, fractured the skulls of the pilots and planned to crash into the Federal Express hub at the Memphis airport. Some of the crew members were miraculously able to recover control of the plane and safely land the aircraft.

(SOURCE: <http://aviation-safety.net/database/1994/940408-0.htm>)

April 9, 1994

The New York Times reports that Saudi Arabia has revoked Osama bin Laden's citizenship and frozen his domestic assets "because of his irresponsible behavior that contradicts the interests of

Saudi Arabia and harms sisterly countries, and his refusal to obey instructions issued to him.” The newspaper states that “the most common financial backing by these [Islamic] militants by wealthy Saudis and other tycoons in Kuwait, Qatar and the United Arab Emirates is through support of Islamic charities or so-called Islamic businesses, which in turn pump money to the militants.”

(SOURCE: *Youssef Ibrahim, “Saudis Strip Citizenship from Backer of Militants, April 9, 1994)*

Summer 1994

Indonesian al Qaeda cell leader Hambali and Wali Khan, one of the Manila bojinka airline bombing planners, establish a Malaysian company that police believe was created mainly to fund terrorist activities. The company, Konsojaya, was created just as preparations for the airline plot were being put together in Manila. Mohammed Amin, another Konsojaya director, made frequent trips to Manila while planning was under way.

(SOURCE: *Terry McDermott, “Early Scheme to Turn Jets into Weapons,” Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2002)*

July 4, 1994

Newsweek reports that Ramzi Yousef is named “America’s Most Wanted” terrorist. A \$2 million award posted for tips leading to his arrest.

(SOURCE: *Newsweek, July 4, 1994)*

July 11, 1994

With funding from Osama bin Laden, Khaled Al Fauwaz opens the Advice and Reformation Committee in London.

(SOURCE: *Paul L. Williams, ‘Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,’ 2002)*

August 29, 1994

Cairo’s *Al-Arabi* reported that “security sources have uncovered the involvement of three Saudis in financing terrorist groups in Egypt. Several bank transfers to terrorist figures abroad, including Tal’at Fu’ad Qasim and Ayman al-Zawahiri, were detected. A total of \$38,000 was transferred to them through a Swiss bank in early August. Security services began monitoring the activities of the Saudis after an Egyptian citizen complained that one of the Saudis has links with Osama bin Laden.

(SOURCE: *Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)*

September 11, 1994

After spending an evening with his brother drinking alcohol and smoking crack cocaine, Frank Eugene Corder flies a Cessna P150 airplane from the airport at Churchville, Maryland through Washington’s protected no-fly air space P-56 and crashes into the White House lawn just south of the Executive Mansion at approximately 1:48a.m.

(SOURCE: *White House Security Review, May 1995, <http://www.prop1.org/park/pave/rev6.htm>)*

December 1994

The Seventh Islamic Summit Conference of Muslim states and affiliated organizations, including the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Muslim World League, World Assembly of Muslim Youth, and the International Islamic Relief Organization state in a joint communiqué:

We reaffirm our denunciation of all forms of terrorism, including state terrorism as they represent a total disregard for the teachings of the true Islamic religion, and a blatant violation of our values, our traditions, and our heritage. We also

declare our firm determination to join, in a spirit of sincere cooperation, in international efforts, to eliminate all forms and practices of terrorism, with due regard to legality and the principles of international law without prejudice to the legitimate right of national resistance to rise up against occupation and secure national rights.

(SOURCE: The Seventh Islamic Summit Conference, Casablanca, Morocco, December 13-15, 1994)

December 1994

Terry Nichols meets with Ramzi Yousef in Manila. Authorities believe Nichols may have met with Yousef to plot the bombing of the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in Oklahoma City. *(SOURCE: Paul L. Williams, 'Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,' 2002)*

December 11-14, 1994

French Minister of Interior Charles Pasqua visits the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to discuss terrorism financing issues and put Saudi leaders “on notice” regarding these activities. In a 2003 court affidavit, Minister Pasqua states:

I attest that beginning in the year 1993, my departments alerted me to the financial support provided by Saudi non-governmental organizations to certain Islamist groups active on French territory. At the time, I officially protest against this situation to Saudi authorities. I made an official visit to Saudi Arabia from November 11, 1994 to November 14, 1994, accompanied by several directors and high officials of the relevant security services under my authority. On this occasion, I met with several Saudi officials, notably King Fahd bin Abdulaziz al Saud, Prince Abdallah, the Minister of Interior, Prince Naef bin Abdulaziz al Saud, the Minister of Defense, Prince Sultan bin Abdulaziz al Saud, and the Director of Intelligence Services, Prince Turki al Faisal al Saud. In the course of the meetings with my Saudi counterparts, I raised the question of financial aid furnished by Saudi charitable organizations enjoying state support, in particular the World Islamic League, to Islamist movements or terrorist groups. I specifically warned my counterparts about this situation and officially requested that they put an end to it, insofar as the Islamist groups receiving this aid were likely to damage French interests or had already done so in the past.

(SOURCE: Testimony of Monsieur Charles Pasqua, Former Minister of Interior of the Republic of France, December 15, 2003)

December 11, 1994

The Abu Sayyaf group claimed credit for setting off a bomb on Philippine Airlines Flight 434, a B-747-200 carrying 273 passengers and 20 crew to Tokyo's Narita Airport. The bomb killed a Japanese passenger and injured ten others. The bomb went off below a passenger seat. The plot was later identified as a precursor for al Qaeda's Bojinka Plot masterminded by Ramzi Yousef and Khalid Sheikh Mohammed.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

December 24, 1994

The *Philippine Daily Inquirer* ran an expose of the al Qaeda-connected Abu Sayyaf Group. The Abu Sayyaf was established in Basilan in the late 1980s by Abdurajik Abubakar Janjalani, a teacher of Islam in the local madaris. He had studied in Libya. Some members of the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) claimed it had links with military officers involved in ransom

kidnap rings. Some captured members said that they had received weapons from the Philippine armed forces. As a result of the report detailing the involvement of the ISI in sponsoring the Abu Sanyaf group, Pakistan was forced to publicly deny connections between its intelligence service and terrorist activities in southeast Asia.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

December 24-26, 1994

The Algerian Armed Islamic Group hijacked an Air France flight in Algiers and threatened to crash it into the Eiffel Tower. French authorities deceived the terrorists into thinking the plane did not have enough fuel to reach Paris and diverted it to Marseilles. A French anti-terrorist force stormed the plane, freed the plane's 173 passengers, and killed all four terrorists. An Algerian passenger later states, "I knew it was a hostage taking when they shouted, 'Allah is Great.'" During the hijacking, an anonymous informant warns the French consulate in Oran, Algeria, that the plane was a "flying bomb that will explode over Paris." Demolition experts subsequently confirm that the explosives were placed in such a manner as to rip the plane apart if triggered. The GIA avenged the loss of its "martyrs" by murdering four Roman Catholic priests in the Algerian city of Tizi-Ouzou.

(SOURCE: Senate Intelligence Committee Testimony, 9/18/02; Thomas Sancton, "Anatomy of a Hijack," Thomas Sancton, "Anatomy of a Hijack," Time, December 26, 1994)

1995

In the CIA's annual National Intelligence Estimates, the agency warned:

As an open and free democracy, the United States is particularly vulnerable to various types of terrorist attacks. Several kinds of targets are especially at risk: National symbols such as the White House and the Capitol, and symbols of US capitalism such as Wall Street; power grids, communications switches, water facilities, and transportation infrastructure—particularly civil aviation, subway systems, cruise lines, and petroleum pipelines; places where large numbers of people congregate, such as large office buildings, shopping centers sports arenas, and airport and other transportation terminals.

We assess that civil aviation will figure prominently among possible terrorist targets in the United States. This stems from the increasing domestic threat posed by foreign terrorists, the continuing appeal of civil aviation as a target, and a domestic aviation security system that has been the focus of media attention: We have attempted to penetrate security at US airports in recent years. The media have called attention to, among other things, inadequate security for checked baggage. Our review of the evidence obtained thus far about the plot uncovered in Manila in early 1995, suggests the conspirators were guided in their selection of the method and venue of attack by carefully studying security procedures in place in the region. If terrorists operating in this country are similarly methodical, they will identify serious vulnerabilities in the security system for domestic flights.

(SOURCE: 1995 National Intelligence Estimates)

January 1995

Former French Ambassador to Saudi Arabia Jean-Michel Foulquier writes in 'Saudi Arabia: The Protected Dictature:' "To close this chapter on the issue of intolerance, how could we not stress the links between the fundamentalist regime of Saudi Arabia and the most radical parties of

modern Islam. The Algerian Islamic Front, the Tunisian Nada, the Sayyaf Group and Hekmatyar in Afghanistan, the Muslim Brothers in Egypt, the Palestinian Hamas, have been until recently supported and financed by Riyadh.”

(SOURCE: Jean-Michel Foulquier a.k.a. Jean Bressot, former French Ambassador in Saudi Arabia, “Saudi Arabia: The protected Dictature,” January 1995, p. 77.)

January 1995

A Philippine National Police raid turns up materials in a Manila apartment indicating that three individuals - Ramzi Yousef, Abdul Murad, and Khalid Sheikh Mohammad - planned, among other things, to crash an airplane into CIA headquarters in Langley, Virginia. The Philippine National Police said that the same group was responsible for the bombing of a Philippine airliner on December 12, 1994.

Authorities also uncover the Bojinka plot to simultaneously blow up 12 commercial aircraft over the Pacific Ocean. In addition, a letter written by the terrorists who planned the failed 1993 WTC bombing is found on a computer disk by law enforcement officials in the Philippines. The letter warns that future attacks would be more precise and they would continue to target the WTC if their demands were not met.

Among the other targets that the plotters proposed were Benazhir Bhutto, then prime minister of Pakistan; the U.S. Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan, U.S. nuclear power plants, and a variety of U.S. government buildings, including CIA headquarters and the Pentagon.

(SOURCE: *U.S. v. Yousef*, Docket No. 98-1041, (2nd Cir., April 4, 2003); FBI Documents; L.A. Times 9/1/02; *Insight* 5/27/02; Terry McDermott, “Early Scheme to Turn Jets Into Weapons,” *Los Angeles Times*, June 24, 2002; See April 10, 1995 entry for plot to fly plane into CIA headquarters)

January 4, 1995

A Sudan Airways flight from Khartoum, Sudan to Merowe is hijacked. The attackers demand to be taken to Egypt.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

January 6, 1995

Terrorist Ramzi Yousef is arrested in Pakistan. The next day, as Yousef is flying over New York City on his way to prison, an FBI agent says to Yousef, “You see the Trade Centers down there, they’re still standing, aren’t they?” Yousef responds, “They wouldn’t be if I had enough money and enough explosives.”

(SOURCE: MSNBC, 9/23/01)

January 23, 1995

By Executive Order 12947, a national emergency was declared to deal with the unusual and extraordinary threat to national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United States constituted by grave acts of violence committed by foreign terrorists that disrupt the Middle East peace process.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

April, 1995

In the April 3, 1995 edition of *Time*, the magazine’s cover story reports on the potential for terrorists to kill thousands in highly destructive acts. Senator Sam Nunn outlines a scenario in

which terrorists destroy the U.S. Capitol Building by crashing a radio controlled airplane into it. “It’s not far-fetched,” he says. His idea was taken from the popular Tom Clancy book *Debt of Honour* published in August 1994.

April 10, 1995

In an FBI confession interview, Abdul Hakim Hasim Murad a fellow Bojinka Plot conspirator and roommate of Ramzi Yousef, described the Manila cell’s plan to fly a plane into the CIA headquarters (paraphrased here by the FBI):

What the subject has in his mind is that he will board any American commercial aircraft pretending to be an ordinary passenger. Then he will hijack said aircraft, control its cockpit and dive it at the CIA headquarters. There will be no bomb or any explosive that he will use in its execution. It is simply a suicidal mission that he is very much willing to execute.

(SOURCE: FBI Documents; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

April 19, 1995

An explosion at the Alfred P. Murrah Federal Building in downtown Oklahoma City kills 168 people and injured hundreds of others in the worst domestic terrorist attack in U.S. history.

Mid-1995

As part of a long review of global terrorism circulated by the FBI, classified Secret, the bureau’s analysts assessed the emerging threat under the heading “Ramzi Ahmed Yousef: A New Generation of Sunni Islamic Terrorists.” The Yousef case “has led us to conclude that a new generation of terrorists has appeared on the world stage over the past few years,” the FBI’s analysts wrote. Yousef and his associates “have access to a worldwide network of support for funding, training and safe haven.” Increasingly, “Islamic extremists are working together to further their cause.” It was “no coincidence” that their terrorism increased as the anti-Soviet Afghan war ended. Afghanistan’s training camps were crucial to Yousef. The camps provided technical resources and allowed him to meet and recruit like-minded radicals. Pakistan and Bosnia had also become important bases for the jihadists. The report also states: “Unlike traditional forms of terrorism, such as state-sponsored or the Iran/Hezbollah model, Sunni extremists are neither surrogates of nor strongly influenced by one nation,” the FBI’s analysts wrote. “They are autonomous and indigenious.” There was now reason to “suspect Yousef and his associates receive support from Osama bin Laden and may be able to tap into bin Laden’s mujahedin support network.” In addition, they may also have been able to draw on Islamic charities for support. The FBI analysis listed the huge semiofficial Saudi Arabian charity, the International Islamic Relief Organization, and the largest government-sponsored Saudi religious proselytizing organization, the Muslim World League, as important resources for the new terrorists. The cable concludes: “Yousef’s group fits the mold for this new generation of Sunni Islamic terrorists...The WTC bombing, the Manila plot, and the recent [Islamic Group] attack against Mubarak demonstrate that Islamic extremists can operate anywhere in the world. We believe the threat is not over.”

(SOURCE: Steve Coll, Ghost Wars; Walter Pincus, The Washington Post, June 6, 2002)

June 21, 1995

Memorandum from President William Jefferson Clinton to his Cabinet on the subject of U.S. Policy on Counterterrorism:

Within the United States, we shall vigorously apply U.S. laws and seek new legislation to prevent terrorist groups from operating in the United States or using it as a base for recruitment, training, fund raising or other related activities. (U)

G. Transportation - related terrorism: The Federal Aviation Administration has exclusive responsibility in instances of air piracy for the coordination of any law enforcement activity affecting the safety of persons aboard aircraft within the special aircraft jurisdiction of the U.S. as defined in public law. The Department of Justice, acting through the FBI, shall establish and maintain procedures, in coordination with the Departments of State, Defense, and Transportation, to ensure the efficient resolution of terrorist hijackings. These procedures shall be based on the principle of lead agency responsibility for command, control and rules of engagement. (U)

June 21, 1995

Fumio Kutsumi hijacked All Nippon Airways flight 857, a B-747 carrying 350 passengers and 15 crew from Tokyo to Hakodate Airport on Hokkaido. He identified himself as Saburo Kobayashi and claimed that he was acting on behalf of Shoko Asahara, the jailed Aum chief charged with the sarin attack in the Tokyo subway. After sitting for 15 hours at Hakodate Airport, riot police stormed the plane and took Kutsumi into custody.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

June 26, 1995

Nine men with connections to Egyptian Islamic Jihad and al Qaeda attempted to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, as he was being driven from the airport to an Organization of African Unity conference. Al-Watan Al-'Arabi claimed that the assassination had been planned for two months, beginning at a meeting led by Islamic Jihad leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri at his villa in Switzerland. The assassination team trained at an al Qaeda and International Islamic Battalion camp north of Khartoum, Sudan, where al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden were based at the time.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

August 28, 1995

A bomb threat closed New York's John F. Kennedy International and La Guardia Airports in New York City and Newark International Airport in New Jersey from 5:45pm to shortly before 7:00pm. No bomb was found at any of the airports.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

September 11, 1995

In Egypt's continuing investigation following the attempted assassination of President Hosni Mubarak, Egyptian Foreign Minister 'Amur Musa announced that it had evidence that Sudan trained foreign terrorists—including Libyans, Egyptians, Tunisians, Algerians, Palestinians, and non-Arabs in 20 training camps around the country.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

Late September 1995

The son of Saudi King Fahd, Abdul Aziz bin Fahd, personally arranged for a \$100 million payment to the Taliban, "which was supporting Osama bin Laden at the time and prepared the way for Osama bin Laden to go to Afghanistan."

(SOURCE: Robert Baer, Statement before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom hearing, "Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat: The Global Propagation of Intolerance," November 18, 2003)

November 13, 1995

A car-bomb in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia kills seven people, five of them American military and civilian advisers for National Guard training. Al Qaeda-related groups including the "Tigers of the Gulf," "Islamist Movement for Change," and "Fighting Advocates of God" fax a letter to CNN claiming responsibility for the attacks and explaining that it was carried out in retaliation for the imprisonment of sheiks al-Ouda and al-Hawali.

(SOURCE: United States v. Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, Case No. CR03-48-N, Testimony of Michael Gneckow, March 11-12, 2003)

December 8, 1995

The Egyptian Islamic Group threatened to hijack Pakistani aircraft and attack Pakistani airports if the Pakistani government did not stop its campaign against the al Qaeda-linked group.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1992-95: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1997)

December 15, 1995

A Saudi Arabian Airlines flight from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to Addis Ababa, Ethiopia is hijacked. The attackers demand political asylum.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

1996

Muslim World League funded Tajik extremist Abdullah Nuri arranges a meeting between Iranian intelligence and Osama bin Laden to conduct terrorism against the United States.

(SOURCE: Robert Baer, Statement before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom hearing, "Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat: The Global Propagation of Intolerance," November 18, 2003)

1996

The CIA establishes a special unit—known as bin Laden Issue Station—with CIA, NSA, FBI and other officers specifically to get more—and more actionable—intelligence on bin Laden and his organization. The unit's first project was to develop a strategic picture of bin Laden's activity. One of the publicly-released products of the unit's work is "Usama bin Ladin: Islamic Extremist Financier," released publicly on August 14 1996. The report describes bin Laden's various terrorist activities: "By January 1994, Bin Ladin had begun financing at least three terrorist training camps in northern Sudan in cooperation with the NIF...Bin Ladin remains the key

financier behind the ‘Kunar’ camp in Afghanistan, which provides terrorist training to al-Jihad and al-Gama’at al-Islamiyah members.” In addition, the report states “Bin Ladin’s support for extremist causes continues despite criticisms from regional governments and his family. Algeria, Egypt and Yemen have accused Bin Ladin of financing militant Islamic groups on their soil.” (SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002; Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden; The United States Depart of State*)

1996

A secret State Department memo on the history of U.S. negotiations with the Taliban notes “Since the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996, the United States has consistently discussed with them peace, humanitarian assistance, drugs and human rights. However, we have made clear that Usama bin Laden (UBL) and terrorism is the preeminent issue between the U.S. and the Taliban. These concerns over bin Laden preceded the 1998 bombings. For instance, Secretary Christopher wrote to the Taliban Foreign Minister in 1996 that “we wish to work with you to expel all terrorists and those who support terrorism.”

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

1996

The CIA distributes a secret report to senior government officials detailing the illicit flow of financial and logistical resources from Islamic charities such as the Muslim World League, International Islamic Relief Organization, Third World Relief Agency, and Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, to terrorist groups, including Egyptian Jihad, al Gama’at al Islamiya, and al Qaeda. The report states, “We continue to have evidence that even high ranking members of the collecting or monitoring agencies in Saudi Arabia...such as the Saudi High Commission are involved in illicit activities, including support for terrorists.” In addition, the analysis reveals that the International Islamic Relief Organization (IIRO) is affiliated with the Muslim World League (MWL), which the report describes as a “major international organization largely financed by the Government of Saudi Arabia.” In fact, the Chairman of the MWL, who is appointed by Saudi King Fahd, also served as Chairman of the Board of Trustees of the IIRO. The report illustrates that the U.S. government has long known about the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia’s links to terrorist financing, and that by the mid-1990s, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was actively involved with financing Islamic charities which funneled substantial resources to transnational terrorist groups.

(SOURCE: 1996 Central Intelligence Agency report)

1996

Captured Al Qaeda operations chief Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, tells U.S. interrogators in 2003 that he began meeting with Osama bin Laden in 1996 to “give him money and operatives so he could hijack 10 planes in the United States and fly them into targets,” after the Bojinka Plot to blow up 11 airliners over the Pacific Ocean was foiled in early 1995. The plan originally called for hijacking five commercial jets on each U.S. coast before it was modified several times. The original blueprint called for as many as 22 terrorists and four planes in a first wave, followed by a second wave of suicide hijackings that were to be aided possibly by al-Qaida allies in Southeast Asia. Mohammad described hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi as central to the hijacking plot. Mohammed said bin Laden offered him four operatives to begin with—al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi as well as two Yemenis, Walid Huhammed bin Attash and Abu Bara al-Yemeni. “All four operatives only knew that they had volunteered for a martyrdom operation involving planes.” Mohammed said the first major change to the plans occurred in 1999 when the two Yemeni operatives could not get U.S. visas. Bin Laden then offered him additional

operatives, including a member of his personal security detail. The plot, he said, eventually evolved into hijacking a small number of planes in the United States and East Asia and either having them explode or crash into targets simultaneously, the reports stated.

By 1999, the four original operatives picked for the plot traveled to Afghanistan to train at one of bin Laden's camps. The focus, Mohammed said, was on specialized commando training, not piloting jets. A key event in the plot, Mohammed told his interrogators, was a meeting in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, in January 2000, that included al-Mihdhar, al-Hazmi and other al-Qaida operatives. The CIA learned of the meeting beforehand and had it monitored by Malaysian security, but it did not realize the significance of the two eventual hijackers until just before the attacks. The interrogation reports state bin Laden further trimmed Mohammed's plans in spring 2000 when he canceled the idea for hijackings in East Asia, thus narrowing it to the United States. Bin Laden thought "it would be too difficult to synchronize" attacks in the United States and Asia, one interrogation report quotes Mohammed as saying. Mohammed said around that time he reached out to an al-Qaida linked group in southeast Asia known as Jemaah Islamiyah. He began "recruiting JI operatives for inclusion in the hijacking plot as part of his second wave of hijacking attacks to occur after Sept. 11," one CIA summary said.

(SOURCE: John Solomon, "Terrorist Says 9/22 Plot Began in '96," Associated Press, September 21, 2003)

1996-2001

In 1996, the Clinton Administration National Security Council draws up a strategy for protecting airspace over the Atlanta Summer Olympics "in response to Iranian-backed terrorism." The plan includes closing airspace over events to civilian traffic, placing armed National Guard fighter jets on alert at a nearby base and launching on patrol a small air force belonging to the U.S. Customs Service, including jets, Black Hawk helicopters and a special radar-equipped plane. The plan is put into place after the government receives transmissions referring to the attack of Olympic venues with small aircraft. The plan is subsequently used for President Clinton's second inauguration in 1997, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's 50th anniversary celebration in Washington in 1999, the Republican and Democratic conventions in 2000 and the Bush inauguration in 2001. Prior to the September 11, 2001, the Bush Administration was involved in planning airspace protection that was provided for the 2002 winter Olympics in Utah.

(SOURCE: Richard Clarke, Against All Enemies, 2004; Scot J. Paltrow, "Kamikaze Terrorism Wasn't a New Idea," Wall Street Journal, April 1, 2004; Andrew R. Thomas, Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel)

January 1996

The Intelligence Community obtained information concerning a planned suicide attack by individuals associated with Sheikh Omar Adb al-Rahman. The plan was to fly to the United States from Afghanistan and smash the plane into White House.

(SOURCE: Statement of Joint Congressional Inquiry Director Eleanor Hill before the Senate Intelligence Committee, September 18, 2002)

March 24, 1996

A Sudan Airways airliner flying from Khartoum, Sudan to Port Sudan is hijacked by two assailants who demand to be taken to Eritrea. The hijackers surrender later the same day Asmara, Eritrea.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

May 6, 1996

In an interview with *Time* magazine in Khartoum, Sudan, Osama bin Laden states “People are supposed to be innocent until proven guilty. Well, not the Afghan fighters. They are the ‘terrorists of the world.’ But pushing them against the wall will do nothing except increase the terrorism.”

(SOURCE: *Time Magazine*, May 6, 1996)

Summer 1996

The Clinton Administration institutes a “no-fly zone” for high-profile occasions designated “National Security Special Events.” Subsequent “no-fly” zones instituted by President Clinton include the 50th anniversary summits of NATO and the United Nations. The no-fly zones are areas of restricted airspace defended by fighter jets and anti-aircraft batteries. Despite continued efforts by Counterterrorism Coordinator Richard Clarke in 2001 to have these security measures permanently implemented to protect Washington, D.C., the Bush Administration refuses to implement this request until after September 11, 2001.

(SOURCE: Steve Fainaru, “Clues Pointed to Changing Terrorist Tactics,” *Washington Post*, May 19, 2002)

June 1996

Saudi business leaders and royal family members secretly meet with bin Laden operatives at the Royal Monceau Hotel in Paris to secure a \$300 million deal with Osama bin Laden which would ensure that al Qaeda would not attack targets in Saudi Arabia. Attendees included Adnan Kashoggi (Saudi arms dealer), Prince Amir Talal bin Abdul Aziz (brother of King Fahd), Abdullah Taha Bakhsh (Saudi businessman), Khalid bin Mahfouz (Saudi billionaire businessman), and Sarkis Soghanalian (Syrian arms dealer).

(SOURCE: 1996 *French Intelligence Report*)

June 25, 1996

A bomb aboard a fuel truck explodes outside a U.S. air force installation in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia. Nineteen U.S. military personnel are killed in the Khobar Towers housing facility, and 515 are wounded, including 240 Americans.

July 1996

Just weeks before the opening of the Atlanta Summer Olympics and the crash of Trans World Airlines Flight 800, the Inspector General of the Department of Transportation, Mary Schiavo, completes a report on airport security that described how undercover government agents were able to breach security at four of the nation’s largest airports, getting into secure areas that would have given them access to airplanes. Some of the agents were even carrying fake bombs. The report was a follow-up to a similar inspection of the same four airports in 1993 in which agents were able to get into secure areas and sometimes onto airplanes in 15 of 20 attempts—75 percent of the time. The 1993 report stated “Once we gained access, we wandered around aircraft parking areas, baggage processing centers, maintenance areas, and ramp administrative offices.” The agents involved with the inquiry were able to get onto planes. One of the investigators entered a cargo hold and another entered the cabin of a plane and left a note to prove that he was there. “During our tests, we displayed no visible identification, dressed casually, engaged in behavior designed to elicit challenges, and did not resort to covert methods.”

(SOURCE: Pam Belluck, “Reports show agents breached air security,” *The Patriot*, July 27, 1996)

July 1996

Bin Laden describes the killing of Americans in the Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia as the beginning of a war between Muslims and the United States.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

July 1996

During the Atlanta Summer Olympics, foreign intelligence agencies intercept transmissions referring to the attack of Olympic venues with small aircraft. In response, Black Hawk helicopters and U.S. Customs jets patrolled the skies above the southeast U.S. during the Games to prevent the commandeering of small aircraft, particularly crop dusters.

(SOURCE: *Aviation Insecurity: The New Challenges of Air Travel*, Andrew R. Thomas)

July 10, 1996

Osama bin Laden tells a British reporter in an interview from his hideout in eastern Afghanistan that Saudi Arabian authorities were only “secondary enemies.” As he saw it, the world had now reached “the beginning of war between Muslims and the United States.”

(SOURCE: Robert Fisk, *The Independent*, July 10, 1996)

July 20, 1996

A bomb exploded at Tarragona International Airport in Reus, Spain, wounding 353 persons, including British and Irish tourists. The Basque Fatherland and Liberty (ETA) organization was suspected.

(SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology”)

July 26, 1996

A Lebanese man hijacks an Iberia Air flight from en route from Madrid to Havana, Cuba. The flight is diverted to Miami International Airport where the hijacker is turned over to the FBI.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 1996

Osama bin Laden issues a public *fatwa* entitled, “Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.” The statement, first published in *Al Quds Al Arabi*, authorizes attacks on Western military targets in the Arabian Peninsula. Bin Laden declares: “It is a duty now on every tribe in the Arab Peninsula to fight, Jihad, in the cause of Allah and to cleanse the land from those occupiers. Allah knows that their blood is permitted to be spilled and their wealth is a booty; their wealth is a booty to those who kill them.”

August 26, 1996

A Sudan Airways flight from Khartoum, Sudan to Amman, Jordan is hijacked by 7 hijackers who demand to be taken to the United Kingdom. The hijackers surrender at London’s Stansted airport.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

September 18, 1996

In a meeting with Taliban Deputy Foreign Affairs Advisor Jalil, Embassy Islamabad POLOFF...urged the Taliban to make UBL unwelcome. Jalil replied that the Taliban do not support terrorism and would not provide refuge to bin Laden.

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

October 1996

The Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an Iranian plot to hijack a Japanese plane over Israel and crash it into Tel Aviv. An individual would board the plane in the Far East. During the flight, he would commandeer the aircraft, order it to fly over Tel Aviv, and then crash the plane into the city. The plot was never carried out.

(SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

Autumn 1996-1997

Following the crash and suspected bombing of TWA Flight 800 in July 1996, President Bill Clinton established a White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security chaired by Vice President Albert Gore to assess the civilian aviation security and safety environment and provide recommendations for improvements.

During this study, top experts and government officials were made aware of the persistent and growing threat of large scale terrorist violence through airline hijackings and the use of airliners as missiles.

The 1996 White House Commission observed a video entitled “The Future Face of Terrorism.” The transcript of the video depicts the face of terrorism as Ramzi Ahmed Yousef. Yousef was among the terrorists who planned to blow-up 12 U.S. airplanes simultaneously over the Pacific Ocean in the Bojinka Plot. The video transcript describes the dramatically increasing threat of mass terrorist violence using commercial aircraft:

Terrorists today are potentially much more dangerous. Open societies and computer literacy make a wealth of knowledge and information easily available. They can target a single individual. But typically their goal is maximum destruction and massive casualties--witness the bombing of the World Trade Center...

A terrorist attack against an aircraft or airport inside the United States remains a real threat. Many [terrorists] are young...repressed and very angry. They see terrorism as a way out of their social situation or as a means to support religious and political ideals. Some even believe suicidal missions will gain them everlasting life.

This is the face of terrorism threatening the airline industry as America enters the 21st century. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef is well-educated, technically skilled in his deadly craft and highly motivated. And in 1995 he and a small cell of co-conspirators planned to spirit bombs aboard 11 US Flag aircraft and blow them from the sky—all on the same day.

Because they can be so difficult to detect, terrorists like Yousef can strike both within the United States and overseas.

Civil aviation has been and continues to be a major target for terrorist organizations. Terrorists tend to have a profile we can watch for. They may pay for their tickets in cash, arrange for one way travel or show up on the date of travel without having made reservations. Terrorists tend to use false or altered passports. Close scrutiny of passports and accompanying documents may reveal tampering.

(SOURCE: 1996-97 White House Commission on Aviation Security)

November 1996

Bin Laden states in an interview, “If we wanted to carry out small operations, it would have been easy to do so after the statements, but the nature of the battle requires qualitative operations that affect the adversary, which obviously requires good preparation.”

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

November 1996

In an interview with Palestinian newspaper editor Abdelhari Atwan in a cave outside Kandahar, Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden states that he felt “back home, because the whole Islamic world is a homeland for Muslims,” and that the recent terrorist bombings against American targets in Saudi Arabia, at Riyadh and Dhahran, were “a laudable kind of terrorism, because it was against thieves.” He also boasted about his endurance: “Having borne arms against the Russians for ten years, we think our battle with the Americans will be easy by comparison, and we are now more determined to carry out until we see the face of God.”

(SOURCE: Steve Coll, *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and bin Laden*)

November 23, 1996

Ethiopian Airlines Flight 961 flying from Ethiopia to Nairobi, Kenya was hijacked by three middle-aged individuals who instructed the pilot to fly to Australia. After approximately four hours in a hostage situation, the pilot was aware there was not enough fuel to make it there. When the plane's engines started shutting down due to lack of fuel, the hijackers took control of the plane and crashed into a Gawala seaside resort near the Comoros Islands. The plane crashed 500 yards from the resort; 123 people died. One survivor described the scene on board as the terrorists took over the plane: “The terrorists said for everyone to be seated. They said they had explosives and they were going to blow up the airplane.”

(SOURCE: Donald G. McNeil, Jr. “Hijacking Survivors Recount Terror,” *The New York Times*, November 25, 1996; “Bizarre ordeal recounted in Ethiopian Airlines Crash,” *CNN World News*, November 24, 1996)

December 6, 1996

In a response letter to Taliban Foreign Minister Ghaus’s earlier letter, Secretary of State Christopher expresses the USG’s wish “to work with the Taliban to expel all terrorists from Afghan soil. The Taliban are told that harboring bin Laden and allowing him and his supporters to transit Afghan territory at will and to conduct uncontrolled activities greatly hurt prospects for Afghanistan rejoining the world community.”

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

1997

CIA analyst Russ Travers wrote a piece in the agency’s in-house journal, ‘Studies in Intelligence.’ Set in 2001, the article stated: “As had been true of virtually all previous intelligence failures, collection was not the issue. The data were there, but we had failed to recognize fully their significance and put them in context.” Indeed, he added, “the system is sufficiently dysfunctional that intelligence failure is guaranteed.”

(SOURCE: John Prados, “Slow-walked and stonewalled,” *Bulletin of Atomic Scientists*, March 1, 2003.)

1997

One of the units at FBI headquarters became concerned about the possibility of a terrorist group using an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) for terrorist attacks. The FBI and CIA became aware of reporting that the unnamed group had purchased a UAV. At the time, the agencies' view was that the only reason that the group would need a UAV would be for either reconnaissance or attack. There was more concern about the possibility of an attack outside the United States, for example, by flying a UAV into a U.S. Embassy or a visiting U.S. delegation.

(SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

1997

Between 1997-2001, the 19 future September 11 hijackers submit 24 visa applications and receive 23 visas. Of these 23 visas, 20 were issued in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia.

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 1, January 26, 2004)

1997

In a National Intelligence Estimate in 1997, the CIA stated: "Civil aviation remains a particularly attractive target for terrorist attacks in light of fear and publicity the downing of an airliner would evoke and the revelations last summer of the vulnerability of the US air transport sector."

(SOURCE: 1997 National Intelligence Estimate)

1997

Members of Al Qaeda living in Madrid, Spain traveled to the United States and prepared several surveillance videos of the World Trade Center, Sears Tower, Golden Gate Bridge, Disneyland, and Las Vegas. These videos were recovered by Spanish authorities and turned over to the 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism. One section of the video depicts the terrorist sitting in Manhattan and looking at the skyline as he states, "These buildings are going to come down."

1997-1998

The FAA 'Red Team' Security Division conducts testing at a major domestic international airport. Former Red Team leader Bogdan Dzakovic describes the testing:

Purely by accident we conducted testing at an extremely busy time when cruise ships were loading and unloading passengers at the same time. The airport was extremely overcrowded with people. Security simply broke down in these conditions. After failing all of our tests and reporting this fact through my chain of command, I reported this abhorrent state of security to my immediate manager. He ordered me not to make a written report on this, and to stop all further testing at this airport.

(SOURCE: Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Washington, DC, May 23, 2003)

January 21, 1997

Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia Raphel told Taliban political advisor Wakil Ahmed that "the Taliban have alienated the U.S. and the international community through their providing sanctuary to the UBL."

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden." Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

February 1997

The White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security reported that:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation, the Central Intelligence Agency, and other intelligence sources have been warning that the threat of terrorism is changing in two important ways. First, it is no longer just an overseas threat from foreign terrorists. People and places in the United States have joined the list of targets, and Americans have joined the ranks of terrorists. The bombings of the World Trade Center in New York and the Federal Building in Oklahoma City are clear examples of the shift, as is the conviction of Ramzi Yousef for attempting to bomb twelve American airliners out of the sky over the Pacific Ocean. The second change is that in addition to well-known, established terrorist groups, it is becoming more common to find terrorists working alone or in ad-hoc groups, some of whom are not afraid to die in carrying out their designs.

March 17, 1997

The FAA publishes an Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM), to certify screening companies and improve the training and testing of security screeners through the development of uniform performance standards. The FAA determined that “[T]he critical element in screener certification is having a reliable and consistent way to measure actual screening performance. “ As Cathal Flynn told the Senate Commerce Committee on April 6, 2000, “After evaluation and consultation, we decided to add more specific screening improvements to the proposed rule based on the use of new technology called threat image projection (TIP) systems. Consequently, in May 1998, we withdrew the ANPRM in order to focus our rulemaking efforts on TIP systems. (SOURCE: *Statement of Admiral Cathal Flynn, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, April 6, 2000.*)

May 1997

Osama bin Laden grants his first western television interview to CNN commentators Peter Bergen and Peter Arnett. During the interview, bin Laden tells Bergen, "We declared a jihad, a holy war, against the U.S. government because it is unjust, tyrannical. We call for jihad against U.S. soldiers in Saudi Arabia...The concentration at this point of jihad is against the American occupiers." The leader of al Qaeda then went on to describe his organization's involvement in the 1993 attacks on U.S. soldiers in Mogadishu, Somalia and he said that al Qaeda was planning additional attacks against US soldiers in the future, and that if America civilians were harmed in those attacks that was their problem, not his.

(SOURCE: *Peter Bergen, Cable News Network, Interview with Osama bin Laden, May 1997; Peter Bergen, Holy War, Inc., pp. 1-23; Vernon Loeb, The Washington Post, August 23, 1998.*)

October 13, 1997

Newsweek first reports that Osama bin Laden is providing large financial payments to the Taliban in exchange for his sanctuary in Afghanistan.

(SOURCE: *Steve LeVine, Newsweek, October 13, 1997*)

November 10, 1997

Al Qaeda members gun down four American oil workers in Pakistan.

(SOURCE: *Paul L. Williams, 'Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,' 2002*)

1998

The Phoenix FBI field office international terrorism squad investigates a possible Middle Eastern extremist taking flight lessons at a Phoenix airport at the same time Hani Hanjour, the future 9/11 hijacker, is living in Arizona. An American Muslim FBI informant named Aukai Collins tells the Associated Press in 2002 that by 1998 the FBI “knew everything about the guy.” Collins reportedly saw nothing suspicious about Hanjour’s activities but reported to the FBI about his observations because Hanjour appeared to be part of a larger, organized group of Arabs taking flying lessons.

(SOURCE: New York Times, June 19, 2002; Associated Press, May 24, 2002; Fox News, May 24, 2002)

1998

Intelligence information states that “...member of UBL was planning operations against U.S. targets. Plans to hijack U.S. aircraft proceeding well. Two individuals [----] had successfully evaded checkpoints in a dry run at a NY airport.”

(SOURCE: Statement of Eleanor Hill, Former Staff Director, Joint Congressional Committee on the 9/11 Attacks, The House Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 10, 2003)

1998

An intelligence memo indicates the possibility of terrorist attacks within the United States: “UBL is planning attacks in the U.S. [-----] says plans are to attack in NY and Washington.

Information mentions an attack in Washington probably against public places. UBL probably places a high priority on conducting attacks in the U.S...CIA has little information on UBL operatives in the U.S.”

(SOURCE: Statement of Eleanor Hill, Former Staff Director, Joint Congressional Committee on the 9/11 Attacks, The House Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 10, 2003)

Spring 1998

Terrorism expert Stephen Gale presents an analysis to the Federal Aviation Administration security officials describing two air hijacking scenarios: one in which terrorists crashed planes into nuclear power plants along the East Coast; another in which they commandeered Federal Express cargo planes and crashed them into the World Trade Center the Pentagon, the White House, the Capitol, the Sears Tower and the Golden Gate Bridge. Gale said the analysis was based in part on the Eiffel Tower threat, and a small plane that had crashed onto the White House grounds in 1994. You can’t protect yourself from meteorites,” an FAA official responded, according to Gale. “He was saying it’s too hard.”

(SOURCE: Steve Fainaru, “Clues Pointed to Changing Terrorist Tactics,” Washington Post, May 19, 2002)

1998-1999

According to newly released sections of the 9/11 Commission Report, FAA intelligence warned that bin Laden and Al Qaeda could try to hijack a commercial jet and slam it into a U.S. landmark. It viewed this possibility as “unlikely” and “a last resort.” The commission also references a 1995 National Intelligence Estimate report noting that “Civil aviation remains a particularly attractive target” for terrorists. Other sections that had previously been secret involve intelligence “chatter” gathered prior to the 2001 attacks and heightened security on airplanes carrying author Salman Rushdie, against whom Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini issued a fatwa following the publication of Rushdie’s 1989 novel “The Satanic Verses.”

(Source: Declassified Aviation Monograph (9/11 Commission Report), September 2005, pp. 53-56).

1998

The FAA 'Red Team' Security Division completes extensive testing of screening at a number of domestic airports. Former Red Team leader Bogdan Dzakovic states, "Basically our test results were the inverse of the results FAA field offices achieved (i.e.: where a field office reported an airport having a 90% success rate in detecting FAA test objects; we would report a success rate of about 10%. In one case we even documented an airport detection rate of about 3%.

(SOURCE: Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Washington, DC, May 23, 2003)

1998

The FAA 'Red Team' Security Division was successful in breaching the multi-million dollar computer controlled access system approximately 85% of the time at a major domestic airport. According to former Red Team leader Bogdan Dzakovic, "No action was taken to remedy this security problem and we have never been back to this airport (or any airport) to re-test access control security."

(SOURCE: Statement of Bogdan Dzakovic to the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Washington, DC, May 23, 2003)

1998

The Government funded study "Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why" speculates that: "Al Qaida could detonate a Chechen-type building-buster bomb at a federal building. Suicide bombers belonging to al Qaida's Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency, or the White House. Ramzi Yousef had planned to do this against the CIA headquarters.

(SOURCE: "Who Becomes A Terrorist and Why," Federal Research Division, Library of Congress.)

1998

The CIA receives a series of reports threatening attacks in the United States, which lead the agency to work together with the FBI to provide advisories for local law enforcement agencies. One such episode occurred when the CIA provided reporting of a plot to hijack a plane on the east coast of the United States to attempt to free the "Blind Sheik" from prison. The report also said that there had been a successful test to elude security at a major airport.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

1998

An extremist associated with al Qaeda says bin Laden is seeking a "Hiroshima."

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

January 1998

A chart of al Qaeda operatives and financiers at the Counter Terrorism Center at CIA is said by one observer to be the length of a highway billboard.

(SOURCE: "Pointman on Terrorism Knows National Security Issues, by M.J. Zuckerman, USA Today, May 22, 1998)

1998

Indian citizen Mohammad Afroz, accused of conspiring to hijack an airliner and crash it into the British House of Commons, clocks 10 hours of flight training on small planes in Tyler, Texas. (SOURCE: Corinne Price memo on Indian Air Hijacking; also Harbaksh Singh Nanda, "Indian Muslims Cry Foul in September 11 Arrest" UPI, September 5, 2002)

February 23, 1998

Osama bin Laden issues a *fatwa*, declaring it a religious duty of all Muslims "to kill the Americans and their allies-civilians and military and plunder their money when and wherever they find it...in any country in which it is possible." The statement is an expansion of an earlier *fatwa* issued in August 1996.

Spring 1998

Terrorism expert Stephen Gale presents an analysis to Federal Aviation Administration security officials describing two air hijacking scenarios: one in which terrorists crashed planes into nuclear power plants along the East Coast; another in which they commandeered Federal Express cargo planes and crashed them into the World Trade Center the Pentagon, the White House, the Capitol, the Sears Tower and the Golden Gate Bridge. Gale said the analysis was based in part on the Eiffel Tower threat, and a small plane that had crashed onto the White House grounds in 1994. An FAA official responded, "You can't protect yourself from meteorites," Gale described. "He was saying it's too hard."

(SOURCE: Steve Fainaru, "Clues Pointed to Changing Terrorist Tactics," *Washington Post*, May 19, 2002)

March 1998

The FAA's Office of Civil Aviation Security first considers the potential for suicide hijacking in the United States. However, in a presentation made to air carriers and airports in 2000 and early 2001 the FAA discounted the threat, because "Fortunately, we have no indication that any group is currently thinking in that direction."

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, "The Aviation Security System and the 9/11 Attacks: Staff Statement No. 3," January 27, 2004)

March 26, 1998

In a meeting with Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Haqqani, "Islamabad Embassy Charge Eastham underscored U.S. concerns about the recent fatwa issued by bin Laden against the U.S. Haqqani denied bin Laden's involvement in the fatwa and assured that UBL was under Taliban restriction."

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden." Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

March 27, 1998

Security was tightened at the US Embassy after receipt of "credible information" of terrorist threats. Islamabad's Al-Akhbar reported that bin Laden was targeting the US Consulate in Peshawar and US Embassy in Islamabad.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press)

May 18, 1998

An FBI agent in the Oklahoma City FBI field office sends his supervisor a memo warning that he has observed "large numbers of Middle Eastern males receiving flight training at Oklahoma airports in recent months." The memo, titled "Weapons of Mass Destruction," further states this

“may be related to planned terrorist activity” and speculates that “light planes would be an ideal means of spreading chemicals or biological agents.” Later in 1998, the FBI receives reports that a terrorist organization might be planning to bring students to the U.S. for flight training. The FBI is aware that people connected to this unnamed organization had performed surveillance and security tests at airports in the U.S. and had made comments suggesting an intention to target civil aviation.

(SOURCE: *9/11 Congressional Inquiry; New York Daily News, September 25, 2002*)

May 26, 1998

In a press conference attended by select Pakistani and Chinese journalists at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan, bin Laden indicates that “the results of his jihad will be ‘visible’ within weeks.” (SOURCE: *Center for Cooperative Research Timeline, “Osama declares war against US: CNN,” Daily Times [Pakistan], August 21, 2002*).

June 10, 1998

ABC News reporter John Miller’s interview of Osama bin Laden airs on “Nightline.” Bin Laden tells Miller that “We do not have to differentiate between military or civilian. As far as we are concerned, they are all targets, and this is what the fatwah says...”

(SOURCE: *Transcript of Interview on Frontline [PBS] Homepage, accessed December 9, 2005; also see ABC News Transcript of Nightline Broadcast*).

June 16, 1998

U.S. diplomats meet with Saudi officials to “press for enhanced vigilance by Saudi security screeners and police patrols around the [King Khaled International] airport.” Although no specific intelligence indicating an attack on civilian aircraft exists, the cable references the June 10 Nightline interview where bin Laden sees no distinction between military and civilian targets as well as the May 26 conference where bin Laden called for attacks “within weeks.” “Consequently, we could not rule out that a terrorist might take the path of least resistance and turn to a civilian target.”

(SOURCE: *Declassified State Department Cable, released by National Security Archive at George Washington University on December 9, 2005*).

June 24, 1998

Osama bin Laden and nearly 100 other al Qaeda operatives meet in Kandahar, Afghanistan to finalize future operational plans “including a series of attacks on U.S. embassies and institutions.” Six weeks after the Kandahar meeting, two car bombs exploded in front U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania.

(SOURCE: *“Americans are Paper Tigers,” Der Spiegel, August 17, 1998*)

July 1998

A feature in *Reader’s Digest* and in the *Wall Street Journal*, entitled ‘This Man Wants You Dead,’ describes the threat posed by Osama bin Laden to the United States and links Bin Laden to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing, 1993 Somalia attack on American forces, and the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.

(SOURCE: *Kenneth Timmerman, “This Man Wants You Dead,” Reader’s Digest, July, 1998*)

August 1998

The Intelligence Community obtained information that a group of unidentified Arabs planned to fly an explosive-laden plane from a foreign country into the World Trade Center. The information was passed to the FBI and the FAA. The FAA found the plot highly unlikely given the state of that foreign country’s aviation program. Moreover, they believed that a flight originating outside

the United States would be detected before it reached its intended target inside the United States. The FBI's New York office took no action on the information, filing the communication in the office's bombing repository file. The Intelligence Community has acquired additional information since then indicating there may be links between this group and other terrorist groups, including al Qaeda.

(SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

August 7, 1998

In its most deadly act of terrorism yet, al Qaeda claims responsibility for bombing the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. In Nairobi, 12 Americans are among the 291 killed, and over 5,000 are wounded, including 6 Americans. In Dar es Salaam, one U.S. citizen is wounded among the 10 killed and 77 injured.¹

August 1998

Sudanese intelligence trail two Arab Afghans following their arrival on a Kenyan Airways flight August 4, 1998. Nossair Sayed Abbas (Pakistan passport number 553540) and Skander Said Suliman (Pakistan passport number 61482) carry Pakistan passports with valid entry visas to Sudan...Both of the men had written down the name of the manager of OBL's former leather tannery in Khartoum. The two men hail from and had received their visas in Quetta, Pakistan...Finally, Sudan check with Pakistan's intelligence service. Abbas and Suliman are believed to be financial couriers for bin Laden...Both men had been trained in bin Laden's Afghanistan camps to make explosives and to fire rocket-propelled grenades and 14.2-mm artillery pieces...On August 9 [just days after the Africa embassy bombings] senior Sudanese intelligence officials discover that Abbas was negotiating to rent an apartment—directly across from the U.S. Embassy. From the apartment's third floor balcony, one could watch all of the activity inside the American embassy's courtyards...Abbas and Suliman were arrested and taken to Kober prison. They admit that they had come to deliver money to several al Qaeda sleeper cells that planned to use the apartment as a staging area to attack the U.S. Embassy in Khartoum...and that there was going to be a second wave of attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and Central Asia...Gutbi el-Mahdi telephoned Janet McElligott and told her "You go tell your boys that I have something for them but they have to come here to Khartoum to get it." The U.S. did not send an investigative team to Sudan and the operatives were flown to Karachi, Pakistan and reportedly released. They are still at-large.

(SOURCE: *Losing Bin Laden*, Richard Minitzer)

August 1998

United Nations Ambassador Bill Richardson meets secretly with the Taliban in the second week of August 1998 where he "came armed with definitive proof of bin Laden's links to the attacks." He asks that Afghanistan expel bin Laden.

(SOURCE: "After missiles U.S. tries to talk to get Osama," by Syed Talat Hussain, *the Nation*, August 29, 1998)

¹ In 1999, as a result of the bombings of the US embassies in Africa, the United States' government sent a delegation to the United Arab Emirates and the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia to warn them significant funds from their countries were being used to finance al Qaeda's terrorist attacks. In spite of these warnings, these countries failed to enact any serious regulations of banks, charities, or mosques. Instead, they turned a blind eye to this problem. See Statements given by William Wechsler and Lee Wolosky to instant plaintiffs counsel. The trip is also described by Dan Benjamin in [The Age of Sacred Terror](#) (2002).

August 1998

Osama bin Laden paid \$2 million to a middle man in Kazakhstan to make a deal to buy “nuclear suitcases” from former KGB agents. According to Russian and U.S. intelligence sources, bin Laden, along with members of al Qaeda’s Shura Council, met with Chechen Mafia figures in Grozny, Chechnya, where they made the deal to purchase 20 nuclear suitcases. For these weapons, bin Laden paid \$30 million in a combination of cash and two types of heroin that had been refined in his laboratories. The street value of the heroin was in excess of \$700 million. (SOURCE: Paul L. Williams, ‘Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,’ 2002)

Mid-to-Late August 1998

The FBI and CIA disrupt a planned attack on another U.S. Embassy in Africa. In a three-day period, more than 20 al Qaeda operatives were arrested in that country. (SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

August 25, 1998

National Public Radio reports that Osama bin Laden had twice attempted to assassinate President Clinton, forcing President Clinton to change his official travel plans overseas. (SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press)

September 1998

On September 25, 1998, Mamdouh Mahmud Salim was arrested in Munich and charged with acting as an al Qaeda agent to purchase highly enriched uranium from a German laboratory. (SOURCE: Paul L. Williams, ‘Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,’ 2002)

September 1998

The U.S. Intelligence Community obtains information that Osama bin Laden’s next operation could possibly involve flying an aircraft loaded with explosives into a U.S. airport and detonating it; this information was provided to senior U.S. Government officials in late 1998. (SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

September 13, 1998

Islamabad Embassy DCM Eastham warned Taliban representative Mujahid that “the Taliban will be held directly responsible for any further terrorist acts instigated by bin Laden.” (SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

September 25, 1998

Federal prosecutors in New York unsealed the criminal complaint against Mamdouh Mahmud Salim on September 25. The complaint charged Salim with conspiracy to commit murder and use weapons of mass destruction. It said Salim helped bin Laden to found al Qaida and that he sat on the group’s majlis al shura, the advisory council that approves military attacks, and on the fatwa committee. It noted that Salim had worked for al Qaida in Sudan, Afghanistan, Malaysia, the Phillipines, and Pakistan. He obtained communications equipment and “electronic items necessary for the detonation of explosives.” It indicated that bin Laden, in conjunction with the governments of Iran and Sudan, sent individuals around the world in the early 1990s to obtain nuclear weapons. The prosecutors charged that Salim met with Iranian officials in Tehran and Khartoum to arrange for al Qaida members to receive explosives training in Lebanon and Hizballah.

Federal prosecutors stated that between 1992 and 1995, he had taken part in a conspiracy to attack U.S. military sites abroad and had conspired to transport explosives.
(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press)

October 11, 1998

Ambassador Milam told Taliban representative Wakil Ahmed that “the longer they shelter bin Laden, the more they will be associated with his crimes.”
(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

October 19, 1998

Dick Gannon, a former Clinton administration deputy director for operations in the State Department’s Office of Counterterrorism tells *U.S. News & World Report* that “We’ve got information about whose backing bin Laden, and in a lot of cases it goes back to the royal family. There are certain factions of the Saudi royal family who just don’t like us.”
(SOURCE: 10/19/98 *U.S. News & World Report*)

October 21, 1998

Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering and Assistant Secretary of State Inderfurth told Taliban representative Mujahid that “The U.S. would hold the Taliban responsible for acts committed by UBL against the U.S. Mujahid said that expelling UBL would violate Taliban rules of hospitality.”
(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

October 29, 1998

The U.S. Intelligence Community obtained information that the Turkish Kaplancilar, an Islamic extremist group, had planned a suicide attack to coincide with celebrations marking the 75th anniversary of the founding of modern Turkey. The conspirators, 23 of whom were arrested, planned to crash an airplane packed with explosives into Ataturk’s tomb during a government ceremony. The Turkish press said the group had cooperated with Osama bin Laden. The FBI’s New York office included this incident in one of its Osama bin Laden databases.
(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

November 4, 1998

U.S. Attorney General Janet Reno indicts Osama bin Laden and Muhammed Atef, al Qaeda’s military commander, on a total of 301 counts of murder in connection with the U.S. Embassy bombings in East Africa and offers a \$5 million reward for bin Laden’s arrest.
(SOURCE: Paul L. Williams, *Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror*, 2002)

October-December 1998

According to government documents obtained by the *Boston Globe*, The FAA warned the nation’s airports and airlines in late 1998 about a possible terrorist hijacking “at a metropolitan airport in the Eastern United States” and urged a “high degree of vigilance” against threats to US civil aviation from Osama bin Laden’s terrorist network. The first of the three FAA circulars, issued on October 8th, instructs airports and airlines to maintain a “high degree of alertness” based on statements made by bin Laden and other Islamic leaders and intelligence information, Bin Laden, the circular stated, had praised one of the bombers arrested in a failed 1995 plot to blow

up US civilian airlines in the Far East. Another unnamed Islamic leader had stated that “militants had been mobilized to strike a significant US or Israeli target, to include bringing down or hijacking aircraft.” The report continues, “The arrest and pending extradition of the bin Laden cadre raises the possibility of a US airliner being hijacked in an effort to demand the release of incarcerated members.”

In a December 8, 1998 circular, the FAA “strongly recommends a high degree of vigilance” based on “the potential for retaliation for US cruise missile strikes in Afghanistan and Sudan.”

In a December 29, 1998 bulletin, the FAA references Osama bin Laden’s jihadist fatwa when it stated, “In light of these inflammatory statements there is continuing concern that bin Laden and terrorist groups comprising his terrorist network are preparing to conduct further terrorist attacks against U.S. interests, including U.S. aviation.”

(SOURCE: Ralph Ranalli, “Bulletin Warned Airports in ’98,” Boston Globe, May 26, 2002)

November 28, 1998

Taliban senior spokesman Wakil Ahmed told U.S. Embassy Islamabad Charge that “Any attempt to expel bin Laden would result in the downfall of the Taliban.”

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

December 1998

A CIA intelligence assessment concluded that bin Laden “is actively planning against U.S. targets...keenly interested in striking the U.S. on its own soil.”

(SOURCE: Joint Congressional Intelligence Report on the 9/11 Attacks, 9/18/02)

December 1998

A senior officer in the Iraqi intelligence service, Mukhabarat is “thought to have offered bin Laden asylum in Iraq..”

(SOURCE: “Saddam ‘Forging Links with bin Laden,” by Julian Borger, Guardian Weekly, February 14, 1999)

December 1998

Bin Laden states in an interview that it is a “religious duty” to acquire weapons of mass destruction, and noted, “How we would use them is up to us.”

(CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

December 25, 1998

Usama bin Laden called for Muslims around the world to attack US and UK citizens and interests to avenge their bombing of Iraq. Bin Laden also threatened Israelis and called for a fight against “the Jews and the crusaders, especially the Americans and British, who did not care about the rights of any child, elderly man or woman in Iraq.”

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

December 1998

The FAA completes a study on the possibility of transferring certain air carrier security responsibilities to either airport operators or to the Federal Government, or to provide for shared responsibilities. According to the Cathal Flynn, the Associate Administrator for Aviation Security:

We found that, while there is significant support for more Federal Government involvement and funding, there is little support for the Government's assuming all air carrier responsibilities. The existing partnership, where the Government sets goals and works with the industry to see that those goals are met, is universally supported...While carriers should not have to bear all the costs of security, they should bear a substantial portion of the personnel costs to provide security screening and the operational costs of using the advanced security equipment that the Federal Government provides...Screeners are a critical link in the performance chain. While it is difficult to verify a correlation between better pay and better performance, we can all agree that properly trained and qualified people who are on the job longer tend to perform better.

(SOURCE: Statement of Admiral Cathal Flynn, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, April 6, 2000.)

December 28, 1998

Islamic militants kidnapped 16 tourists on a highway near Aden, Yemen, including 12 Britons, two Americans, and two Australians. Four of the hostages were killed, prior to Yemenese authorities' successful intervention. The FBI soon disclosed evidence that the terrorists were funded by Osama bin Laden and had trained at al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan. The kidnappers were armed with rocket-propelled grenades and automatic weapons and equipped with a laptop computer and a satellite phone.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

1999

The FBI lists Usama bin Laden on its 'Most Wanted Terrorists' list. It offers a reward of up to \$25 million "for information leading directly to the apprehension or conviction of Usama bin Laden...Usama bin Laden is wanted in connection with the August 7, 1998, bombings of the United States Embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzani, and Nairobi, Kenya. The attacks killed over 200 people. In addition, Bin Laden is a suspect in other terrorist attacks throughout the world."

(SOURCE: fbi.gov/mostwant/terrorists/)

1999

An FAA directive identifies Osama bin laden by name as a threat to civil aviation.

1999

The FY 2000 CIA budget request to Congress describes bin Laden as "the most significant individual sponsor of Sunni Islamic extremist and terrorist activity in the world today."

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

1999

A widely circulated interagency study commissioned by the National Intelligence Council entitled 'The Sociology and Psychology of Terrorism: Who Becomes a Terrorist and Why?,' laid out several hypothetical attack scenarios posed by the most dangerous terrorist organizations in the world. Among other possible terrorist plots, the study describes the possibility of al Qaeda suicide bombers crash-landing an aircraft into the Pentagon:

Al Qaeda's expected retaliation for the U.S. cruise missile attack against al Qaeda's training facilities in Afghanistan on August 20, 1998, could take several forms of terrorist attack in the nation's capital. Al-Qaeda could detonate a Chechen-type building-buster bomb at a federal building. Suicide bomber(s) belonging to al-Qaeda's Martyrdom Battalion could crash-land an aircraft packed with high explosives (C-4 and Semtex) into the Pentagon, the headquarters of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), or the White House. Ramzi Yousef had planned to do this against the CIA headquarters. In addition, both al-Qaeda and Yousef were linked to a plot to assassinate President Clinton during his visit to the Philippines in early 1995.

Following the August 1998 cruise missile attack, at least one Islamic religious leader called for Clinton's assassination, and another stated that "the time is not far off" for when the White House will be destroyed by a nuclear bomb. Al-Qaeda's retaliation, however, is more likely to take the lower-risk form of bombing one or more U.S. airliners with time-bombs. Yousef was planning simultaneous bombings of 11 U.S. airliners prior to his capture. Whatever form an attack may take, bin Laden will most likely retaliate in a spectacular way for the cruise missile attack against his Afghan camp in August 1998.
(*SOURCE: Library of Congress, Federal Research Division, September 1999*)

1999

CIA Director George Tenet orders a baseline review of the CIA's operational strategy against bin Laden which results in the implementation of 'The Plan' to capture and bring to justice bin Laden and his principal lieutenants. The plan included a strong and focused intelligence collection program to track—and then act against—bin Laden and his associates in terrorist sanctuaries. It was a blend of aggressive human source collection—both unilateral and with foreign partners—and technical collection.

(*SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002*)

January 2, 1999

A UN Plane carrying one U.S. citizen, four Angolans, two Philippine nationals, and one Namibian was shot down, according to UN officials. No deaths occurred. Angolan authorities blamed the attack on National Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA).

(*SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, "Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology"*)

January 19, 1999

Indian police arrest four people and charged them with involvement in a plot directed by Osama bin Laden to bomb the US Embassy and two consular offices in Madras and Calcutta. The attacks were to have taken place before the January 26 anniversary of the Indian constitution. Police recovered two kilograms of RDX explosives and five detonators when they arrested the suspects at New Delhi's rail station. The group was purportedly led by Sayed Abu Nasir of Bangladesh and included four Egyptians, a Sudanese and a Burma national.

(*SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony*)

January 22, 1999

Richard A. Clarke, national coordinator for counterterrorism and computer security programs, announced that US intelligence enforcement agencies had prevented two truck bombings of US embassies by Osama in Laden's terrorists since the August 1998 east Africa embassy bombings. Some officials indicated that one of the embassies was in Uganda.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

January 28, 1999

Congressman Benjamin Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations Committee, criticizes U.S. foreign policy toward south Asia. Gilman describes "an unrelenting Pakistan-Afghanistan nexus in promoting international terrorism." He asserted that Pakistan supported Afghan terrorist camps and "provided crucial diplomatic support for the Taliban regime, hoping it will be dependent on Pakistan after gaining control throughout Afghanistan."

(SOURCE: "US Congressman Slams Pakistan-Taliban Nexus: NNI, January 28, 1999)

February 1999

The Intelligence Community obtained information that Iraq had formed a suicide pilot unit that it planned to use against British and U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf.

(SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

February 1999

During a London Islamist rally, Abu Hamza, Imam of the Finsbury Park Mosque, unveiled a plan to punish the United States and Britain for their air attacks on Iraq. Abu Hamza stated the following: "The idea is to slow down [the traffic] and make the sky very high risk for anybody who flies." During the same rally, an English-language presentation is circulated. It included a slide title "Muslim Antiaircraft Net," a plan to build connected webs of "flying mines" hanging from balloons. The slide shows a spider web of mines. Another slide shows a military aircraft whose nose explodes while hitting the web.

(SOURCE: CBC News, *The National*, "The Recruiters," Terence McKenna, June 2002)

February 2, 1999

CIA Director George Tenet tells an open session of the Senate Intelligence Committee that "there is not the slightest doubt that Usama Bin Ladin, his worldwide allies, and his sympathizers are planning further attacks against us. He will strike where in the world he thinks we are vulnerable. We are concerned that one or more of Bin Ladin's attacks could occur at any time."

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, *Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee*, October 17, 2002)

March 1999

German intelligence officials give the Central Intelligence Agency the first name and phone number of future September 11 hijacker Marwan al-Shehhi in the United Arab Emirates, and asked the Americans to track him. Al-Shehhi's name and contact information is obtained by the Germans by monitoring the telephone of Mohamed Heidar Zammar, an Islamic militant in Hamburg, Germany who is closely linked to the 9-11 plotters.

(SOURCE: James Risen and Eric Lichtlau, "CIA Was Given Data on Hijacker Long Before 9/11," *New York Times*, February 24, 2004)

March 1999

The U.S. Intelligence Community obtained information regarding plans by an al-Qaeda member, to fly a hang glider into the Egyptian Presidential Palace and then detonate the explosives he was carrying. The individual was subsequently arrested and is in custody abroad.

(SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

May 1999

An investigation in the Southern District of New York into the case of USA v. Ihab Mohamed Ali, reveals that the defendant, an accused al Qaeda operative, received pilot training in Oklahoma in 1994. This discovery illustrates government knowledge of al-Qaeda operatives receiving pilot lessons in the United States more than two years prior to September 11, 2001.

(SOURCE: USA v. Ihab Mohamed Ali, United States District Court, Southern District of New York)

June 1999

Clinton Administration National Security Council Taskforce Director on Al Qaeda William Wechsler and the Department of Treasury's Office of Foreign Assets Control Director Richard Newcomb traveled to Saudi Arabia to put the Saudi regime "on notice" regarding terrorism financing activities in the kingdom. One senior official present during the meetings stated: "We laid everything out—what we knew, what we thought. We told them we'd just had two of our embassies blown up and that we needed to deal with them in a different way." In response to the urging by American officials, little was done by the Saudis to curb terrorist financing. A second meeting in January 2000 was reportedly met with the same response.

(SOURCE: David E. Kaplan, "The Saudi Connection," U.S. News & World Report, December 15, 2003)

June 7, 1999

The FBI places Osama bin Laden on its 'Most Wanted List' for the first time.

July 1999

U.S. government informant Randy Glass records a conversation he shares with Pakistani arms dealers, held at a restaurant within view of the World Trade Center. R.G. Abbas, one of the Pakistani dealers, points to the WTC and says, "Those towers are coming down." Abbas later makes other references to an attack on the WTC. Glass passes these warnings on to government officials, but he claims "The complaints were ordered sanitized by the highest levels of government."

(SOURCE: NBC Dateline, 3/18/03)

August 1999

A graphic of what appears to be the World Trade Center towers in crosshairs appears on page 45 of Air Force Manual 10-100: Airman's Manual (August 1999 edition). The same image appears on the cover of a manual distributed by the Department of Justice at a training program titled "Managing Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents: An Executive Level Program for Sheriffs" in June 2000.

(SOURCE: The Memory Hole website, "Another Official Pre-9/11 Image of the WTC Being Targeted." 30 November 2004.)

October 1999

In secret negotiations to hand over Osama bin Laden, the Taliban regime suggests to the United States “several solutions including a UBL trial by a panel of Islamic scholars or monitoring UBL Afghanistan by OIC or UN.”

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

October 1999

Following the release of a report detailing how wealthy Saudi businessmen bankroll Al Qaeda through international banks and Islamic charities, U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright indicates to the media that she plans to raise the issue with Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan bin Abdul Aziz al Saud during his visit to the United States in late 1999.

(SOURCE: Indian Express, “Saudi Businessmen Funding Bin Laden—US Media Report,” October 29, 1999)

October 16, 1999

The UN Security Council imposes sanctions on the Taliban until bin Laden is expelled from the country. The sanctions prohibit all commerce between member states and the Afghan government.

October 19, 1999

The UN Security Council adopts Resolution 1269. The Resolution calls on member states to cooperate in combating global terrorism. The main body of the Resolution follows:

Reaffirming that the suppression of acts of international terrorism, including those in which States are involved, is an essential contribution to the maintenance of international peace and security,

1. Unequivocally condemns all acts, methods and practices of terrorism as criminal and unjustifiable, regardless of their motivation, in all their forms and manifestations, wherever and by whomever committed, in particular those which could threaten international peace and security;
2. Calls upon all States to implement fully the international anti-terrorist conventions to which they are parties, encourages all States to consider as a matter of priority adhering to those to which they are not parties; and encourages also the speedy adoption of the pending conventions;
3. Stresses the vital role of the United Nations in strengthening international cooperation in combating terrorism and emphasizes the importance of enhanced coordination among States, international and regional organizations;
4. Calls upon all States to take, inter alia, in the context of such cooperation and coordination, appropriate steps to:
 - cooperate with each other, particularly through bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements, to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, protect their nationals and other persons against terrorist attacks and bring to justice the perpetrators of such acts;
 - prevent and suppress in their territories through all lawful means the preparation and financing of any acts of terrorism;

- deny those who plan, finance or commit terrorist acts safe havens by ensuring their apprehension and prosecution or extradition;
- take appropriate measures in conformity with the relevant provisions of national and international law, including international standards of human rights, before granting refugee status, for the purpose of ensuring that the asylum-seeker has not participated in terrorist acts;
- exchange information in accordance with international and domestic law, and cooperate on administrative and judicial matters in order to prevent the commission of terrorist acts;

5. Requests the Secretary-General, in his reports to the General Assembly, in particular submitted in accordance with its resolution 50/53 on measures to eliminate international terrorism, to pay special attention to the need to prevent and fight the threat to international peace and security as a result of terrorist activities;

6. Expresses its readiness to consider relevant provisions of the reports mentioned in paragraph 5 above and to take necessary steps in accordance with its responsibilities under the Charter of the United Nations in order to counter terrorist threats to international peace and security;

7. Decides to remain seized of this matter.

October 25, 1999

Assistant Secretary Inderfurth met with Taliban representative Abdul Mujahid to hand over a letter stating... “The U.S. was not opposed to Islam; bin Laden was in Afghanistan planning attacks on the U.S. and elsewhere’ the UN Security Council had unanimously passed a resolution calling on the Taliban to hand bin Laden over to a country where he could be brought to justice; we were ready to discuss this issue and had in fact raised it over 20 times with the Taliban officials.” In response to the letter, Mujahid made two proposals...the Taliban would confine UBL in Afghanistan under supervision of the OTC, NAM or the UN...The second proposal was for a panel of Islamic scholars to decide UBL’s future. One scholar would be from Afghanistan, one from Saudi Arabia, and one from a third country. Inderfurth noted that if this process took place, the U.S. hoped it would lead to extradition.

(SOURCE: United States Department of State, “U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden.” Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

October 29, 1999

Following a visit to the United States by Saudi Prince Sultan, *USA Today* reports that:

More than a year after the US Embassy bombings in East Africa, prominent businessmen in Saudi Arabia continue to transfer tens of millions of dollar to bank accounts linked to indicted terrorist Osama bin Laden...According to a Saudi government audit acquired by U.S. intelligence, five of Saudi Arabia’s top businessmen ordered the National Commercial Bank (NCB), the kingdom’s largest, to transfer personal funds, along with \$3 million diverted from a Saudi pension fund, to New York and London Banks. The money was deposited into the accounts of Islamic charities, including Islamic Relief and Blessed Relief, which serve as fronts for bin Laden. The businessmen, who are worth more than \$5 billion, are paying bin Laden “protection money” to stave off attacks on their businesses in Saudi Arabia, intelligence officials said.

October 31, 1999

Egypt Air Flight 900. The pilot, quietly repeating an Islamic prayer, crashes, apparently with intent, the Boeing 767 into the Atlantic Ocean shortly after its departure from New York's JFK Airport.

(SOURCE: <http://www.nts.gov/events/ea990/Default.htm>)

November 12, 1999

Seven rockets were launched by remote control from three empty vehicles at the US Embassy, World Bank building, and the Saudi-Pak tower, which houses UN offices in Islamabad. Several people were injured. The rockets fell short of their targets and caused little damage. Pakistani authorities believed that the attacks were carried out by either Lashkar or Taleban affiliated authorities. The UN had imposed sanctions on the Taliban regime in Afghanistan two days prior to the attack.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

November 22, 1999

The UN and US reportedly had tightened security arrangements at their facilities after the UN's security coordinator, Benon Sevan of Cyprus, released an internal memo indicated that there were "reliable reports" that bin Laden's supporters could attack US or UN targets in Pakistan, Afghanistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, or Turkmenistan in retaliation for the sanctions imposed against Afghanistan on November 14.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

December 1999

The FBI obtained from Jordan copies of a six-volume manual used by bin Laden to train al Qaeda recruits. The manual had been in the possession of terrorists who were arrested in Jordan while planning New Year's attacks in Israel and Jordan. During their interrogations, the suspects revealed that they planned to flatten the Raddisson SAS Hotel in Amman "like a pancake" with explosives in a coordinated attack. The group also wanted to attack US tourists at Mount Neblo and at a site on the Jordan River.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony; Paul L. Williams, 'Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,' 2002)

December 15, 1999

Washington State Police arrested Ahmed Ressay on the Canadian-US border, as he arrived by ferry from Canada. He was transporting two 22-ounce bottles of nitroglycerin, more than 100 pounds of urea, 14 pounds of a sulfate, and homemade timers in his rental car on his way to Los Angeles International Airport to carry out a bombing. Ressay had trained and was financed by al Qaeda affiliates.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

December 24, 1999

Indian Airlines Airbus hijacking. Five militants hijacked a flight bound from Kathmandu to New Delhi carrying 189 people. The plane and its passengers were released unharmed on December

31, 1999. It is considered to be the first hijacking directly connected to and carried out by al Qaeda and Osama bin Laden.

(SOURCE: U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology”)

Late 1999

Saudi Arabia’s Intelligence Chief Prince Turki al-Faisal tells the AP in a 2003 interview that “his government determined in late 1999 or early 2000 that eventual Sept. 11 hijackers Khalid al-Mihdhar and Nawaf al-Hazmi were al-Qaida operatives involved in two terror plots.” Prince Turki alleges his intelligence agency told the CIA in late 1999 and early 2000 that the kingdom had placed both men on its own terror watch list after learning from al-Qaida prisoners and intelligence intercepts that al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi might be connected to the 1998 al-Qaida attacks on U.S. embassies in Africa and a 1997 effort to smuggle weapons. In response to this assertion, the CIA denies receiving such information until after the September 11 attacks. CIA spokesman states “There is not a shred of evidence that Saudi intelligence provided CIA any information about al-Mihdhar and al-Hazmi prior to September 11 as they have described. There have been exhaustive examinations of our records, not only by us, but by Congressional inquiries, and no such records have surfaced. We have found information similar to that which you cite which the Saudis passed to us a month after September 11.

(SOURCE: John Solomon, “Saudis, U.S. Describe Intelligence Links,” *The Associated Press*, October 17, 2003)

2000

The Federal Aviation Act and its various amendments, Parts 107 and 108 of the Federal Aviation Regulations sets forth the respective responsibilities of airport operators and air carriers. 14 C.F.R. pt. 107 (Airport Security); 14 C.F.R. pt. 108 (Airplane Operator Security). The Act and its amendments specifically dictated that the screening function had to be carried out by air carriers. 49 U.S.C. §44901(a); see also S. Rep. No. 106-388, at 1(2000), at 1(2000). Pursuant to that directive, Part 108 charged air carriers with screening passengers and property and monitoring and securing sterile areas—areas such as the concourse where gates are located and access is controlled through inspection—under the air carriers’ control.

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement of Jane F. Garvey, Administrator, Federal Aviation Administration, January 27, 2004)

2000

In its publication, “Criminal Acts against Civil Aviation 2000,” the FAA stated:

Although Bin Laden is not known to have attacked civil aviation, he has both the motivation and the wherewithal to do so. Bin Ladin’s anti-Western and anti-American attitudes make him and his followers a significant threat to civil aviation, especially U.S. civil aviation.

The FAA report also points out that:

Increased awareness and vigilance are necessary to deter future incidents—be they from terrorist or non-terrorists. It is important to do the utmost to prevent such acts rather than to lower security measures by interpreting the statistics as indicating a decreasing threat.

Winter 2000

Terrorist cells planning attacks against U.S. and foreign military and civilian targets in the Persian Gulf region are broken up, and hundreds of pounds of explosives and other weapons are seized—including anti-aircraft missiles. These operations also netted proof that some Islamic charitable organizations had been either hijacked or created to provide support to terrorists operating in other countries.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

January 5-8, 2000

Approximately a dozen of bin Laden's trusted followers hold a secret, "top-level al-Qaeda summit" in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. Plans for the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole and the 9/11 attacks are discussed. At the request of the CIA, the Malaysian secret service monitors the meeting and then passes the information on to the United States. Attendees of the meeting include: Hijackers Nawaf Alhazmi and Khalid Almihdhar. The CIA already knows many details about these two by the time the meeting begins. Included in the meeting is Khalid Shaikh Mohammed, a top al-Qaeda leader and the alleged "mastermind" of the 9/11 attacks. The US had known Mohammed was a major terrorist since the exposure of Operation Bojinka in 1995. US officials have stated that they only realized the meeting was important in the summer of 2001. The possible presence of Mohammed at this meeting is highly disputed. In 2003, one terrorism expert testifies before the 9/11 Independent Commission that he has access to transcripts of Mohammed's interrogations since his capture, and that Mohammed admits leading this meeting. Indonesian terrorist known as Hambali was also present. He was the main financier of Operation Bojinka. Philippine intelligence officials learned of Hambali's importance in 1995, but didn't track him down or share information about him. Yazid Sufaat, a Malaysian man owned the condominium where the meeting was held. Sufaat travels to Afghanistan in June 2001, and is arrested by Malaysian authorities when he returns to Malaysia in late 2001. Fahad al-Quso, a top al-Qaeda operative also attends. Al-Quso is arrested by Yemeni authorities in late 2000, but the FBI is not given a chance to interrogate him before 9/11. He escapes from prison in 2003. Tawfiq bin Attash, better known by his alias "Khallad." Bin Attash, a "trusted member of bin Laden's inner circle," was in charge of bin Laden's bodyguards, and served as bin Laden's personal intermediary at least for the USS Cole attack. He is also thought to be the "mastermind" of that attack. Bin Attash had been previously arrested in Yemen for suspected terror ties, but let go. He is captured in Pakistan by the US in April 2003. Ramzi bin al-Shibh, who investigators believe wanted to be the twentieth hijacker, also attends the meeting. His presence at the meeting may not have been realized until after 9/11, despite a picture of him next to bin Attash, and even video footage of him. German police have credit card receipts indicating bin al-Shibh is in Malaysia at the same time. Anonymous Malaysian officials claim he is there, but US officials deny it. There is also the possibility that another hijacker, Salem Alhazmi, also attends the meeting. US intelligence intercepts from before the meeting show that he at least had plans to attend.

(SOURCE: CNN, August 30, 2002; San Diego Tribune, September 27, 2002; USA Today, February 12, 2002; Los Angeles Times, February 2, 2002; New York Times, January 31, 2002; Newsweek, June 2, 2002; Newsweek, September 20, 2001; CNN, May 15, 2003; Contemporary Southeast Asia, December 1, 2002; New York Times, May 1, 2003; Washington Post, July 14, 2002; Time, September 15, 2002; Die Zeit, October 1, 2002; Newsweek, November 26, 2001; CNN, November 7, 2002; Los Angeles Times, September 1, 2002; Associated Press, September 20, 2002; Congressional Inquiry, July 24, 2003)

January 5, 2000

The FAA issues a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) which requires the certification of all screening companies, specifies training requirements for screeners, sets standards for screening passengers and cargo, and establishes requirements for the use of screening requirements. When implemented, the NPRM would require screening companies to adopt FAA-approved security programs and would require carriers to install TIP systems on all their X-ray and explosive detection systems. The rule also requires that all screening companies adopt and implement FAA-approved screening security programs that include procedures for performing screening functions, including operating equipment; screener testing standards and test administration requirement; threat image projection standards, operating requirements, and data collection methods; and performance standards. In addition, all screening personnel would have to pass computerized knowledge-based and X-ray interpretation tests before and after their on-the-job training and at the conclusion of their recurrent training. These tests would be monitored by air carrier personnel in accordance with the air carriers' security programs.

(SOURCE: Statement of Admiral Cathal Flynn, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, April 6, 2000.)

February 2000

CIA Director George Tenet tells an open session of the Senate Intelligence Committee that "Everything we have learned recently confirms our conviction that (UBL) wants to strike further blows against America" and that he could strike "without additional warning."

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

February 6, 2000

An Arian Afghan Airlines Boeing 727-228 flying from Kabul, Afghanistan to Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan is hijacked. The hijacker demanded to be taken to the UK. The aircraft flew to London via Tashkent, Uzbekistan, and Moscow, Russia. The hijackers surrender at London Stansted Airport five days later.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

February 16, 2000

The offer of \$5 million reward for the capture of Osama bin Laden was stamped on the face of Pakistani 100-rupee notes that were distributed around the country. The announcement appears on both sides of the notes in Pashtu and Dari.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

March 2000

Auckland, New Zealand police foiled a plot to bomb a scientific research nuclear reactor in Sydney during the 2000 Summer Olympic in the city. Police believe that the plot ring had connections to bin Laden and al Qaeda.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

March 10, 2000

President Clinton's planned visit to a village in Bangladesh is called off because of a terrorist threat linked to Al Qaeda.

(SOURCE: Paul L. Williams, 'Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,' 2002)

April 2000

The FAA distributes 700 CD ROM copies of a 24 slide presentation of potential and existing threats to air security to the airlines and air operators. Executives from United and American Airlines acknowledge having received and reviewed the presentation during the spring of 2000. (SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Aviation Security on 9/11: The Airlines, January 27, 2004)

April 2000

The Intelligence Community obtained information regarding an alleged Bin Laden plot to hijack a 747 airliner. The source was a "walk-in" to the FBI's Newark office who claimed that he had been to a training camp in Pakistan where he learned hijacking techniques and received arms training. He also stated that he was supposed to meet five to six other individuals in the United States who would also participate in the plot. They were instructed to use all necessary force to take over the plane because there would be pilots among the hijacking team. The plan was to fly the plane to Afghanistan, and if they would not make it there, that they were to blow up the plane. (SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

April 6, 2000

The Associate Administrator of the FAA for Security, Admiral Cathal Flynn, stated in open testimony before the Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation Subcommittee on Aviation Security, "...[M]oreover, members of foreign terrorist groups and representatives from state sponsors of terrorism are present in the United States. There is evidence that a few foreign terrorist groups have well-established capability and infrastructures here..." (SOURCE: Statement of Admiral Cathal Flynn, Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security, Before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science, and Transportation, Subcommittee on Aviation, April 6, 2000.)

April 23, 2000

Philippine Islamic separatist group Abu Sayyaf kidnaps 20 people, including three Germans and two French tourists, from a Malaysian resort island. The militants demanded the release of Ramzi Yousef, mastermind of the 1993 World Trade Center attacks. (SOURCE: Mike Gardner and Adam Sherwin, "Terror gang kidnaps tourists." Times of London, April 25, 2000.)

May 2000

The United Nations Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK) raid a house rented by the Saudi Joint Relief Committee (SJRC) in Pristina, Kosovo following fears of a possible terrorist attack on the U.S. office in the province. UN and US officials state that the organization was acting as a cover for several al Qaeda operatives, including former SJRC Wael Hamza Jalaidan, Secretary General of the Rabita Trust in Pakistan and co-founder of al Qaeda, and Adel Muhammad Sadi Bin Kazem. An intelligence document reviewed by the BBC states that Jalaidan helped bin Laden "move money and men to and from the Balkans." (SOURCE: Nick Wood, "U.S. fears terrorist attack in Kosovo," BBC News, April 3, 2000)

May 2000

U.S. Department of Agriculture Loan Officer Johnelle Bryant meets with 9/11 organizer Mohammed Atta in a USDA Miami-Dade County field office. Atta attempts to secure a \$650,000 loan for a crop-dusting business he is supposedly developing. Atta tells Bryant that he had just arrived in the United States from Afghanistan "to start his dream, which was to go to flight school and get his pilot's license, and work both as a charter pilot and a crop duster too," Bryant told ABC news in a June 6, 2002 interview. Atta wanted to finance a twin-engine six-passenger aircraft, remove the seats and "build a chemical tank that would fit inside the aircraft and take up every available square inch of the aircraft except for where the pilot would be sitting." When Bryant explained that there was an application process, Atta became "very agitated." He thought the loan would be in cash, and that he would have no trouble obtaining it to purchase an aircraft. He also remarked about the lack of security in the building, pointing specifically to a safe behind Bryant's desk. "He asked me what would prevent him from going behind my desk and cutting my throat and making off with the millions of dollars in that safe," said Bryant. According to anonymous law enforcement officials, packing twin-engine planes with explosive chemicals, making it a flying bomb, had been the terrorists' plan since the mid-1990s.

Before leaving Bryant's office, Atta became fixated with an aerial photo of Washington that was hanging on her office wall. "He just said that it was one of the prettiest, the best he'd ever seen of Washington," she said, remembering that he was impressed with the panoramic view that captured all the monuments and buildings in one photograph, pointing specifically to the Pentagon and the White House. "He pulled out a wad of cash," she said, "and started throwing money on my desk. He wanted that picture really bad." Bryant indicated that the picture was not for sale, and he threw more money down. "His look on his face became very bitter at that point," Bryant remembers. "I believe he said, 'How would America like it if another country destroyed that city and some of the monuments in it,' like the cities in his country had been destroyed?" (SOURCE: ABC News, 6/6/02)

May 22, 2000

The BBC reports that the Russian Federal Security Service accused the Saudi Arabia-based Islamic organization, al Haramain, of providing Chechen rebels with money and supplies under the guise of supporting Muslim religious activities. (SOURCE: "Saudi Arabia denies group's Chechen links," BBC, May 22, 2000)

May 27, 2000

Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering gives Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Jalil a point-by-point outline of the information tying Usama bin Laden to the 1998 embassy bombings. The Taliban subsequently rejected this evidence. (SOURCE: United States Department of State, "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden." Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

June 2000

A graphic of what appears to be the World Trade Center towers in crosshairs appears on page 45 of Air Force Manual 10-100: Airman's Manual (August 1999 edition). The same image appears on the cover of a manual distributed by the Department of Justice at a training program titled "Managing Weapons of Mass Destruction Incidents: An Executive Level Program for Sheriffs" in June 2000. (SOURCE: The Memory Hole website, "Another Official Pre-9/11 Image of the WTC Being Targeted." 30 November 2004.)

July 27, 2000

A National Airlines plane scheduled to fly from New York JFK to Las Vegas is hijacked by a man who entered the plane with a gun and demanded to be taken to Antarctica. He surrenders the same day.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

August 9, 2000

The Philadelphia Inquirer reports that Osama bin Laden and his brother-in-law, Jamal al-Khalifa, set up a branch of the International Islamic Relief Organization in Mindanao, Phillipines in 1992 “as a front organization for funding terrorist activities.” A Phillipines intelligence report states “The IIRO which claims to be a relief institution is being utilized by foreign extremists as a pipeline through which funding for the local extremists are being coursed through.” A former member of the al Qaeda subsidiary Abu Sayyaf terrorist group based in the Phillipines told the *Inquirer*:

Only 10 to 30 percent of the foreign funding goes to the legitimate relief and livelihood projects and the rest goes to terrorist operations. The IIRO was behind the construction of mosques, school buildings and other livelihood projects in areas penetrated, highly influenced and controlled by the Abu Sayyaf.

(SOURCE: Christine Herrera, “Bin Laden Funds Abu Sayyaf through Muslim Relief Group,” *Philadelphia Inquirer*, August 9, 2000)

September 2000

A Moroccan man named L’Houssaine Kherchtou tells FBI authorities that he had been sent to flight school by one of Osama bin Laden’s top lieutenants from al-Qaida’s military committee. He was instructed to learn to fly so he could operate crop dusters caring for al-Qaida’s crops in Sudan. One day, he was told, he would become a pilot for al-Qaida. In a meeting Kherchtou attended in 1993 or 1994, he observed an Egyptian man telling al Qaeda operative Ihab Ali about how air traffic control works and how people communicate over air traffic control systems. An Assistant U.S. Attorney told the *St. Petersburg Times* that, “It was his belief that there might have been a plan to send a pilot to Saudi Arabia or someone familiar with that to monitor the air traffic communications so they could possibly attack an airplane perhaps belonging to an Egyptian president or something in Saudi Arabia.”

(SOURCE: Chuck Murphy, “Pilot Led a quiet life in Orlando,” *St. Petersburg Times*, October 28, 2001)

September 14, 2000

A Qatar Airways Airbus A.300 going from Doha, Qatar Airport to Amman, Jordan is hijacked at Ha’il, Saudi Arabia by a man demanding political asylum. He surrenders later the same day.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 11, 2000

One day before the U.S.S. Cole bombing in Yemen, the Taliban Embassy in Islamabad held a press conference during which the ambassador called on “other Muslim countries to wipe out the atrocities being meted out by the Zionist government” and denounced the United States “for harboring enmity with Islam.”

(SOURCE: *The Taliban’s official website*: <http://www.afghan-ie.com>)

October 12, 2000

A terrorist bomb damages the destroyer U.S.S. Cole in the port of Aden, Yemen, killing 17 American sailors and injuring 39. Al Qaeda accepts responsibility for the attack.

October 14, 2000

A Saudi Arabian Airlines Boeing 777-268 flying from Jeddah, Saudi Arabia to London is hijacked in order for the assailants to make a political statements. The hijackers surrender later the same day in Baghdad, Iraq.

(SOURCE: Aviation Safety Network, Hijackings Database, <http://aviation-safety.net/database/>)

October 24, 2000

Shortly after the U.S.S. Cole attack, the Taliban defiantly urged that Israel “should be given a practical and tooth breaking response.”

(SOURCE: *Shariat Weekly (Kabul)*, October 24, 2000)

October 24-26, 2000

Pentagon officials carry out a “detailed” emergency drill based upon the crashing of a hijacked airliner into the Pentagon.

(SOURCE: *MDW News Service 11/3/00; Mirror 5/24/02*)

October 27, 2000

Amidst rumors that the United States would retaliate against al Qaeda for the U.S.S. Cole bombing, the Taliban’s foreign minister, Maulvi Abdul Wakil Mutawakkil, said that the Taliban would “retaliate with full force” if the United States were to strike again at bin Ladin.”

(SOURCE: *Tariq Butt, “Taliban to Retaliate if Attacked by U.S.,” The News (Islamabad)*, October 27, 2000)

December 19, 2000

The UN Security Council passes Resolution 1333, banning all military aid to the Taliban in an effort to shut down al Qaeda terrorist camps in Afghanistan.

2001

The National Security Agency reported at least 33 communications indicating a possible, imminent terrorist attack in 2001.

(SOURCE: *Statement of Eleanor Hill, Former Staff Director, Joint Congressional Committee on the 9/11 Attacks, The House Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 10, 2003*)

January 5, 2001

The French Government *Direction Generale de Securite Exterieur*e produces a classified report titled “Hijacking Threats by Radical Islamists that Could Affect American Airlines, Delta Airlines, Air France, and Lufthansa.” The report is one of more than 30 memos delivered to American intelligence authorities in the months prior to September 11th. It is later referenced in French media coverage of terrorist threats to the United States.

(SOURCE: *2001 French Government Report*)

January 17, 2001

Six members of Lashkar-e-Tayyba militant group were killed when they attempted to seize Srinagar Airport.

(SOURCE: *U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Bureau of Public Affairs, “Significant Terrorist Events, 1961-2001: A Chronology”*)

January 31, 2001

The U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century releases the Hart-Rudman report on counterterrorism. The study states, “The combination of unconventional weapons proliferation with the persistence of international terrorism will end the relative invulnerability of the U.S.”

homeland to catastrophic attack...A direct attack against American citizens on American soil is likely over the next quarter century.”

(SOURCE: U.S. Commission on National Security/21st Century)

March 2001

Longtime intelligence community observer, Selig Harrison, tells the international media that the CIA worked in tandem with Pakistan to create the “monster” that is today’s Afghanistan’s ruling Taliban. “The CIA made a historic mistake in encouraging Islamic groups from all over the world to come to Afghanistan.” The U.S. provided \$3 billion for building up these Islamic groups, and it accepted Pakistan’s demand that they should decide how this money should be spent. Regarding the link between Pakistan’s ISI and the Taliban, Harrison stated, “The Taliban are not just recruits from ‘madrassas’ (Muslim theological schools) but are on the payroll of the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence, the intelligence wing of the Pakistani government).” The Taliban are now “making a living out of terrorism.”

(SOURCE: Sanjay Suri, “CIA worked with Pak to create Taliban,” India Abroad News Service, March 6, 2001)

Spring 2001

Clinton Administration Deputy National Security Advisor General Donald Kerrick wrote a memo to the incoming Bush Administration National Security Council stating “We will be struck again.” Kerrick never receives a response to his memo.

(SOURCE: Family Steering Committee for the 9/11 Independent Commission, “Regarding the Importance of Gaining Access to the NSC,” February 9, 2004.

April 2001

The Intelligence Community obtained information from a source with terrorist connections who speculated that Bin Laden would be interested in commercial pilots as potential terrorists. The source warned that the United States should not focus only on embassy bombings, that terrorists sought “spectacular and traumatic” attacks, and that the first World Trade Center bombing would be the type of attack that would be appealing. The source did not mention a timeframe for any attack. The information was not disseminated within the U.S. Intelligence Community.

(SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

May 2001

An American Airlines crew discovered that their uniforms, documents, and identification badges had stolen from a hotel.

(SOURCE: The Times Online, 9/14/01)

May 2001

The CIA learns that supporters of Osama bin Laden were planning to infiltrate the United States; that seven were on their way to the United States, Canada, and Britain; that his operatives “were disappearing while others were preparing for martyrdom,” and that his associates “were planning attacks in the United States with explosives.”

(SOURCE: Washington Post 9/19/02)

May 2001

Department of Defense medical personnel are trained for a hypothetical airliner hijacking attack on the Pentagon.

(SOURCE: U.S. Medicine, October 2001)

May 2001

An article appears on a Web site maintained by defendant Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, currently on trial in United States District Court, District of Idaho, Southern Division, written by radical Saudi sheik, Homed Ali (phonetic) which reads, “the holy warrior must kill himself if he knows that this will lead to the killing of a great number of the enemies: “[H]e will not be able to kill them without killing himself first or demolishing a center vital to the enemy or its military force...” “This is not possible except by involving the human element in the operation. In this new era, this can be accomplished with the modern means of bombing or bringing down an airplane on an important location that will cause the enemy great losses.”

(SOURCE: United States v. Sami Omar Al-Hussayen, Case No. CR03-48-N, Testimony of Michael Gneckow, March 11-12, 2003)

May 11, 2001

The State Department warned that Americans abroad could be targets of a threat by Usama bin Laden supporters. “Americans should maintain a low profile, vary routes and times required for all travel, and treat mail and packages...with suspicion.”

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

May 31, 2001

Michael O’Hanlon, international terrorism expert at Brookings, tells the media that “I think that [a new attack] will strike the United States again. It’s evident.”

(SOURCE: L’Orient – Le Jour, May 31, 2001, cited in Med Intelligence News Summary 2000 – 2002, <http://medintelligence.free.fr/RdPterrorisme.htm>).

Spring-Summer 2001

The CIA assists the Jordanian government in breaking up another terrorist cell in Jordan and seizes large quantities of weapons, including rockets and high explosives.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

Spring-Summer 2001

The U.S. helps break up a terrorist plan to attack U.S. facilities in Yemen.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002)

Early Summer 2001

Thirty-three communications were collected by the National Security Agency between May and July indicating a “possible, imminent terrorist attack.”

(SOURCE: Joint Congressional Intelligence Report on the 9/11 Attacks, 9/18/02)

Summer 2001

The FAA Red Team Security Division completed an audit of the airlines’ security systems and briefed the airline security executives on the results.

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, January 27, 2004)

Summer 2001

A Middle East expert describes in an article on the Taliban and al Qaeda the financial benefits that al Qaeda provides to the Taliban regime: “It is conceivable that as Taliban leaders have

become increasingly involved in the drug trade, bin Laden's international network may have helped them in distributing these narcotics. Numerous terrorist-affiliated websites are certainly active in soliciting funds for the Taliban. As a symbol of defiance toward the United States and of adherence toward the cause of militant Islam, bin Laden is also valuable to the Taliban as a source of donations from abroad, particularly from the wealthy Arab countries of the Persian Gulf.

(SOURCE: Julie Sirrs, "The Taliban's International Ambitions," *The Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2001, Volume VIII.)

Summer 2001

A senior bin Laden associate is arrested. Information he provided included plans to kidnap Americans in three countries, and carry out hijackings.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, *Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee*, October 17, 2002)

Summer 2001

The CIA provides intelligence to a Latin American country on a group of terrorists considering hijackings and bombings. An FBI team detected explosives residue in their hotel rooms.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, *Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee*, October 17, 2002)

Summer 2001

The Intelligence Community Counterterrorism Board issues several threat advisories which contain phrases like "al-Qa'ida is most likely to attempt spectacular attacks resulting in numerous casualties," and "al-Qa'ida is prepared to mount one or more terrorist attacks at any time." As a result, the FAA issued two alerts to air carriers in the summer of 2001.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, *Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee*, October 17, 2002)

Summer 2001

The civil aviation system in the United States stood, as it had for some time, at an intermediate aviation security alert level—tantamount to a permanent Code Yellow. This level, and its corresponding security measures were required when:

Information indicates that a terrorist group or other hostile entity with a known capability of attacking civil aviation is likely to carry out attacks against U.S. targets; or civil disturbances with a direct impact on civil aviation have begun or are imminent.

(SOURCE: *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States*, Staff Statement No. 3, January 27, 2004)

Summer 2001

Former U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency Afghanistan analyst Julie Sirrs publishes an important critique of U.S. intelligence failures in Afghanistan and south Asia. Based on her independent travels to Afghanistan in October 1999 and March 2000, Ms. Sirrs argues that the U.S. should no longer treat the Taliban and al Qaeda as separate issues and movements, and that the Taliban, much like al Qaeda, poses a global security threat with its recruitment of international jihadists and intertwined operational links with al Qaeda. Sirrs states:

Far from fighting a purely intra-Afghan civil war, the Taliban's goals and supporters extend far beyond the borders of Afghanistan. As such, thousands of

foreign Muslim extremists have flocked to the movement's side...The Taliban is thus not merely a group that is a threat to Afghanistan but to the entire world, and one that the United States should take a more active and effective role in countering.”

The foreign soldiers are recruited with active support of several terrorist organizations, including bin Ladin's, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan, and Harakat ul Ansar. Once inside Afghanistan, the recruits receive weapons training in Taliban camps and direct combat experience in fighting against the United Front.” Sirrs continues, “Where the Taliban end and bin Laden's Al-Qaida organization begins is perhaps difficult to determine...Both the Taliban and Al-Qaida are perhaps best viewed as links in the same chain of the international terrorist network. The Taliban have created an indispensable haven in Afghanistan, a base where extremists like bin Ladin and others can meet and plan future attacks in relative safety. ”

(SOURCE: Jule Sirrs, “The Taliban's International Ambitions,” *The Middle East Quarterly*, Summer 2001, Volume VIII.)

June 2001

The CIA works with a Middle Eastern partner to arrest two bin Laden operatives planning attacks on U.S. facilities in Saudi Arabia.

(SOURCE: CIA Director George Tenet, *Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee*, October 17, 2002)

June 13, 2001

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak learns of a communiqué from Osama bin Laden saying he wanted to assassinate President George W. Bush and other G8 heads of state during their summit in Italy. Mubarak tells *Le Figaro*, a French daily newspaper that Egyptian intelligence told the United States about the threat and that the warning included a reference to “an airplane stuffed with explosives.”

(SOURCE: David E. Sanger, “Threat at Genoa Summit Revealed,” *New York Times*, September 26, 2001)

June 14, 2001

Indian police arrested Abdel Raouf Hawas, a Sudanese man, and Mohammed Shamim Sarwar, an accomplice of indeterminate nationality suspected of planning to bomb the US Embassy and charged them with possession of 13 pounds of explosives, detonators, and timers. The Sudanese student said he was acting on orders from Abdul Rehman Al Safani, a Yemeni man with ties to Usama bin Laden. Raouf said that the explosives and detonators found in the car had been provided by two Sudanese Embassy diplomats—the Charge d'Affaires and its consul, who was the embassy's intelligence agent. Hawas told the authorities that Safani was working for al Qaeda. The deputy police commissioner told the media that the group had been planning an attack against the US Embassy for two years.

(SOURCE: Edward Mickolus and Susan L. Simmons, *Terrorism, 1998-2001: A chronology of events and a selectively annotated bibliography*, Westport, CT: Greenwood Press; 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

June 22, 2001

The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) issued an “information circular” to commercial airlines citing concern about possible hijackings.

(SOURCE: *Reuters* 5/16/02)

June 22, 2001

The *New York Post* reports that President Bush's July visit to the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy might be moved to an aircraft carrier, such as the *USS Enterprise*, or a cruise ship because of terrorist threats. Security officials are reportedly alarmed about "the vulnerability of the Genoa summit site to remote-controlled airplanes and other exotic weapons."

(SOURCE: *Niles Lathem and Andy Soltis, "Threats May Move Summit," New York Post, June 22, 2001*)

June 28, 2001

U.S. Government officials are advised by the Intelligence Community that the attacks were expected to "have dramatic consequences on governments or cause major casualties."

(SOURCE: *Statement of Eleanor Hill, Former Staff Director, Joint Congressional Committee on the 9/11 Attacks, The House Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 10, 2003*)

July 2001

A terrorist who had been directed to begin an operation to attack the U.S. Embassy or cultural center in a European capital is detained in the Middle East.

(SOURCE: *CIA Director George Tenet, Joint Congressional Inquiry Committee, October 17, 2002*)

July 2001

The Italian Government closes airspace over Genoa and mounted anti-aircraft batteries based on information that Islamic extremists were planning to use an airplane to kill President Bush during the Genoa summit of the Group of Eight industrial powers. According to Italy's Deputy Prime Minister Gianfranco Fini, in remarks reported by the Italian news agency, told the Americans "that there was the possibility of an attack against the U.S. president using an airliner. That's why we closed the airspace and installed [antiaircraft] missiles" around the meeting site. The *Washington Post* article reporting this threat states it has been standard operating procedure since the Atlanta Olympics in 1996 to create "no-fly zones" for high-profile occasions designated "National Security Special Events." Others included the 50th anniversary summits of NATO and the United Nations. The no-fly zones are areas of restricted airspace defended by fighter jets and antiaircraft batteries

(SOURCE: *Steve Fainaru, "Clues Pointed to Changing Terrorist Tactics," Washington Post, May 19, 2002*)

July 2001

The CIA warns senior government officials that "based on a review of all-source reporting over the last five months, we believe that UBL [bin Laden] will launch a significant terrorist attack against U.S. and/or Israeli interests in the coming weeks. The attack will be spectacular and designed to inflict mass casualties against U.S. facilities or interests. Attack preparations have been made. Attack will occur with little or no warning." The CIA also reported that an individual who had recently been in Afghanistan indicated, "Everyone is talking about an impending attack."

(SOURCE: *Washington Post, 9/19/02; Joint Congressional Intelligence Report on the 9/11 Attacks, 9/18/02*)

July 1, 2001

On CNN's Late Edition, California Senator Dianne Feinstein states "One of the things that has begun to concern me very much as to whether we really have our house in order, intelligence staff have told me that there is a major probability of a terrorist incident within the next three months."

(SOURCE: *July 1, 2001 Interview with Senators Feinstein and Shelby on CNN's Late Edition*)

July 1, 2001

Djamel Begal, an Algerian member of Al Qaeda, is arrested in the United Arab Emirates upon the discovery of his plot to crash a helicopter into the U.S. Embassy in Paris.
(SOURCE: Paul L. Williams, 'Al Qaeda: Brotherhood of Terror,' 2002)

July 2, 2001

Taliban Deputy Foreign Minister Jalil told U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Milam that "UBL has not been convicted and that the Taliban still consider him innocent."
(SOURCE: United States Department of State, "U.S. Engagement with the Taliban on Usama bin Laden." Posted in released form by the National Security Archive.)

July 2, 2001

The FAA issues an information circular citing a possible threat of an attack using explosives at an airport terminal.
(SOURCE: Reuters 5/16/02)

July 6, 2001

After July 5th meetings with National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice, White House Chief of Staff Andrew Card, and National Security Council Director Richard Clarke, the Bush Administration's Counterterrorism Security Group (CSG) bars U.S. counterterrorism officials from non-essential travel.
(SOURCE: "Chronology of Pre-September 11 Intelligence on Threats," Reuters, May 16, 2002)

July 10, 2001

Phoenix, Arizona FBI agent Ken Williams sends a memorandum warning about suspicious activities involving a group of Middle Eastern men taking flight training lessons in Arizona. The memorandum specifically suggests that Osama bin Laden's followers might be trying to infiltrate the civil aviation system as pilots, security guards or other personnel, and recommends a national program to track suspicious flight school students. The memo is sent to the counterterrorism unit division at FBI headquarters in Washington and to two field offices, including the counterterrorism section in New York. The memo is ignored at all three offices.

July 10, 2001

A dozen top government agency, airline, and airport officials gathered around a conference table just weeks before September 11 when teams of hijackers took over two flights departing from Logan Airport and flew them into the World Trade Center towers. The meeting was held to discuss the state of security at Logan International Airport. One official who was present at the meeting told the *Boston Globe* on condition of anonymity, "It was business as usual. The clear consensus was that nothing needed to be changed, nothing tightened up." Indeed, according to individuals present at the meeting, the FAA security manager at Logan, Steve Luongo, raised objections to a security enhancement plan proposed by Joseph Lawless, who was then Massport director of public safety. In addition, the airlines operating at Logan "adamantly opposed Lawless's plan to use undercover state police officers to test security checkpoints before setting up a system for improving compliance rates." This 'do-nothing' sentiment prevailed despite the fact that deputy national security adviser Richard Clarke told a group FAA and FBI officials that "something really spectacular is going to happen here, and it's going to happen soon."
(SOURCE: Sean Murphy, "Before 9/11, Word of Threats Unheeded," *Boston Globe*, May 18, 2002)

July 10, 2001

Senior U.S. Government officials are told by the Intelligence Community that

“[a]ttack preparations have been made.”

(SOURCE: Statement of Eleanor Hill, Former Staff Director, Joint Congressional Committee on the 9/11 Attacks, The House Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 10, 2003)

July 17, 2001

In a July 2001 final rule the Federal Aviation Administration is put on notice regarding the ongoing threat of potential hijackings. The rule states:

With respect specifically to the threat to civil aviation in the United States, it must be seen in the context of the broader threat. The events in Asia in early 1995, showed that the terrorists persisted in planning to attack aviation even then there were other targets identifiable with the United States in the area and even when they knew that the security measures protecting aviation had been strengthened. Publicity about problems with US domestic civil aviation security measures increases the potential for attacks here. Civil aviation targets may be chosen by terrorists even if alternative, and (in their view) softer targets are available, especially since an attack on aviation seizes the public’s imagination to a degree equaled by few other types of attack.

(SOURCE: Department of Transportation, Federal Aviation Administration, 14 CFR Part 108, [Docket No. FAA-2001-8725; Formerly Docket No. 28978; Amendment No. 108-18])

July 17, 2001

The Federal Register publishes an FAA notice stating, “The terrorist threat level in the United States over the next decade will remain as high as it is and will probably rise. Expanding geographical range of terrorist activity is increasingly evident. Members of foreign terrorist groups, representatives from state sponsors of terrorism, and radical fundamentalist elements are present in the United States.”

(SOURCE: Federal Register, July 17, 2001, cited by Mary Schiavo, before the 9/11 Independent Commission)

July 21, 2001

A regional Iraqi newspaper reports that Osama bin Laden “will try to bomb the Pentagon after he destroys the White House, is insisting very convincingly that he will strike America on the arm that is already hurting, and will curse the memory of Frank Sinatra every time he hears his songs [New York, New York].”

(SOURCE: 7/21/01 ‘America: An Obsession Called Osama bin Ladin,’ Al-Nassiriya)

July 23, 2001

September 11 mastermind and leading al Qaeda operative Khalid Sheikh Mohammed receives a visa to visit the United States under the known alias, Abdulrahman al Ghamdi.

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 1, January 26, 2004)

July 28, 2001

CBS News reports that Attorney General John Ashcroft has begun flying by leased jet aircraft instead of commercial airlines. In response to inquiries from *CBS News*, the Justice Department responds that as a result of a “threat assessment” by the FBI, the Attorney General has been advised to travel only by private jet for the remainder of his term. The DOJ spokesman states, “There was a threat assessment and there are guidelines. He is acting under those guidelines.” All other Busn cabinet appointees, with the exception of the Secretaries of Interior and Energy,

with remote sites to see, fly commercially. The Secretaries of State and Defense traditionally travel with extra security on military planes.
(SOURCE: Dan Rather, Jim Stewart, "Why is Ashcroft Traveling by Way of Specially Chartered Jet?" CBS News: Evening News with Dan Rather, July 28, 2001)

Late July 2001

The FAA issued information circular warning airlines that terrorist groups are planning and training for hijackings and urging carriers to use caution.
(SOURCE: Reuters 5/16/02)

August 2001

The Intelligence Community obtained information regarding a plot to either bomb the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi from an airplane or crash an airplane into it. The Intelligence Community learned that two people who were reportedly acting on instructions from Osama Bin Laden met in October 2000 to discuss this plot.

Based on information it had in its possession at the time, the CIA sent a message to the FAA asking the FAA to advise corporate security directors of U.S. air carriers of the following information:

A group of six Pakistanis currently based in La Paz, Bolivia may be planning to conduct a hijacking, or possibly a bombing or an act of sabotage against a commercial airliner. While we have no details of the carrier, the date, or the location of this or these possibly planned action(s), we have learned the group has had discussions in which "...Atlanta and New York, among other locations were mentioned as possible targets.

(SOURCE: 9/18/02 Congressional Testimony)

August 2001

An intelligence report informs senior US officials that al Qaeda members had resided in or traveled to the United States for years and maintained a support structure here. The same report included FBI judgments about patterns of activity consistent with hijackings and other forms of attacks as well as information acquired in May 2001 which indicated that a group of Bin Ladin supporters was planning attacks in the United States with explosives.
(SOURCE: Statement of Eleanor Hill, Former Staff Director, Joint Congressional Committee on the 9/11 Attacks, The House Select Committee on Homeland Security, September 10, 2003)

August 2001

Weeks before the terrorist attacks, the United States and the United Nations receive warnings from a secret Taliban emissary that Osama bin Laden was planning a huge attack on American soil.

(SOURCE: The Independent 6/7/02)

August 2001

The British government gave President George W. Bush a categorical warning about al Qaeda airline hijackings. According to Bush administration officials, the alert was included in the August 6, 2001 Presidential terrorism briefing.

(SOURCE: The Sunday Herald 5/19/02)

August 2001

Israeli Intelligence officials warned their counterparts in the United States that large-scale terrorist attacks on highly visible targets on the American homeland were imminent.
(SOURCE: *The Telegraph* 9/16/01)

August 2001

The CIA informed the FBI and the INS that two men suspected of al-Qaeda affiliations were likely to come to the United States. The two, Khalid al-Midhar and Nawaq al-Hamzi, were both hijackers on American Airlines Flight 77.
(SOURCE: *Le Monde*, 9/22/01)

August 4, 2001

INS Border Agent Jose Melendez-Perez interview and denied entry into the U.S. to an individual by the name of Mohamed al-Kahtani at Orlando International Airport. September 11th hijacker Mohammed Atta was at the airport waiting for his arrival on a Virgin Atlantic flight from London. Additional information not yet released has further led investigators to believe that al-Khatani intended to be the 20th hijacker.
(SOURCE: *Testimony of Jose Melendez-Perez, National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Aviation Security on 9/11: The Airlines, January 27, 2004*)

August 6, 2001

President George W. Bush reviewed a one-and-a-half page “analytic report” during his daily intelligence briefing discussing Osama bin Laden’s historical methods of operation. National Security Adviser Condoleeza Rice says the report cited a general possibility of “traditional” hijackings by al Qaeda, perhaps to demand the release of Sheik Omar Abdel-Rahman, the radical Muslim who plotted the 1993 World Trade Center bombing.
(SOURCE: *Reuters* 5/16/02)

August 15, 2001

Based on concerns raised by flight school staff at a Minnesota pilot training center, Zacarias Moussaoui, a French citizen, is arrested and detained on an immigration violation after illustrating alarming behavior and requesting pilot training to fly a plane and not take off or land. The FBI confiscates his possessions, including a computer laptop, but is not able to obtain a search warrant to examine computer contents. When arrested, Moussaoui had in his possession two knives, fighting gloves, and shin guards. On August 22, French authorities provide FBI officials with information connecting Moussaoui to radical Islamic groups and indicate that he has been on a terrorist “watch list” in France. From August 23-27, FBI agents in Minnesota attempt to obtain a search warrant under FISA to examine the contents of Moussaoui’s laptop but are refused. On the afternoon of September 11th, officials search Moussaoui’s computer and find information revealing that Moussaoui may have been planning an attack using a crop duster plane and contact information tying Moussaoui to Ramzi Binalshibh, lead hijacker Mohammad Atta’s former roommate.

August 16, 2001

The FAA issued an information circular warning carriers to be on alert for potential attack by people using weapons disguised as cellphones, key chains or pens.
(SOURCE: *Reuters* 5/16/02)

August 31, 2001

London police arrest Abu Doha (aka “The Doctor”), an Algerian accused of supervising a cell of Afghan-trained terrorists. Doha is wanted by American officials in relation to the failed

Millennium Bomb Plot. According the article, Millennium bomber Ahmed “Ressam...told investigators that Mr. Doha’s cell at an al-Qaeda camp in Afghanistan studied plans to bomb various US targets, including airports, consulates and naval vessels.”

(SOURCE: James Bone, “US Seeks London Algerian “Terrorist,” *Times of London*, August 31, 2001).

Late Summer 2001

A Moroccan intelligence secret agent named Hassan Dabou informed his chiefs in King Mohammed VI’s royal intelligence service that Osama bin Laden’s men were preparing “large-scale operations in New York in the summer of autumn of 2001.” The warning was said to have been passed from the Moroccan capital of Rabat to Washington.

(SOURCE: John Cooley, “Other Unheeded Warnings Before 9/11?” *The Christian Science Monitor*)

Late Summer 2001

Jordan’s General Intelligence Division intercepted:

A crucial al Qaeda communication that probably took place after the July 5 warning by a Phoenix, Arizona FBI agent that Arab terrorists could be sending men to flight schools, and either before or shortly after August 6, when President Bush received a CIA briefing about possible hijackings. The intercepts content was deemed so important that Jordanian King Abdallah’s men relayed it to Washington, probably through the CIA station at the US Embassy in Amman. To be sure that the message got through, it was also passed to a German intelligence agent who was visiting Amman at the time. The message showed clearly that a major attack was planned inside the continental US. It said aircraft would be used. But neither hijacking nor, apparently, precise timing nor targets were named. The code name of the operation was mentioned: in Arabic, Al Ourush al Kabir, “The Big Wedding.”

(SOURCE: John Cooley, “Other Unheeded Warnings Before 9/11?” *The Christian Science Monitor*)

Early September 2001

German police encounter a Hamburg airport worker acquainted with both Mohammad Atta and Marwan al-Shehhi. The worker, believed to be a cousin of Atta, has since been arrested.

(SOURCE: *The Times Online*, 9/14/01)

Early September 2001

Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak told the New York Times in June 2002 that Egyptian Intelligence warned American officials about a week before September 11 that Osama bin Laden’s network was in the advance stages of executing a significant operation against an American target. President Mubarak indicates that the information was derived from a secret Egyptian agent with close ties to the bin Laden organization and that the Egyptian intelligence chiefs tried unsuccessfully to halt the al Qaeda operation.

(SOURCE: 6/4/02, *The New York Times*)

September 5 and 6, 2001

Franco-American meetings were held in Paris to discuss threats against American interests in Europe, notably the United States embassy in France. DST and DGSE officers and soldiers met with American service representatives to notify them of a French Islamic activist of Moroccan descent, Zacarias Moussaoui, held in America since August 17.

(SOURCE: *Le Monde*, 9/22/01)

September 7, 2001

Mohammad Atta visited Shuckum's bar in Hollywood, FL. When bartender Patricia Idrissi disagreed with Atta about his bar tab, he said to her, "I'm a pilot for American Airlines. I can pay my (expletive) bill." Atta then removed a wad of \$100 and 50-pound notes and paid his bill.

(SOURCE: *The Times Online*, 9/14/01)

September 11, 2001

On the day of the attacks, the 1st Air Force Air Combat Command was in the fourth day of an annual exercise called Vigilant Guardian. Maj. Gen. Larry Arnold, the Commander of Tynsdale Air Force Base, Florida, where the exercise is conducted, wonders "was the hijacking part of the exercise? Is this some kind of a screw-up?"

(SOURCE: 9/11/02 ABC News; January 2002, *Code One*)

September 13, 2001

Roman police reopened their investigation into the May 2001 theft of American Airlines crew members' uniforms, documents, and identification badges stolen from a hotel. American police investigated a bag believed to have belonged to one of the hijackers, which airport staff had failed to transfer from the connecting flight. The bag contained a Qur'an and a calculator.

(SOURCE: *The Times Online*, 9/14/01)

September 20, 2001

Transportation Secretary Norman Y. Mineta testified on September 20, 2001 that: "They had box openers, which are this long with a sharp hook—razor sharp. But under the 4-H (ph) requirement at the time, it would not have been picked up as an illegal carry-on."

November 1, 2001

Statement issued by William T. Barbour, President of Argenbright Security, a security screening company operating out of two of the terminals from which hijacked planes departed on September 11th:

...there is no evidence to date that these employees did a single thing incorrectly. In fact, [the screeners] were following Federal Aviation Administration regulations that, at the time, allowed knives of up to four inches, box cutters and corkscrews and other items to be carried onto an airplane.

Mr. Barbour's statement was issued in a letter to the editor of the Los Angeles Times and published on November 1, 2001.

We now know that this information was deceptive. Excerpts of the Checkpoint Operations Guide (“COG”) which is the operating manual for airport security screening personnel, clearly indicates that the “box cutters,” “mace,” “tear gas,” and “pepper spray” were illegal and prohibited weapons and impermissible in sterile airport areas. Mace and box cutters are known to have been used by the September 11 hijackers.

(SOURCE: *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 3, January 27, 2004*)

April 19, 2002

Ramzi Binalshibh and Khalid Sheik Mohammed met with Yosri Fouda, a reporter from the Al Jazeera network, for over 48 hours. A series of interviews were conducted wherein Khalid and Ramzi confessed to the September 11th attacks. Khalid Sheik Mohammed stated that he was the head of the military arm of Al Qaeda and he was the “mastermind behind the attack.” Ramzi Binalshibh was the head of operations and coordinated communications between Afghanistan and Mohammed Atta.

(Yosri Fouda’s conversation with The 9/11 Families United to Bankrupt Terrorism. A translation of Ramzi’s interview with Fouda is attached. Audio and videotapes of Khalid Sheik Mohammed were confiscated by the terrorists and not returned to Yosri Fouda.)

June 2002

CIA Director George Tenet testified in a closed session before the Congressional Joint Inquiry into the September 11 attacks. Tenet reportedly told the Committee that “we had followed bin Laden for many years and had no doubt that he intended a major attack,” dating CIA interest to “the period from 1991 to 1996, when he was in Sudan.”

(SOURCE: *John Prados, “Slow-walked and stonewalled,” Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, March 1, 2003.*)

June 2, 2002

Newsweek reported that the FBI has prepared a detailed chart showing how agents could have uncovered the terrorist plot if the CIA had told them what it knew about the hijackers Almihdhar and Alhazmi sooner. One FBI official says, “There’s no question we could have tied all 19 hijackers together.”

(SOURCE: *Newsweek, 6/2/02*)

June 24, 2002

The Los Angeles Times reports that the outlines of what became the September 11 attacks were planned inside al Qaeda for at least eight years—virtually the entire tenure of the Clinton Administration.

(SOURCE: *Early Scheme to turn Jets into Weapons,” by Terry McDermott, The Los Angeles Times, June 24, 2002*)

September 18, 2002

Eleanor Hill, Staff Director of the Joint Congressional Inquiry into the September 11, 2001 attacks, testified before Congress regarding the government’s general awareness and knowledge of the attacks prior to 9/11:

Central to the September 11 attacks was the terrorists’ use of airplanes as weapons. In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks, there was much discussion about the extent to which our Government was, or could have been, aware of the threat of terrorist attacks of this type and the extent to which adequate precautions were taken to address that threat. We therefore asked the question:

Did the Intelligence Community have any information in its possession prior to September 11, 2001 indicating that terrorists were contemplating using airplanes as weapons?

Based on our review to date of the requested information, we believe that the Intelligence Community was aware of the potential for this type of terrorist attack, but did not produce any specific assessments of the likelihood that terrorists would use airplanes as weapons. Our review has uncovered several examples of intelligence reporting on the possible use of airplanes as weapons in terrorist operations.

October 2002

The Sunday Times reports that US intelligence documents detail how al Qaeda's South East Asia regional leader, Omar, Faruq, received \$74,000 from an account controlled by Osama bin Laden to purchase explosives materials to carry out the Bali night club bombing in 2002. During interrogations of Faruq, the detained al Qaeda operative described how Indonesian Islamist groups also obtained funds from Al Haramain Islamic Foundation, a Saudi-based charity. Faruq told officials that Al Haramain was "the principal source" of his funding in Indonesia. (SOURCE: Nick Fielding, "Bin Laden paid for Bali bombing," *The Sunday Times*, 20 October, 2002)

October 6, 2002

The French oil tanker *Limburg* is attacked by al Qaeda operatives in Yemen waters by an explosive-packed motor boat.

October 17, 2002

CIA Director George Tenet tells an open session of the Senate Intelligence Committee that:

We have heard the allegation that our analysts erred by not explicitly warning that hijacked aircraft might be used as weapons. Your staff has been given access to over half a million pages of documents and interviewed hundreds of intelligence officials in their efforts to investigate this complex issue. The documents we provided show some 12 reports, spread over seven years, which pertain to possible use of aircraft as weapons in terrorist attacks. We disseminated those reports to the appropriate agencies—such as the FAA, Department of Transportation, and FBI—as they came in. Moreover, we also provided sanitized versions of intelligence reports that were about threats to civil aviation so they could be distributed more widely through the airline industry. But if one goes back and collects the reports over the same period that pertained to possible truck bombs, car bombs, assassinations, kidnappings, or attacks using chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear devices, those lists would have been far longer. A quick scan of such reporting since 1996, for example, showed about 20 times as many reports concerning car bombs and about five times as many reports concerning weapons of mass destruction.

February 2003

Four plaintiffs in Burnett, et al, v. al Baraka, et al, all of whom are victims of the 9/11 attacks, testified in the Hamburg, Germany trial of Mounir el Motassadeq. On February 19, 2003, Motassadeq was sentenced to the maximum 15 years in prison for helping the Hamburg-based al Qaeda terror cell that included lead hijacker Mohammed Atta and two other suicide pilots. The

plaintiffs' moving testimony regarding the September attacks highlighted the commitment of 9/11 families to holding terrorist groups and their financiers accountable for the attacks.

May 2, 2003

The *Associated Press* reported that American authorities had uncovered a plot by al Qaeda to crash a small aircraft loaded with explosives into the United States Consulate in Karachi, Pakistan. A Department of Homeland Security advisory warned that al Qaeda was in the late stages of planning an attack on the consulate using a small fixed-wing aircraft or helicopter. Such a plot, along with one uncovered last year in which al Qaeda planned to fly a small plane into a United States warship in the Persian Gulf, demonstrated a "fixation" on using aircraft in attacks, the advisory stated.

(SOURCE: "U.S. Reports Plot to Fly a Plane Into U.S. Consulate in Pakistan," *Associated Press*, May 2, 2003)

May 16, 2003

Adel al Jubeir, a senior foreign policy adviser to the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Crown Prince Abdullah, tells an *Associated Press* reporter that:

We began to look at accounts every time somebody presents us with information that may indicate that a particular person or institution is engaged in the support of unlawful activity. We froze Osama bin Laden's accounts in the early 1990s. We have looked at the actions of major Saudi donors since the early and mid 1990s. It's one thing to say we think so-and-so is supporting terrorism. Well, where's the proof? We have been probably the first country in the world that has gone to other countries and asked them to open up their financial system to us. We knocked on the doors of European countries in the early 1990s. We even came to the United States in the mid '90s to ask for evidence when we see a transfer that leaves Saudi Arabia and goes to a European country. And we go to the European country, and we say, We think this person supports terrorists. We saw a transfer. Where did it go from your bank? The response we got was, Sorry, bank privacy laws. It takes two to tango. We have a mechanism within the G-8, the Financial Action taskforce on Terror Financing, eight recommendations. We have implemented seven of them. The eighth one that we're looking at has to do with legal sanctions.

May 23, 2003

Former Federal Aviation Administration Inspector General and aviation security 'watchdog,' Mary Schiavo, told the 'National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States,' the panel investigating the failures leading up to the 9/11 attacks, that the airline industry and the FAA were clearly on notice regarding the chronic problem of cockpit intrusions, air rage incidents, and hijackings. Significantly, Schiavo tells the Commission:

Perhaps the biggest or most alarming urban legend that has come out...is that no rules were broken on 9/11. What could you have done? Nothing was wrong. Nobody violated any laws, nobody violated regulations that require security on the various carriers and obligations on them. And then of course we all heard, including persons you have heard from, who went on the media to say box cutters were allowed. They were not, most assuredly not, allowed. This comes from the regulations and the guidelines that the carriers use to do their security. Neither was pepper spray. Pepper spray absolutely not allowed.

In addition, Schiavo shared alarming air safety statistics with the Commission; thirty-one successful airplane bombings between 1970-2001; 47,402 air rage incidents from 1994-2001 on U.S. civil aircraft; 59 attempts to shoot down civil airliners; and 823 airline hijackings from 1970 to 2001. Finally, in the short months just preceding 9/11, Schiavo found documentation of 30 cockpit intrusions on American airplanes.

(SOURCE: Mary Schiavo, Expert testimony before the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, May 23, 2003)

October 17, 2003

The Associated Press publishes a story on Saudi-American relations in the war on terrorism. The story describes American officials as saying that the flow of Saudi information at times has been halting or incomplete, especially when it comes to questions about the kingdom's own citizens. And they say Saudi attention before September 11 to possible terrorist abuses of Saudi-based charities was lacking.

(SOURCE: John Solomon, "U.S. Describe Intelligence Links," The Associated Press, October 17, 2003)

November 7, 2003

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States voted to subpoena the Pentagon for documents related to the activities of U.S. air defenses on September 11, 2001. The independent commission said it was "especially dismayed" by incomplete document production on the part of the North American Aerospace Defense Command, or NORAD.

(SOURCE: Laurence Arnold, "9/11 Commission Votes to Subpoena Pentagon, Associated Press, November 7, 2003.)

November 18, 2003

Former general counsel to the U.S. Department of the Treasury, David Aufhauser, tells the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom:

The [Arabian] peninsula was al Qaeda's banker for years and has been an additional source for outlier groups like Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation. It is also...the home of the most bounteous collection of contributions for Hamas, particularly during the hajj...The source of the funding includes wealthy, knowing donors, fundraisers who amassed collections from markets and gatherings, clerics who directed zakata contributions to al Qaeda's mission, and NGOs who managed their money with abandon and spirited it around the globe, ostensibly to build palaces for teaching, but who perhaps unwittingly, or perhaps in some cases with a deliberate blindness, transposed their mission of grace into a mission for hellishness, particularly in places like Indonesia, the Balkans, East Africa and Pakistan.

(SOURCE: David Aufhauser, Statement before the U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, "Is Saudi Arabia a Strategic Threat: The Global Propagation of Intolerance," November 18, 2003)

January 27, 2004

The National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States describes its findings on industry and Government responsibility for air security prior to September 11 in a hearing in Washington, DC:

We believe the FAA's approach of admonishing air carriers to use common sense about what items should not be allowed on an aircraft, while also approving the

air carrier's checkpoint operations guidelines that defined the industry's "common sense," in practice, created an environment where both parties could deny responsibility for making hard and most likely unpopular decisions. (SOURCE: *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 3, January 27, 2004*)

January 27, 2004

A hearing of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States discloses the air carriers' procedures for dealing with hijacking scenarios:

Air carrier responsibilities for security and anti-hijacking training for flight crews were set forth in the Air Carrier Standard Security Program. In addition to specifying several hours of security training, it provided an outline of in-flight hijacking tactics for both the cockpit and cabin crews. Among other things, this outline advised air crews to refrain from trying to overpower or negotiate with hijackers, to land the aircraft as soon as possible, to communicate with authorities, and to try delaying tactics.

One of the FAA officials most involved with the Common Strategy in the period leading up to 9/11 described it as an approach dating back to the early 1980s, developed in consultation with the industry and the FBI, and based on the historical record of hijackings. The point of the strategy was to "optimize actions taken by a flight crew to resolve hijackings peacefully" through systematic delay and, if necessary, accommodation of the hijackers. The record had shown that the longer a hijacking persisted, the more likely it was to have a peaceful resolution. The strategy operated on the fundamental assumptions that hijackers issue negotiable demands, most often for asylum or the release of prisoners, and that "suicide wasn't in the game plan" of hijackers.

(SOURCE: *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Staff Statement No. 4, January 27, 2004*)

January 27, 2004

FAA Administrator Jane F. Garvey tells the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States that:

On September 11, 2001, security was a shared responsibility. The FAA was responsible for establishing and enforcing regulations, policies and procedures. Air carriers bore the primary responsibility for applying security measures, including screening to passengers, service and flight crews, baggage and cargo. Airports, run by State or local government authorities, were responsible for maintaining a secure ground environment and for providing law enforcement support for implementation of airline and airport security measures.

(SOURCE: *National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement of FAA Administrator Jane F. Garvey, January 27, 2004*; "Study and Report to Congress on Civil Aviation Security Responsibilities and Funding, Federal Aviation Administration Study, 1998")

January 27, 2004

American Airlines, Inc. Chief Executive Officer Gerard J. Arpey tells the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States that "We at American, along with the other U.S. carriers, were responsible for implementing the system that the FAA designed and enforced," but

that “the civil aviation industry did not foresee the type of attacks that took place on September 11th. It is clear that the security system was not designed to deal with coordinated, suicidal hijack teams with the ability to use commercial aircraft as weapons of mass destruction.”

(SOURCE: National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, Statement of American Airlines, Inc. Chief Executive Officer Gerard J. Arpey, January 27, 2004)

Conclusion

Numerous warnings and clues were given prior to September 11th from which terrorist financiers, our intelligence community and the aviation industry could have foreseen the hijacking attacks. In the history of commercial aviation, there are only two methods by which an airline has been attacked--by bomb or hijacking. These methods date back to the 1960's and are the most frequent means by which terrorists strike. The solution for preventing such attacks does not change regardless of the target or the resulting catastrophe. For that reason the proper inquiry is whether it was foreseeable for al Qaeda to hijack aircraft. No reasonable person could dispute the answer. Islamic extremists, like al-Qaeda, have on numerous occasions indicated that it was prepared, not only to hijack a commercial airliner, but to use it as a weapon. Moreover, al-Qaeda frequently identified the World Trade Center Towers, the Pentagon and the Capitol as its most sought-after targets.