

Exhibit 132

Ongoing Commitments, Deadlines, Plans*Responsibilities/projects that we will continue overseeing until handover or completion*

Work	Motivation	Responsible	Handover Plan	Open Questions
Monitoring SLA and job inventories (enforcement, appeals)	Maintaining our commitments to enforce underage policies and unblock falsely checkpointed accounts within a reasonable timeframe (48 hours).	On-call	Set a deadline for when we will stop doing this	1. Are the new teams going to care about the SLA? Should we still be caring about the SLA?
Taking actions to prevent SLA dropping, backlogs building, or jobs expiring	Maintaining an acceptable precision + recall to ensure false positives are low and ops demand is within limits.	On-call	Set a deadline for when we will stop doing this	2. Should we set a deadline where we will no longer be acting to remedy any ops capacity issues?
Monitoring automation precisions and rates	Making sure urgent company priorities are addressed, and other requests are documented for the handover team.		Handover documented new requests or escalate exceptional cases to current roadmap.	
Acting to fix changes	Addressing outstanding enforcement gaps.		Not being handed over, will continue until resolution	
Support and triage for new requests	Setting us up for CSER reporting (committed to by end of September).		N/A - completed before handover	1. Will the new team take over reporting to CSER?
Coordinating open SEVs	Unblocking project Simile work (launching August 23rd).		N/A - completed before handover	
Annotating dashboards to make CSER reporting easier	Wrapping up findings of our audits to be addressed by handover team.		N/A - completed before handover	
Underage simile enforcement + monitoring	Aid in handover.		N/A - completed before handover	
Wrap-up (document) audits (basic + RR)	Aid in handover.		N/A - completed before handover	
Overhaul Underage wiki	Commitment we made with HOP to be completed by end of Q3.		N/A - completed before handover	
Create wiki for consolidated age jobs	Unblocking Simile work (separate GDPR related security review process)		N/A - completed before handover	
<u>Migrate SRT reporting (enforcement) jobs to Routing 3.0 (wiki) (Human Ops request)</u>	High priority task to ensure SRT jobs are still rendered correctly.		N/A - completed before handover	
Security Risk Assessment - U13 Enforcement for FRL Accounts	Ensure legacy flow is entirely empty of users so that deprecation can begin and no users are violating regulatory commitments.		N/A - completed before handover	
Migrate legacy SRT renderers - T121019057	Considered part of maintenance - some high-reaching users are being checkpointed multiple times.		N/A - completed before handover	
Migrate over buggy legacy flow users - T121031500	May be de-prioritized to backlog in favour of new team commitments.		N/A - completed before handover (or moved to backlog)	
Bug with users getting checkpointed multiple times T127394536	BE task - removal of legacy code and old appeal CFs, makes handover simpler		N/A - completed before handover (or moved to backlog)	
IG U13 Legacy flow deprecation	May be de-prioritized to backlog in favour of new team commitments.			
Supporting external data requests - pulling data, completing stat review, assisting with transparency documentation	Needed to comply with transparency requests		Handover to new team once identified	1. If the new team takes over CSER reporting, are they also going to be responsible for data transparency requests?
Deprecation of dormant checkpoint policy	Deprecation this indefensible policy as part of Roadmap to BASIC maturity.		N/A - completed before handover	

Backlog

Work that we have dropped and will now handover to new team.

Item Number	Task	Description	Task Links	Other Links	Motivation	Comments
		We enforce this correctly in most places - but we don't have proper testing to guarantee this, and without a proper audit we are at risk of enforcement (or communication) gaps.				AM to scope this work either way. We believe all major gaps are covered, but there may be some minor cases (e.g. user facing copy) that can be corrected.
1	Ensure legislation in Spain and South Korea is being applied properly	Places for consideration: 1. Proper handling at DOB confession entrypoints 2. Proper handling during appeals review 3. Appropriate UX during enforcement and reporting (e.g "You must be at least X years old", or picking an age in FB form) 4. Any automations that may be relevant (e.g. auto-ignore where report says user is 13+) 5. Proper handling during underage	T105424323		The age limit in Spain and South Korea is 14, rather than 13 in the rest of the world.	
2	Reduce U13 retention window to 60d	Youth pXFN have advised us that it is not defensible to retain underage user data for 180d (the standard for admin scheduled deletions) - we need to coordinate with Deletion API and modify propagation behaviour to reduce this to 60d				AM to understand latest state on this (as this required coordination with owners of Deletion API).
3	Fix escalated underage jobs tracking	We have a number of reports of users being underage that come from other report types that are escalated to us based on the reviewer's decision. We have very poor tracking of the sources of these jobs so are unable to map what the source of different escalated jobs are.	T123747277	Investigation quip: https://fb.quip.com/1K8PAUgkdgAh Lockdown quip: https://fb.quip.com/by6PAn7KBTl7	We are unable to identify the source of escalated underage jobs. This means we can't verify that escalations are working as intended from all sources and can't be sure we are reviewing all suspected cases of an account being underage.	
4	Add U13 end-to-end and integration tests	Push blocking E2E tests (perhaps Westworld)				
5	Improve monitoring of deleting underage accounts	At the moment we have sql queries to monitor the % of accounts that should be deleted for being underage that are deleted. These are slow to load and lack any alerting. We should speed them up and add alerts, and ideally add tracking for the volume of accounts due to be deleted on a given date		Underage audit: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iAKrguTEO5Rj2U2i_7gDWqCfuAnzk50iHtZVUE-_toY/edit?usp=sharing Previous issues relating to not deleting accounts on time: S272759, S276725 Dashboard widget: https://fburl.com/datainsights/hwub	Crucial to adhering to regulations is our deleting of underage accounts. We need to be monitoring and responding to this if it breaks to ensure regulatory compliance.	
6	Improve monitoring of underage appeals	We lack visibility of a few important components of our appeals flow. 1. No visibility of the precision of the automations we run on submitted IDs 2. No visibility on the volume of underage appeals on Facebook 3. No visibility of the volume of manual ID reviews jobs that are created for IG appeals 4. No visibility of the average handle time for manual appeal jobs		Underage audit: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iAKrguTEO5Rj2U2i_7gDWqCfuAnzk50iHtZVUE-_toY/edit?usp=sharing Underage dashboards: https://fburl.com/unidash/lq9l580l	In order to respond quickly to issues with the user experience in our appeals flow, we need better monitoring. Without this we will not be able to detect issues with appeal decision precision or spikes / drops in appeal volumes or average handle times that will needs ops capacity / indicate upstream issues.	
7	Understand and remove (or pXFN align) soft-linking enforcement against underage accounts for FB	We uncovered the use of soft-linking to disable FB accounts for being underage. We are unsure why and want to understand what this is being triggered by		Underage audit: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iAKrguTEO5Rj2U2i_7gDWqCfuAnzk50iHtZVUE-_toY/edit?usp=sharing	We have no ground truth for what an underage account is, so we cannot measure the precision of an approach where we remove soft-linked accounts. In the current situation, this approach may be indefensible	
8	Identify and resolve automation issues	We've observed that the automations we run on 3rd party reports don't always trigger when expected. This could be because of the legacy of our old automation accuracy holdout implementation. We need to investigate the cause of this and resolve it		Workplace post: https://fb.workplace.com/groups/1426463750895412/permalink/1959675747574207/	Automations failing to run costs us both unnecessary ops capacity, and also poor user experiences where accounts may be checkpointed repeatedly for being underage. This has led to at least one high profile IG account needing internal assistance in resolving this repeat checkpoint behaviour	

	We lack visibility of a few important components of our 3rd party reporting flow:			Without monitoring whether underage escalations are arriving in our queue we will be slow to respond to issues in this pipeline that could lead to reports of underage accounts not being reviewed. Likewise, lacking monitoring of how well our automations are running means we are unaware of issues as they happen
9	Improve monitoring of underage 3rd party reporting	1. No visibility of the percent of escalated underage jobs that end up in our underage queue 2. No visibility of the percent of jobs that should be decisioned automatically, that are	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iAKrguTE05Rj2U2i_7gDWqCfuAnzk50iHtZVUE-_toY/edit?usp=sharing	
10	Audit the checkpoint enrolment logic for users that change their DOB to an underage value	We didn't manage to audit the checkpoint enrolment as part of our planned audit sprint. To ensure it is working as understood, we should audit it	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iAKrguTE05Rj2U2i_7gDWqCfuAnzk50iHtZVUE-_toY/edit?usp=sharing	Users changing their date of birth to an underage value is the major source of accounts being checkpointed for being underage. Knowing how the system for this is working, and being aware of issues or gaps, will help us ensure we can respond to issues in our primary source of account takedowns. Without monitoring the volume and rate of date of birth changes that are underage, and that result in an underage checkpoint, we have no visibility of whether our systems for self-confession are working as intended. There could be an unknown number of users we should be checkpointing that we aren't
11	Improve monitoring of underage enrolments via DOB updates	1. No visibility of the volume of date of birth change requests that are made for an underage date of birth 2. No visibility of the rate of underage date of birth changes that result in a checkpoint	https://docs.google.com/document/d/1iAKrguTE05Rj2U2i_7gDWqCfuAnzk50iHtZVUE-_toY/edit?usp=sharing	
12	Logging is broken for reports coming from escalations and IG in-app reporting in single_review_tool_main	We rely on single_review_tool_main for realtime monitoring of incoming report volumes. We split it using object_family_member to visualise splits across FB and IG. This column isn't set properly for escalations and for IG in-app reporting.	T124731450 Workplace post: https://fb.workplace.com/groups/936804576456887/permalink/1237278320176171/	Realtime monitoring of report volumes is vital in helping us respond to breaks in our reporting flows or to alert ops to spikes in demand. Diagnosing and fixing the issue with logging is important to ensure we maintain our ability to respond quickly
13	Apply NLP to SRT underage enforcement jobs to automate review of age admittance in user bios	Part of our review policy for instagram user reports is to see if the reported account has an admittance of age in their bio. We've been discussing using NLP to automate this process and reduce handle time for manual review jobs	T123416896 Meeting notes from initial discussion: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1klkowzrXztspjRKcL1H02n16gro_1WMxdU-zyNiM5Y/edit?usp=sharing	Our Instagram review protocol asks reviewers to look at the account bio for an admission of being underage. This is likely a straightforward tasks for NLP and will speed up our review jobs, meaning we need less ops capacity.
14	Update DOB to the DOB of the submitted ID when a user successfully appeals the underage checkpoint	On IG we don't update DOB when appeal is successful, on FB we do but we believe it may be broken (as updating DOB is blocked when account is restricted). Let's get this working in both places and add proper E2E testing to protect this. Also add for FRL. On FB we currently match for 2 of 3 of {name, profile-pic, dob} - given that during U13 appeals we often can't trust the dob - we may want to relax to just matching one of this set - else users with profile pictures that do not fully display the user's face will get rejected. One of the automations we run on reports of users being underage relies on the adult classifier model from core dimensions. At the moment on Instagram we are calling this model for users in unsupported regions and actioning them based on their stated age instead of realising they have no prediction and skipping this automation nolrv for them. At the moment our third party report review doesn't include any message or post content from users, so totally lacks any insight into place where users have admitted to being underage. Adding these features may help the precision of our enforcements. Reels/stories also apply here.	T123105786	By failing to update account DOBs after they have been ID verified, we are facilitating age misrepresentation which could have harmful downstream effects.
15	Reduce IDV match criteria to 1 of 3?	On FB we currently match for 2 of 3 of {name, profile-pic, dob} - given that during U13 appeals we often can't trust the dob - we may want to relax to just matching one of this set - else users with profile pictures that do not fully display the user's face will get rejected. One of the automations we run on reports of users being underage relies on the adult classifier model from core dimensions. At the moment on Instagram we are calling this model for users in unsupported regions and actioning them based on their stated age instead of realising they have no prediction and skipping this automation nolrv for them. At the moment our third party report review doesn't include any message or post content from users, so totally lacks any insight into place where users have admitted to being underage. Adding these features may help the precision of our enforcements. Reels/stories also apply here.	T1231798765	
16	Restrict Adult Classifier enforcement automation policy to supported regions	At the moment on Instagram we are calling this model for users in unsupported regions and actioning them based on their stated age instead of realising they have no prediction and skipping this automation nolrv for them. At the moment our third party report review doesn't include any message or post content from users, so totally lacks any insight into place where users have admitted to being underage. Adding these features may help the precision of our enforcements. Reels/stories also apply here.	T120684412	Ignoring reports of accounts being underage based on their stated age is a poor approach and means we are likely ignoring reports of many legitimately underage accunts.
17	Add the ability to include content from messages or posts in our underage enforcement review jobs	At the moment our third party report review doesn't include any message or post content from users, so totally lacks any insight into place where users have admitted to being underage. Adding these features may help the precision of our enforcements. Reels/stories also apply here.	T119369460	Our review protocol is currently based almost exclusively on account photos. If the account in question has admitted to being underage via message or post, we may still end up ignoring them despite them self-admitting. This is quite an indefensible enforcement gap
18	Align FB u13 flow content with what was approved for IG	IG content was recently overhauled and aligned with Youth pXFN - we should do the same with FB.	T119132544	

	In IG reporting jobs we assess two things to decide if an account should be underage checkpointed: - If there appears to be a clear account owner who is underage from the photos (including profile picture) - If there is an admittance of being underage in the bio		
19	Support inclusion of user's bio in FB report jobs	In FB jobs we do not search the bio - only the photos are considered. We ought to achieve parity with both platforms, and Youth pXFN have also asked us to do this. Things to do/consider: 1. File a LaMa to get approval (should be easy as Youth pXFN originally requested this) 2. File an Ops request to handle small increase in AHT 3. Surface the bio content in the SRT job 4. Queues will either need to be marketised (they are not currently in FB) OR we need to use auto-translation 5. Change the decision tree to ask if there's an admittance in the bio	T119131329 Using the bio on Instagram but not on Facebook for account reviews means our enforcement is not in parity across our apps and means we may be missing important information in deciding to checkpoint an account on FB
20	Implement job stacking for underage reports		
21	Align underage country calculation with Youth pXFN	We're checking for underage enforcement eligibility in all different places, some places in distillery use the GeoAPI to get the country, other places use the request IP country, others use the registered country. Let's place all these checks in one thrift service and call it from everywhere.	T115985075 Using disparate sources of information for country means we may be incorrectly handling underage accounts in countries where the requirements are stricter (e.g. U14 in Spain and S.Korea) and could have downstream impacts on the routing of our underage reports to the correct review queues
22	Handle IG to IG U13 propagation		
23	Audit U13 escalations that lead to immediate disables	We probably shouldn't be escalating to immediate disables - we have a policy to always allow users to appeal for 30 days. Let's figure out where we have places that we're doing this, record them below and discuss if they're justified.	T112855432 T114122201 This is a poor user experience and given we lack visibility into the precision of our enforcement (as we lack a ground truth) is likely too extreme an approach
24	Explore Age Verification Menu / Yoti Selfi integration in underage flows		
25	Actor-centric account reviews	Explore reviewing hard-link FB and IG accounts when reviewing a report of an account being underage to ensure we're using all available information where possible	T124745948 T124434942 Age Verification menu could provide options for reducing ops demand in our 3rd party review flow, but more important can reduce the high friction in our account appeals flow, reducing the impact on voice. The underage violation type depends on the user's age and is surface-agnostic. We should be using all available information to identify if a user is underage rather than silo-ing our reviews to the surface they were reported on. At the moment our underage reporting contact forms on FB are not as well protected against scripted attacks as they could be. We've previously had a SEV because of scripted attacks on our IG reporting form, which is now captcha protected. We should aim to achieve parity between the apps and prevent future SEVs.
26	Enable captcha protection on FB reporting contact forms		LAMA: https://www.internalfb.com/launch_manager/reviews/L1116429API
27	Establish U13 SEV guidelines		SEV guidelines meeting notes: https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Q0MwyqGrBlWtI2elaCrqF6Jkflyr8UBP8yHKwNOtnas/edit?usp=sharing T111858912 We have no objective measures of when we should be opening a SEV. This leads to slower response times when it comes to issues we should be escalating.
28	IG-SURF monitoring	IG-SURF (the in-app underage reporting flow for IG) is currently rolled out to 1% of prod but we don't have much logging or alerting around this flow - it will be crucial to have this before rolling out any further.	

29	Prevent accounts being checkpointed for underage multiple times at UFAC config level		Comments discussion here https://fb.workplace.com/groups/1426463750895412/posts/1959675747574207/?comment_id=1971214809753634&reply_comment_id=1971331279741987	Accounts being checkpointed for being underage repeatedly after clearing them is a poor user experience and has led to at least one issue with a high profile Instagram account requiring internal intervention. We should prevent this at the checkpoint level rather than relying on our third party report automations to limit this We have flat ops capacity this half. Finding a way to reduce our ops demand with enforcement job automations frees up capacity that we may be able to use for initiatives to drive down underage prevalence Anecdotally we know many business accounts are checkpointed for being underage due to mistakes. Given these are high value users, we should be doing more to protect them from being enrolled in this very high friction checkpoint	
30	Invest in further automations for enforcement jobs	See quip doc.	https://fb.quip.com/gCniAy10MDNZ	Understanding why users are reported repeatedly by the same people may help us protect them from abuse, or alternatively, identify pain points in our reporting flow that is leading to reporters misunderstanding them In theory, multiple people reporting an account for being underage should be a strong signal the account is underage. In reality, it is the opposite. We may be lacking key information in our review protocol that is leading to this outcome and investigating these cases may unearth components we should be considering in review	
31	Reduce FP rate of business accounts for U13	Applying the same friction that Age Platform applied for Age Collection to our edit DOB flows - with the aim of reducing underage admittance FPs			
32	Understand why such a high proportion of reported accounts are reported multiple times by the same reporters	16% of accounts reported for being underage are reported multiple times by the same reporter. We don't know if this is driven by abusive behaviour on behalf of the reporters, or a lack of understanding / ease in our reporting flows.	Workplace post: https://fb.workplace.com/groups/1426463750895412/permalink/1968890873319361/		
33	Understand why such a high proportion of reported accounts are reported multiple time by different reporters	8% of accounts reported for being underage are reported multiple times by different reporters. We are less likely to checkpoint these accounts than those reported by only a single reporter. We don't understand why this is.	Workplace post: https://fb.workplace.com/groups/1426463750895412/permalink/1968890873319361/		
34	Deprecate dormant account policy	Deprecate the dormant account automation policy across all markets.	Policies.hs	The dormant account policy automation (auto-checkpoint reported accounts which have been inactive for over 30 days) was only ever shipped as an emergency solution to a large backlog—it is not defensible long term as there's no known correlation between account dormancy and underage users, nor is there any correlation expected.	Deprecated in all but 3 markets—waiting on ops approval for the final 3.
35	Escalations from group review jobs	There are cases where users are being reported from group posts for admitting being underage. As a minimum we should offer the ability to escalate these jobs to Underage queue - perhaps including evidence to increase action rate. POC is [REDACTED]. If there has not been a direct admittance of being underage in an oculus abuse report then we instead report the hardlinked FB account (if exists) for review - but the action rate here is extremely low.	https://docs.google.com/spreadsheets/d/1vNZoEfqJEhD1A1cHgYG8mZPqsDqHLmrxcjLbu6Cx6a0/edit#gid=404447256	It's not defensible to be ignoring cases of direct and public admittance of being underage when these users get reported.	
36	Discuss improving action rate of oculus abuse reported FRL accounts.	We should consider other signals that can be used (e.g. number of times reported - if they seem natural, other signals like height and sound of voice etc from the headset) to improve the action rate of reported FRL accounts.	Speak with VR Integrity	There will likely be lots of cases where the user sounds underage and will be obviously underage to other users, but we will dismiss the reports because we don't have direct evidence.	
37	Explore softlink matching to reduce recidivism	FEP can match with retrospective takedowns from the last 90 days - so if an account is taken down and the user spins up a new one - it can be detected.	T124434880 Speak with Enforcement Propagation team.	We have lots of issues, particularly on IG, with users spinning up new accounts as soon as their last one was taken down. This is hard to defend and we can detect these with FEP.	

38	Unify FB report job creation	In places where jobs are created <i>not</i> via the CF - we have to create dummy CF objects in order to file reports because this is what the report handler requires - this is hacky and we should change it so that it doesn't have to take a CF object.		BE task	https://www.internalfb.com/cases/1036903
Other Age					
50	Develop 'Adult Age Misrepresentation' VT & Enforcement	We have already established Adult Age Misrepresentation (Adults pretending to be teens) as a new violation type. We still need to development enforcement for this violation.	T105935149		https://l.facebook.com/L.php?u=https%3A%2F%2Fdocs.google.com%2Fdocument%2Fd%2F15bky7UAQ_MtdG8DBLx_6PnNqQNslSec0teS2x6_N1TQ%2Fedit%23&h=AT2rsN6VsW54DBdYcQRUmzOjk0NGJmL2dGpNct17ZB1dWo_dls_oCicBKPuKKimJnVDi5mBjvfdC5f9lqUF5pDvmYInEarCSwud5kTTeYAbnRbi0rv_xcqViD_7lqQYe5o5_aG AAM is a serious violation from child safety perspective as evident from linked case study, we currently do not enforce proactively on age lying. This is also linked to Teen As Misrep (Teens pretending to be adults) both problems will benefit from developing proactive enforcement for age lying.
51	Fix EditDOB Auto-Classifiers	We run classifiers to determine if we should permit a user's date of birth change. The use of this classifiers for this purpose is broken and means we aren't gating date of birth changes based on our adult classifiers or inappropriate-interactions with children classifier.			https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pYGmSTOy41fwd5-9UL-CEIz898mR_kwuk-ugNovv70w/edit?usp=sharing
52	Audit age transition blocks	As part of the edit DOB flows we run checks to block a DOB change request if it meets logic surrounding age transitions e.g. changing DOB to an under 18 value. We haven't been able to audit these checks to ensure they are working as intended			https://www.internalfb.com/intern/wiki/Attribute_Misrepresentation/Initiatives/EditDOB/(Edit_DOB)_Age_Transitions/
53	Audit edit DOB appeals systems	We were unable to audit our edit DOB appeals flow fully during our Reliability and Response audit. The unaudited systems:			https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pYGmSTOy41fwd5-9UL-CEIz898mR_kwuk-ugNovv70w/edit?usp=sharing
54	Improve monitoring of edit DOB appeals	1. Appeals contact forms 2. Authenticity Platform Integration and SRT job creation 3. Decision handler 4. Birthday updates We lack visibility of key components of our edit DOB appeals flow			https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pYGmSTOy41fwd5-9UL-CEIz898mR_kwuk-ugNovv70w/edit?usp=sharing
55	Improve monitoring of account center edit DOB restrictions	1. No visibility of the rate of users that submit a DOB change request that is blocked, that go on to appeal 2. No visibility of the volume of submitted appeals that fail i.e. don't result in an appeal job being created 3. No visibility of the average handle time of a manual ID review job for a DOB change appeal 4. No visibility of appeal approval, rejection, or pending rates 5. No visibility of appeal automation We lack visibility of the volume of edit DOB requests blocked in account center by the validation logic We lack visibility of the restrictions we apply to DOB change requests in our legacy edit DOB flows			https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pYGmSTOy41fwd5-9UL-CEIz898mR_kwuk-ugNovv70w/edit?usp=sharing
56	Improve monitoring of legacy edit DOB restrictions	1. No visibility of the volume of requests blocked by frequency limits 2. No visibility of the volume of requests blocked by age transition blocks 3. No visibility of the volume of requests blocked by auto-decision classifiers Automatically close out Edit DOB requests that are in inventory for over 30 days.... perhaps the user can get a email to retry submitting the request.			https://docs.google.com/document/d/1pYGmSTOy41fwd5-9UL-CEIz898mR_kwuk-ugNovv70w/edit?usp=sharing
57	Auto-close edit DOB requests that are older than 30 days		T115611755		

58	Ensure we have visibility over Fb EditDOB auto-accepts	Add logging for age/iic-classifier based FB EditDOB auto-accept/rejects	T125285383
59		Account centre work	
60	Prepare for new regulatory standards pending for Teen Age Misrep	[Placeholder] Scope and build for U18-as-O18 (Teen Age Misrep) as we get clarity on new regulations (likely, develop an integrity aware U18 signal to support product experiences for minors).	

Another compliance case

Action:
Prioritize and work on this

New Requests

New requests from partners - these will be reviewed once per week and either triaged into backlog or escalated to be worked on by us (dependent on urgency).

Project	Description	What do you need from us?	Request POC	If urgent - why?	Notes
Support IG-SURF rollout in limited markets	Due to recent regulatory scrutiny we may need to rollout the in-app flow in some markets.	- Support rolling out and monitoring. - Potentially some heavier lifting shipping automations/optimisations to offset ops demand increase	[REDACTED]	Upcoming regulator investigation	[REDACTED] A request from a policy/legal group during a regulator inquiry quite some time ago, pretty sure this inquiry is wrapped up now and we did not choose to pursue further. Can be considered dropped.
WhatsApp underage enforcement for WAFFLE	WhatsApp is being integrated with the accounts centre - which now means that we have signal when users are underage, we should be enforcing as we do with other accounts (e.g. integrated with FEP)	Unclear - potentially just support	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED] Not had any further contact with this team, they have not reached out to use since.
Age enforcement for Meta work profiles	Fresh discussion with team working on Work accounts	Unclear - potentially just support	[REDACTED]		[REDACTED] Not had any further contact with this team, they have not reached out to use since.
Youth Ads	We are launching a new youth ads technology, need to understand risks of adults changing their birthdays to <18 in order to be in youth ads experience	Information about how birthday change appeals work, specifically how age prediction is incorporated — which versions of age prediction (thresholds, etc)	[REDACTED]	This has been flagged as a topic in a review with R&P leads on 8/18/22. Just need a simple answer	[REDACTED] Not had any further contact with this team, they have not reached out to use since.
UK External Data Request for U13 Takedowns	The ICO (UK regulator) has made a Response For Information (RFI) on the number of underage accounts we have removed across some time period (specifically UK accounts) Request for annual US-only data about the number of "contacts, complaints, or inquiries" that the company has received related to use of IG or FB by a child under 13.	Computing numbers, taking these through stat review, collaborating on data transparency request		Regulator data request	Complete.
FTC U13 Reporting Numbers	Request for annual US-only data about the number of "contacts, complaints, or inquiries" that the company has received related to use of IG or FB by a child under 13.	Computing numbers, taking these through stat review, collaborating on data transparency request		Regulator data request	Complete.
Tenured user compromised-then-disabled	An Integrity priority is reducing impact on benign tenured users. Underage is one of the largest causes of tenured user account disables. We suspect much of this is actually compromised activity.	- Sample of 300 users with linf > 365 disabled for Underage, split by reason (e.g. changed DOB on account vs user report)	[REDACTED]		Complete.
Attend to CCSR (Critical Commitment Safeguard Review) Requests	As part of the Sensitive Data Use Audit the SDU team identified EditDOB contact form flow as one of the flows where user uploads an ID. CCSR request is audit the flows and have guards in place to prevent misuse of these uploaded IDs	Prepare an audit document with code pointers and then work with the team to put the safeguards and evidence in place.	[REDACTED]		Estimated effort: 20 days for 1 eng