Exhibit 129

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA, et al., Plaintiffs, v. *META PLATFORMS, INC, and Instagram, LLC,* Defendants IN RE: SOCIAL MEDIA ADOLESCENT ADDICTION/PERSONAL INJURY PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO: 4:23-cv-05448	MDL No. 3047 Case No. 4:23-cv-05448-YGR Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers Magistrate Judge: Hon. Peter H. Kang

SECOND CORRECTED TRIAL REPORT OF PATRICK MCDANIEL
FEBRUARY 13, 2026

Table 8 - Number of Checkpoints of US Users

To measure the number of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints at the state-level, I observed that the field "conformed_entity_dimensions.jurisdictions" for Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 may contain state-level information. In Checkpointing Table, the field "enrollment_conformed_entity_dimensions.jurisdictions" also may contain state-level information. Below are tables that show the distribution of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints by state (where such state information was available).

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	270,958 (52.9%)
US	Table 2	87,245 (17.0%)
US_AK	Table 2	36 (<0.1%)
US_AL	Table 2	207 (<0.1%)
US_AL	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US_AR	Table 2	937 (<0.1%)
US_AR	Table 1	1,145 (<0.1%)
US_AZ	Table 2	418 (<0.1%)
US_AZ	Table 1	3 (<0.1%)
US_CA	Table 1	28,353 (5.5%)
US_CA	Table 2	22,971 (4.5%)
US_CO	Table 1	1,985 (<0.1%)
US_CO	Table 2	1,655 (<0.1%)
US_CT	Table 1	1,335 (<0.1%)
US_CT	Table 2	1,129 (<0.1%)
US_DC	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US_DC	Table 2	48 (<0.1%)
US_DE	Table 2	300 (<0.1%)
US_DE	Table 1	69 (<0.1%)
US_FL	Table 2	10,681 (2.1%)
US_FL	Table 1	2,802 (0.5%)
US_GA	Table 2	2,409 (<0.1%)
US_GA	Table 1	44 (<0.1%)
US_HI	Table 2	52 (<0.1%)

US_HI	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US_IA	Table 2	100 (<0.1%)
US_IA	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US_ID	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US_ID	Table 2	69 (<0.1%)
US_IL	Table 2	4,236 (0.8%)
US_IL	Table 1	5,740 (1.1%)
US_IN	Table 2	245 (<0.1%)
US_IN	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US_KS	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US_KS	Table 2	99 (<0.1%)
US_KY	Table 1	9 (<0.1%)
US_KY	Table 2	186 (<0.1%)
US_LA	Table 1	406 (<0.1%)
US_LA	Table 2	1,626 (<0.1%)
US_MA	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US_MA	Table 2	228 (<0.1%)
US_MD	Table 1	8 (<0.1%)
US_MD	Table 2	454 (<0.1%)
US_ME	Table 2	36 (<0.1%)
US_MI	Table 1	7 (<0.1%)
US_MI	Table 2	400 (<0.1%)
US_MN	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US_MN	Table 2	202 (<0.1%)
US_MO	Table 2	203 (<0.1%)
US_MO	Table 1	3 (<0.1%)
US_MS	Table 1	13 (<0.1%)
US_MS	Table 2	847 (<0.1%)
US_MT	Table 2	179 (<0.1%)
US_MT	Table 1	33 (<0.1%)
US_NC	Table 2	495 (<0.1%)
US_NC	Table 1	8 (<0.1%)
US_ND	Table 2	20 (<0.1%)
US_NE	Table 2	67 (<0.1%)
US_NH	Table 2	37 (<0.1%)
US_NJ	Table 1	3 (<0.1%)
US_NJ	Table 2	508 (<0.1%)
US_NM	Table 2	37 (<0.1%)
US_NM	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US_NV	Table 2	2,127 (<0.1%)
US_NV	Table 1	798 (<0.1%)

US_NY	Table 2	1,404 (<0.1%)
US_NY	Table 1	10 (<0.1%)
US_OH	Table 2	3,675 (0.7%)
US_OH	Table 1	2,192 (<0.1%)
US_OK	Table 2	174 (<0.1%)
US_OR	Table 1	242 (<0.1%)
US_OR	Table 2	1,102 (<0.1%)
US_PA	Table 2	428 (<0.1%)
US_PA	Table 1	6 (<0.1%)
US_RI	Table 2	32 (<0.1%)
US_SC	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US_SC	Table 2	156 (<0.1%)
US_SD	Table 2	20 (<0.1%)
US_TN	Table 2	378 (<0.1%)
US_TN	Table 1	5 (<0.1%)
US_TX	Table 2	13,948 (2.7%)
US_TX	Table 1	19,116 (3.7%)
US_UT	Table 1	1,349 (<0.1%)
US_UT	Table 2	1,123 (<0.1%)
US_VA	Table 1	3,708 (0.7%)
US_VA	Table 2	2,659 (0.5%)
US_VT	Table 1	4 (<0.1%)
US_VT	Table 2	66 (<0.1%)
US_WA	Table 1	590 (<0.1%)
US_WA	Table 2	5,356 (1.0%)
US_WI	Table 2	196 (<0.1%)
US_WV	Table 2	65 (<0.1%)
US_WY	Table 2	11 (<0.1%)
	Total	512,242

Table 9 - Reports by State

Jurisdiction	Table	Enforcements
US	Table 3	3,419,719 (75.3%)
US_AK	Table 3	1,117 (<0.1%)
US_AL	Table 3	11,756 (<0.1%)
US_AR	Table 3	11,638 (<0.1%)
US_AZ	Table 3	15,974 (<0.1%)
US_CA	Table 3	210,051 (4.6%)
US_CO	Table 3	19,592 (<0.1%)
US_CT	Table 3	13,127 (<0.1%)
US_DC	Table 3	3,584 (<0.1%)
US_DE	Table 3	3,823 (<0.1%)
US_FL	Table 3	103,907 (2.3%)
US_GA	Table 3	47,794 (1.1%)
US_HI	Table 3	4,352 (<0.1%)
US_IA	Table 3	3,728 (<0.1%)

US_ID	Table 3	2,775 (<0.1%)
US_IL	Table 3	49,670 (1.1%)
US_IN	Table 3	13,376 (<0.1%)
US_KS	Table 3	3,971 (<0.1%)
US_KY	Table 3	7,747 (<0.1%)
US_LA	Table 3	22,024 (<0.1%)
US_MA	Table 3	11,722 (<0.1%)
US_MD	Table 3	18,632 (<0.1%)
US_ME	Table 3	1,882 (<0.1%)
US_MI	Table 3	22,018 (<0.1%)
US_MN	Table 3	7,634 (<0.1%)
US_MO	Table 3	12,040 (<0.1%)
US_MS	Table 3	12,373 (<0.1%)
US_MT	Table 3	2,078 (<0.1%)
US_NC	Table 3	26,549 (0.6%)
US_ND	Table 3	924 (<0.1%)
US_NE	Table 3	3,343 (<0.1%)
US_NH	Table 3	1,944 (<0.1%)
US_NJ	Table 3	22,674 (<0.1%)
US_NM	Table 3	3,194 (<0.1%)
US_NV	Table 3	16,436 (<0.1%)
US_NY	Table 3	46,173 (1.0%)
US_OH	Table 3	38,770 (0.9%)
US_OK	Table 3	7,215 (<0.1%)
US_OR	Table 3	10,606 (<0.1%)
US_PA	Table 3	25,187 (0.6%)
US_RI	Table 3	1,987 (<0.1%)
US_SC	Table 3	12,077 (<0.1%)
US_SD	Table 3	985 (<0.1%)
US_TN	Table 3	17,956 (<0.1%)
US_TX	Table 3	164,869 (3.6%)
US_UT	Table 3	11,571 (<0.1%)
US_VA	Table 3	37,518 (0.8%)
US_VT	Table 3	1,140 (<0.1%)
US_WA	Table 3	19,395 (<0.1%)
US_WI	Table 3	8,826 (<0.1%)
US_WV	Table 3	2,354 (<0.1%)
US_WY	Table 3	707 (<0.1%)
	Total	4,540,504

Table 10 - Enforcements by State

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	2,145,585 (97.5%)
US_AR	Checkpointing Table	615 (<0.1%)
US_CA	Checkpointing Table	22,999 (1.0%)
US_CO	Checkpointing Table	3,187 (<0.1%)
US_CT	Checkpointing Table	661 (<0.1%)
US_DE	Checkpointing Table	4 (<0.1%)
US_FL	Checkpointing Table	71 (<0.1%)
US_IL	Checkpointing Table	2,779 (<0.1%)
US_LA	Checkpointing Table	11 (<0.1%)
US_MT	Checkpointing Table	2 (<0.1%)
US_NV	Checkpointing Table	17 (<0.1%)
US_OH	Checkpointing Table	620 (<0.1%)
US_OR	Checkpointing Table	6 (<0.1%)
US_TX	Checkpointing Table	17,511 (0.8%)
US_UT	Checkpointing Table	2,283 (<0.1%)
US_VA	Checkpointing Table	3,947 (<0.1%)
US_WA	Checkpointing Table	19 (<0.1%)

	Total	2,200,317

Table 11 - Checkpoints by State

172. Moreover, below is a plot that shows the number of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints about US and Potentially US users over time. The fields "first_create_timestamp" and "report_ds" identify when a report was created in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.[328] I assume the field "action_time" identifies when an enforcement is actioned in Table 3 because of the name of the field. I assume the field "enrollment_time" identifies when a user is checkpointed in the Checkpointing Table for the same reason.

173. In the plot, the x-axis represents time and the y-axis represents the number of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints per month. Tables are differentiated by color and US vs. Potentially US users are denoted as solid vs. dashed lines, respectively. Note the changes in value among the y-axes.

[328] See META3047MDL-177-00122356

185. Limiting the analysis to the time period and app on which I understand SURF has been used qualitatively does not change the results of the analysis. Table 1 reports about US users still show the same pattern. The exception is with respect to Potential US users, where these filters remove a large volume of ostensible SURF reports. This result is difficult to square with Meta's testimony about how to identify SURF reports in Table 1.[339]

186. **Q2. How many underage reports and how many unique US users subject to such reports were ignored automatically due to a lack of a bio and photos (broken down by state)?**

187. This question asks how many reports were ignored automatically because the user profile did not contain a bio or photos.

188. To identify the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to a lack of bio and photos, the field "automation_policy_name" in Table 1[340], and the subfield "automation_policy_name" in the field "report_entity_review_funnel_redacted" in Table 2, may contain at least the following values:

    (a) FB_Underage_ignore_fb_no_media_profile

    (b) FBUnderageIgnoreNoMediaProfile

[339] Blanaru Dep. 41:21-42:4.
[340] META3047MDL-177-00122360

(c) IG_Underage_ignore_no_bio_and_no_media

(d) IGUnderageIgnoreNoBioAndNoMediaProfiles

(e) IGUnderageIgnoreNoMediaProfile

(f) IGUnderageIgnoreNoMediaProfiles

(g) UnderageIgnoreNoMediaProfiles

189. I assume that these values refer to the policy Meta applies which ignores reports of accounts because there was either: (1) no bio, or (2) no photos on the account.[341] Below is a table which contains the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to a lack of bio and photos.

Table	No Bio or Photos Auto-Ignored Reports
Table 1 (Potential US)	32,095
Table 1	7,402
Table 2	3,440
Total	42,937

Table 20 - Number of Ignored Reports Due to a Lack of a Bio or Photos

190. Moreover, below is a table that shows the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to a lack of bio and photos by state.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	5,652
US	Table 2	1,633
US_AL	Table 2	1
US_AR	Table 2	19
US_AR	Table 1	49
US_AZ	Table 2	1
US_CA	Table 2	507
US_CA	Table 1	616
US_CO	Table 1	64
US_CO	Table 2	42

[341] See Hartnett Dep. 179:11-180:6 for details surrounding this policy. See Blanaru Dep. Ex. 1 at 1 for similar values that are used here.

US_CT	Table 1	28
US_CT	Table 2	25
US_DC	Table 2	6
US_DE	Table 1	3
US_DE	Table 2	6
US_FL	Table 1	71
US_FL	Table 2	183
US_GA	Table 2	61
US_IA	Table 2	2
US_IL	Table 1	184
US_IL	Table 2	110
US_IN	Table 2	2
US_KS	Table 2	1
US_KY	Table 2	1
US_LA	Table 2	52
US_LA	Table 1	18
US_MA	Table 2	5
US_MD	Table 2	2
US_MI	Table 2	4
US_MO	Table 2	16
US_MS	Table 2	19
US_MT	Table 2	4
US_MT	Table 1	1
US_NC	Table 2	3
US_NJ	Table 2	9
US_NV	Table 2	20
US_NV	Table 1	17
US_NY	Table 2	9
US_OH	Table 2	101
US_OH	Table 1	65
US_OK	Table 2	1
US_OR	Table 2	37
US_OR	Table 1	11
US_PA	Table 2	3
US_SD	Table 2	1
US_TN	Table 2	1
US_TX	Table 2	383
US_TX	Table 1	493
US_UT	Table 1	25
US_UT	Table 2	23
US_VA	Table 2	107

US_VA	Table 1	77
US_WA	Table 2	39
US_WA	Table 1	28
US_WI	Table 2	1
	Total	10,842

Table 21- Number of Ignored Reports Due to a Lack of a Bio or Photos by State

191. Finally, to identify the number of unique US users that are the subject of these auto-ignored reports, I examined the fields "deprecated_responsible_id_hashed", "entity_attr_id_hashed", "entity_attr_id_rid_hashed", "object_id_hashed", "object_id_v1_hashed", "object_rid_hashed", and "responsible_rid_hashed" in Table 1, which all represent account identifiers.[342] The fields "entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed" and "entity_attr_primary_profile_id_hashed" in Table 2 both represent account identifiers.[343]

192. Since there are multiple fields that provide account identifiers, I used the field which had the largest number of unique values (as many reports had empty values for particular identifiers). Below is a table that shows the number of unique users that were the subject of these auto-ignored reports.

Table	Unique Users
Table 1 (Potential US) (object_id_v1_hashed)	10,408
Table 1 (deprecated_responsible_id_hashed)	6,262
Table 2 (entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed)	2,602
Total	19,272

[342] See 2025.10.06 - Corrected Meta Ltr. re META3047MDL_VOL245.pdf. I assume the memo omitted the word "_hashed" when providing the identifiers for these fields. Moreover, I assume ""entity_rid" within the "entity_attr" column refer to "entity_attr_id_hashed" and "entity_attr_id_rid_hashed". I make the same assumptions on the "object_rid" and "responsible_rid" columns.

[343] See 2025.10.06 - Corrected Meta Ltr. re META3047MDL_VOL245.pdf. I assume the memo omitted the word "_hashed" when providing the identifiers for these fields. Moreover, I assume "entity_attr_primary_profile_rid_hashed" to be an account identifier.

Table 22 - Number of Unique Users with Ignored Reports Due to a Lack of a Bio or Photos

193. Additionally, below are state-level jurisdictions of these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	4,826
US	Table 2	1,329
US_AL	Table 2	1
US_AR	Table 1	39
US_AR	Table 2	17
US_AZ	Table 2	1
US_CA	Table 1	513
US_CA	Table 2	328
US_CO	Table 1	56
US_CO	Table 2	33
US_CT	Table 2	18
US_CT	Table 1	25
US_DC	Table 2	3
US_DE	Table 1	3
US_DE	Table 2	6
US_FL	Table 1	54
US_FL	Table 2	145
US_GA	Table 2	52
US_IA	Table 2	1
US_IL	Table 2	76
US_IL	Table 1	119
US_IN	Table 2	2
US_KY	Table 2	1
US_LA	Table 2	46
US_LA	Table 1	14
US_MD	Table 2	2
US_MI	Table 2	2
US_MS	Table 2	19
US_MT	Table 1	1
US_MT	Table 2	4
US_NC	Table 2	2
US_NJ	Table 2	5
US_NV	Table 2	19
US_NV	Table 1	17
US_NY	Table 2	4
US_OH	Table 1	57
US_OH	Table 2	51
US_OK	Table 2	1
US_OR	Table 1	9
US_OR	Table 2	32
US_PA	Table 2	2
US_TN	Table 2	1
US_TX	Table 2	291
US_TX	Table 1	412
US_UT	Table 1	25
US_UT	Table 2	18
US_VA	Table 2	57
US_VA	Table 1	72
US_WA	Table 1	20
US_WA	Table 2	32
US_WI	Table 2	1

	Total	8,864

Table 23 - Number of Unique Users with Ignored Repots Due to a Lack of Bio or Photos by State

194. My analysis shows the significance of Meta's policy of automatically ignoring reports of accounts that have no bio or photos. Meta received reports of ~20,000 users that were children, but Meta took no further action to investigate those reports because they were discarded by Meta's automated system because of a lack of a bio or photos.

195. **Q3. How many underage reports and how many unique US users subject to such reports were ignored automatically because Meta's Adult Classifier predicted the user to be over 18 (broken down by state)?**

196. Similar to the question above, this question asks how many reports were ignored automatically because Meta's Adult Classifier predicted the user to be over 18.

197. As this question measures the prevalence of a different automation, the same fields are used. Again, the field "automation_policy_name" in Table 1, and the subfield "automation_policy_name" in the field "report_entity_review_funnel_redacted" in Table 2, may contain at least the following values:

    (a) FB_Underage_ignore_based_on_predicted_age_signals

    (b) IG_Underage_ignore_based_on_predicted_age_signals

(c) IGUnderageAdultClassifierIgnore

(d) Threads_Underage_ignore_based_on_predicted_age_signals

(e) UnderageAdultClassifierIgnore

198. I assume that these values refer to the policy Meta applies which ignores reports of accounts because Meta's Adult Classifier predicted the user to be over 18.[344] Below is a table which contains the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to Meta's Adult Classifier predicting the user to be over 18.

Table	Predicted Over 18 Auto-Ignored Reports
Table 1	83,465
Table 1 (Potential US)	77,785
Table 2	3,295
Total	164,545

Table 24 - Number of Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18

199. Moreover, below is a table that shows the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to Meta's Adult Classifier predicting the user to be over 18 by state.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	66,221
US	Table 2	2,310
US_AK	Table 2	3
US_AR	Table 1	235
US_AR	Table 2	14
US_AZ	Table 2	5
US_CA	Table 1	8,710
US_CA	Table 2	444
US_CO	Table 1	537

[344] See Hartnett Dep. 175:16-176:15 for details surrounding this policy. See also META3047MDL-146-00072824 at -072831 (UnderageAdultClassifierIgnore defined to mean "Ignore if our adult classifier predicts them to be over 18")

US_CO	Table 2	2
US_CT	Table 1	394
US_CT	Table 2	56
US_DC	Table 2	1
US_DE	Table 2	3
US_FL	Table 1	13
US_FL	Table 2	80
US_GA	Table 2	32
US_ID	Table 2	1
US_IL	Table 2	58
US_IL	Table 1	1,303
US_IN	Table 2	1
US_KS	Table 2	7
US_KY	Table 2	1
US_LA	Table 2	5
US_MA	Table 2	1
US_MI	Table 2	1
US_MS	Table 2	3
US_MT	Table 2	2
US_MT	Table 1	1
US_NC	Table 2	6
US_ND	Table 2	1
US_NH	Table 2	1
US_NJ	Table 2	5
US_NV	Table 2	36
US_NV	Table 1	9
US_NY	Table 2	22
US_OH	Table 2	18
US_OH	Table 1	350
US_OR	Table 2	4
US_PA	Table 2	7
US_TN	Table 2	4
US_TX	Table 2	109
US_TX	Table 1	4,470
US_UT	Table 2	6
US_UT	Table 1	363
US_VA	Table 1	854
US_VA	Table 2	21
US_VT	Table 2	1
US_WA	Table 2	15
US_WA	Table 1	5

US_WI	Table 2	1
US_WV	Table 2	8
	Total	86,760

Table 25- Number of Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18 by State

200. Finally, using the same account identifiers and approach described above, below is a table that shows the number of unique users that were the subject of these auto-ignored reports.

Table	Unique Users
Table 1 (Potential US) (object_id_hashed)	77,379
Table 1 (object_id_hashed)	61,912
Table 2 (entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed)	1,668
Total	140,959

Table 26 - Number of Unique Users Who Had Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18

201. Additionally, below are the state-level jurisdictions for these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	49,461
US	Table 2	1,196
US_AK	Table 2	1
US_AR	Table 2	3
US_AR	Table 1	179
US_AZ	Table 2	5
US_CA	Table 1	5,869
US_CA	Table 2	149
US_CO	Table 1	429
US_CO	Table 2	2
US_CT	Table 1	313
US_CT	Table 2	9
US_DC	Table 2	1
US_DE	Table 2	3
US_FL	Table 1	7
US_FL	Table 2	55
US_GA	Table 2	5

US_ID	Table 2	1
US_IL	Table 1	1,020
US_IL	Table 2	40
US_IN	Table 2	1
US_KS	Table 2	4
US_KY	Table 2	1
US_LA	Table 2	5
US_MA	Table 2	1
US_MI	Table 2	1
US_MS	Table 2	3
US_MT	Table 2	2
US_MT	Table 1	1
US_NC	Table 2	5
US_ND	Table 2	1
US_NH	Table 2	1
US_NJ	Table 2	4
US_NV	Table 2	23
US_NV	Table 1	4
US_NY	Table 2	16
US_OH	Table 1	289
US_OH	Table 2	16
US_OR	Table 2	4
US_PA	Table 2	3
US_TN	Table 2	3
US_TX	Table 2	63
US_TX	Table 1	3,424
US_UT	Table 2	6
US_UT	Table 1	260
US_VA	Table 1	651
US_VA	Table 2	16
US_VT	Table 2	1
US_WA	Table 1	5
US_WA	Table 2	14
US_WI	Table 2	1
US_WV	Table 2	3
	Total	63,580

Table 27 - Number of Unique Users Who Had Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18 by State

top-five most frequently occurring reasons why users are checkpointed for potentially being underage. The percentage field is with respect to the total number of account checkpoints. Discussed subsequently, these top checkpoint reasons often refer to users who self-admit they are underage.

Table	Checkpoint Reason	Frequency	Percentage
Checkpointing Table	PolicyChain: Enroll people confirming to be underage to age verification checkpoint	476,755	21.7%
Checkpointing Table	U13: AGE_COLLECTION	439,288	20.0%
Checkpointing Table	PolicyChain:EnrollOnUnderageDOBUpdate Enroll people confirming to be underage to age verification checkpoint	425,065	19.3%
Checkpointing Table	PolicyChain:EnrollOnUnderageDOBUpdate Confirmed to be underage	333,207	15.1%
Checkpointing Table	PolicyChain: U13 Admittance via Account Centre	93,221	4.2%
Table 3	policy:disable_async_job	101,657	62.3%
Table 3	policy:ig_underage_checkpoint;ig_underage_checkpoint	15,928	9.8%
Table 3	policy:	12,449	7.6%
Table 3	policy:state_manager	3,315	2.0%
Table 3	decision:["Is_there_underage_admission::no_indication","Are_there_underage_photos::Yes_above_threshold"]	2,575	1.6%

Table 39 - Most Common Checkpointing Reasons

235. Next, the fields "creator_rid_hashed", "entity_rid_hashed", and "owner_rid_hashed" identify the user in Table 3.[364] As used in the prior section, I use the fields "entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed" and "entity_attr_primary_profile_rid_hashed" in Checkpointing Table to identify users. Below is a table, using same the approach described above, that shows the number of unique users[365] that are checkpointed.

Table	Unique Users
Checkpointing Table (entity_id_hashed)	1,810,035
Table 3 (entity_rid_hashed)	105,175
Total	1,915,210

[364] Ashley Simonsen, Corrected Meta Ltr re META3047MDL_VOL245, Ltr from Counsel for Meta to Counsel of Record (Oct. 6, 2025).

[365] I attempted to deduplicate IDs between these two tables—there were no matches among the fields.

Table 40 - Number of Checkpointed Users

236. Finally, below is a table that shows the state-level jurisdictions of these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	1,766,761
US_AR	Checkpointing Table	415
US_CA	Checkpointing Table	18,652
US_CO	Checkpointing Table	2,838
US_CT	Checkpointing Table	366
US_DE	Checkpointing Table	3
US_FL	Checkpointing Table	63
US_IL	Checkpointing Table	1,763
US_LA	Checkpointing Table	11
US_MT	Checkpointing Table	2
US_NV	Checkpointing Table	15
US_OH	Checkpointing Table	390
US_OR	Checkpointing Table	5
US_TX	Checkpointing Table	13,515
US_UT	Checkpointing Table	2,063
US_VA	Checkpointing Table	3,156
US_WA	Checkpointing Table	18
	Total	1,810,036

Table 41- Number of Checkpointed Users (via Checkpointing Table) by State

Jurisdiction	Table	Enforcements
US	Table 3	82,436
US_AK	Table 3	32
US_AL	Table 3	295
US_AR	Table 3	210
US_AZ	Table 3	381
US_CA	Table 3	4,094
US_CO	Table 3	283
US_CT	Table 3	224
US_DC	Table 3	66
US_DE	Table 3	79
US_FL	Table 3	1,824
US_GA	Table 3	1,169
US_HI	Table 3	122
US_IA	Table 3	89
US_ID	Table 3	66
US_IL	Table 3	874
US_IN	Table 3	345
US_KS	Table 3	104
US_KY	Table 3	218
US_LA	Table 3	509
US_MA	Table 3	276
US_MD	Table 3	464
US_ME	Table 3	36
US_MI	Table 3	438
US_MN	Table 3	209
US_MO	Table 3	252
US_MS	Table 3	265
US_MT	Table 3	38
US_NC	Table 3	680
US_ND	Table 3	18
US_NE	Table 3	79

US_NH	Table 3	43
US_NJ	Table 3	547
US_NM	Table 3	63
US_NV	Table 3	354
US_NY	Table 3	1,063
US_OH	Table 3	783
US_OK	Table 3	193
US_OR	Table 3	191
US_PA	Table 3	635
US_RI	Table 3	38
US_SC	Table 3	335
US_SD	Table 3	17
US_TN	Table 3	435
US_TX	Table 3	2,679
US_UT	Table 3	220
US_VA	Table 3	701
US_VT	Table 3	24
US_WA	Table 3	409
US_WI	Table 3	210
US_WV	Table 3	50
US_WY	Table 3	10
	Total	105,175

Table 42 - Number of Checkpointed Users (via Table 3) by State

237. My analysis shows that Meta's age detection systems are heavily reliant on users self-admitting that they are underage—all of the top-five reasons in the Checkpointing Table (representing ~80% of all checkpoints) are related to users who admit they are underage in some way (e.g., "DOBUpdate", "Admittance via Account Centre", etc.).[366]

5.5.4 Results on User Account Disables

238. This analysis of Meta's productions focuses on US users that have been deactivated (often described as being "disabled" in the data) for being underage. Here, I analyze the number of users that were disabled for being underage, based on elapsed time, and specific actions that led to the account

[366] Blanaru Dep. 51:3-52:25; Blanaru Dep. Ex. 1 at 4; see also META3047MDL-037-00084734 ("AGE_COLLECTION").

242. As used in the prior section, I use the fields "entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed" and "entity_attr_primary_profile_rid_hashed" in Checkpointing Table to identify users. Below is a table, using same the approach described above, that shows the number of unique users that are disabled.

Table	Unique Users
Checkpointing Table (entity_id_hashed)	1,322,210 (100.0%)
Total	1,322,210 (100.0%)

Table 45 - Number of Unique Users Disabled

243. Moreover, below is a table that shows the state-level jurisdictions of these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	1,283,555
US_AR	Checkpointing Table	333
US_CA	Checkpointing Table	16,841
US_CO	Checkpointing Table	2,652
US_CT	Checkpointing Table	245
US_FL	Checkpointing Table	2
US_IL	Checkpointing Table	1,382
US_NV	Checkpointing Table	2
US_OH	Checkpointing Table	278
US_TX	Checkpointing Table	12,116
US_UT	Checkpointing Table	1,959
US_VA	Checkpointing Table	2,844
US_WA	Checkpointing Table	1
	Total	1,322,210

Table 46 - Number of Unique Users Disabled by State

244. For measuring the time taken to be disabled, I assume the field "enrollment_time" refers to the time a user is checkpointed and "decision_time" refers to the time at which a decision about the checkpointed user is made. Thus, the duration at which a user is checkpointed can be measured by the difference between these two fields. Below is a table which contains the number of disabled accounts, binned by whether the account was

(y) "U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: PolicyChain: U13 Admittance via Account Centre"

(z) "U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: PolicyChain: U13 Admittance via Account Centre"

(aa) "U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: Reenrollment:U13: PolicyChain: U13 Admittance via Account Centre"

(bb) "U13: U13 Admittance via Account Centre"

(cc) "U13: U13: Reenrollment:U13: EDIT_PROFILE_SET_UNDERAGE_DOB"

(dd) "U13: U13: Reenrollment:U13: PolicyChain: U13 Admittance via Account Centre"

249. Below is table that shows the number of checkpoints due to users editing their date of birth to be under 13, split by decision.

Table	DOB Disabled	DOB Cleared	DOB Distilery Cleared
Checkpointing Table	828,458 (80.0%)	201,445 (19.4%)	5,844 (0.6%)
Total	828,458 (80.0%)	201,445 (19.4%)	5,844 (0.6%)

Table 48 - Checkpoint Decisions for Users Who Edited Their Date of Birth

250. Below is a table that shows the number of accounts disabled due to users editing their date of birth to be under 13, broken down by state.

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	783,669
US_AR	Checkpointing Table	409

US_CA	Checkpointing Table	19,289
US_CO	Checkpointing Table	2,789
US_CT	Checkpointing Table	388
US_FL	Checkpointing Table	4
US_IL	Checkpointing Table	1,870
US_NV	Checkpointing Table	3
US_OH	Checkpointing Table	351
US_TX	Checkpointing Table	14,389
US_UT	Checkpointing Table	2,064
US_VA	Checkpointing Table	3,232
US_WA	Checkpointing Table	1
	Total	828,458

Table 49 – Number of Accounts Disabled because Users Edited Their Date of Birth by State

251. Next, to measure the time between when a user was checkpointed and when they were disabled for editing their date of birth to be under 13, I apply the same approach above where I compute the difference between the fields "enrollment_time" and "decision_time". Below is a table which contains the number of accounts that were disabled for editing their date of birth, binned by whether the account was checkpointed for less than forty-five days, from forty-six days to six months, from six months to a year, to greater than one year.

Table	≤ 45 days	46 days to 6 months	6 months to 1 year	> 1 year
Checkpointing Table	602,081 (73.1%)	176,180 (21.4%)	6,298 (0.8%)	39,176 (4.8%)
Total	602,081 (73.1%)	176,180 (21.4%)	6,298 (0.8%)	39,176 (4.8%)

Table 50 - Number of Checkpoint Disable Decisions Because Users Edited Their Date of Birth that Took N Days

252. My analysis again shows a high reliance on detecting underage users via self-reporting methods (such as a user changing their date of birth). The data also shows that Meta held tens of thousands of users in checkpoints for longer than 6 months even though they had admitted to being underage.

273. To identify whether accounts should be disabled by Meta because they are soft-matched to an account that was disabled for being underage, I performed the following steps:

274. First, I identified US accounts that were disabled for being underage. Through Very Recent Checkpointing Table, this was done by collecting IDs (via "rid_hashed", which I assume is semantically identical to the field "entity_rid_hashed" in Checkpointing Table) that had the value "disabled" in the field "decision" (as done in prior analyses). Finally, all checkpoints in Very Recent Checkpointing Table pertain to accounts suspected (or confirmed) to be underage.[381] I call such IDs "Disabled IDs".

275. Next, I find IDs that are soft-matched to a Disabled ID. I filter such soft-matched IDs on a table-specific basis, namely:

276. For FB-to-FB Clustering Table, no filtering is applied; all pairs were included.[382]

[381] Letter from Ashley Simonsen, outside counsel for Meta, Covington & Burling (Aug. 15, 2025) (regarding META3047MDL_VOL270).

[382] I understand that there is some measure used to ascertain if two IDs within the FB-to-FB Clustering Table are within a cluster (as is with all clustering algorithms), be it distance (e.g., Euclidian), similarity (e.g., cosine), probability (e.g., KL divergence), density (e.g., reachability), or graph-based (e.g., edge weights). Unfortunately, Meta's 30(b)(6) witness was unable to testify as to how this cluster is formed: See Blanaru Dep. 59:23-60:1. In general, clustering algorithms assign data points to a cluster if the points are "sufficiently" close. Here, "sufficiently" is measured by some form of a threshold, be it based on distance, similarity, probability, density, or weight. However, Meta asserts that their FB-to-FB Clustering algorithm does not use a threshold. See Blanaru Dep. 60:3-19. Thus, I assume that if the FB-to-FB Clustering algorithm returns two IDs as part of a cluster, that is a prediction that these two accounts may be owned by the same user.

277. For the FB-to-IG Softmatch Table, any ID pair that had all values of the fields "score_2025_MM_DD" (where "MM_DD" was either "04_14", "05_11", "06_07", or "07_06") over than 0.555 (which is the threshold used for the IG-to-IG Softmatch model—I assume the same threshold is applied for this model) was included.[383] Moreover, this is a reasonable threshold because the values of these fields follow a bi-modal distribution where values are concentrated to be below 0.4 and above 0.7. In the figure below, the x-axis represents the value of the score and the y-axis represents the number of soft--match pairs that had a score equal to the value on the x-axis. The red line corresponds to the threshold I apply.



Figure 6 - Histogram of FB-to-IG Softmatch Table Score Values (with 0.555 Threshold)

[383] After stating that Meta's IG-IG softmatch table used a threshold to determine whether a pair was considered to be "SUMA" (same user multiple accounts), Meta's 30(b)(6) witness testified that she did not know the threshold used for the FB-to-IG Softmatch Table. See Blanaru Dep. at 53:3-56:4, 59:4-8. Ms. Blanaru noted in her errata that "[t]here is no threshold for inclusion in the Facebook-to-Instagram soft-matching table. All potential matches are included." Nov. 13, 2025 Errata Sheet, Blanaru Dep. 59:8.

278. For IG-to-IG Softmatch Table, any ID pair that had all values of the fields "is_suma_2025_MM_DD"[384] (where "MM_DD" was either "05_24", "06_07", "06_23", or "07_06") not equal to 0 (as this indicates that the pair of IDs are not owned by the same user) was included.[385]

279. I call IDs that are soft-matched to a Disabled ID that were not filtered out "Candidate IDs" (as they represent IDs that Meta's models predict to be owned by the same user).

280. Next, I check if a "Candidate ID" is neither in Very Recent Checkpointing Table (via "rid_hashed"), Very Recent Table 3 (via "creator_id", "creator_rid_hashed", "entity_id_hashed", "entity_rid_hashed", "owner_id", and "owner_rid_hashed"), nor Very Recent VAN Table (via "creator_rid_hashed", "entity_id_hashed", "entity_rid_hashed", and "owner_rid_hashed"). In this way, such "Candidate IDs" are not checkpointed, not enforced, and have not had an enforcement propagated to them (and therefore, are currently allowed to remain on Meta's platforms).

[384] "SUMA" stands for "Same-User-Multiple-Account". See Hartnett Dep. 292:1-3.
[385] Blanaru Dep. 54:12-21.

281. Finally, I verified that at least one of the IDs[386] in the pair had a US jurisdiction[387](via "enrollment_conformed_entity_dimensions.jurisdictions" in Very Recent Checkpointing Table for Disabled IDs and via Softmatch Jurisdiction Table for Candidate IDs). I call such IDs "Unenforced IDs" as they represent IDs that are not enforced or checkpointed, but are soft-matched (over a threshold) to an ID that was disabled for being underage, and either has a US jurisdiction or is soft-matched to an ID that does. Finally, across all pairs with an Unenforced ID, I computed the number of unique Unenforced and Disabled IDs. Below are tables that show the results of the filters described above for each of Meta's soft-match models.

Table	Softmatch Pairs	Pairs over Threshold	Pairs with a Disabled Account	Unenforced Softmatch Pairs	Unenforced Accounts	Disabled Accounts
FB-to-FB Clustering Table	176,564,405	176,564,405	31,476	30,811	15,748	13,106
FB-to-IG Softmatch Table	2,999,628,582	1,282,987,972	57,202	49,483	47,748	21,797
IG-to-IG Softmatch Table	4,613,904,488	2,734,812,541	125,499	119,095	72,320	18,397

Table 5758 - Soft-match Analysis Results

[386] Note that Meta described Very Recent Checkpointing Table as "data relating to U.S. Facebook and Instagram accounts." Accordingly, I consider these users to be US users. See 2025.08.15 Meta Ltr. re META3047MDL_VOL270.pdf. However, I observed that some of these users had values in the subfield "jurisdictions" from the field "enrollment_conformed_entity_dimensions" indicating foreign geography and thus, to be conservative, I filtered them out in my analysis per these steps.

[387] I performed this check for IG-to-IG Softmatch Table and FB-to-IG Softmatch Table. FB-to-FB Clustering Table has a "country" field which is "US" for >99.95% of rows.

282. Moreover, below are tables of the state-level jurisdictions of Disabled Accounts.

FB-to-FB Clustering Table Disabled Account Jurisdictions	Count
US	1,837
US_AK	38
US_AL	191
US_AR	114
US_AZ	455
US_CA	1,215
US_CO	164
US_CT	65
US_DC	29
US_DE	27
US_FL	497
US_GA	308
US_HI	39
US_IA	115
US_ID	45
US_IL	261
US_IN	273
US_KS	108
US_KY	270
US_LA	148
US_MA	251
US_MD	137
US_ME	49
US_MI	273
US_MN	160
US_MO	198
US_MS	125
US_MT	27
US_NC	318
US_ND	36
US_NE	69
US_NH	35
US_NJ	151
US_NM	59
US_NV	68
US_NY	1,224
US_OH	397
US_OK	135
US_OR	191
US_PA	365
US_RI	17
US_SC	180
US_SD	25
US_TN	268
US_TX	682
US_UT	73
US_VA	613
US_VT	26
US_WA	395
US_WI	199
US_WV	134

US_WY	27

Table 58 - FB-to-FB Clustering Table Disabled Accounts by State

FB-to-IG Softmatch Table Disabled Account Jurisdictions	Count
US	1,174
US_AK	43
US_AL	413
US_AR	210
US_AZ	474
US_CA	2,426
US_CO	289
US_CT	163
US_DC	53
US_DE	66
US_FL	1,522
US_GA	939
US_HI	130
US_IA	143
US_ID	82
US_IL	642
US_IN	384
US_KS	196
US_KY	338
US_LA	484
US_MA	301
US_MD	437
US_ME	53
US_MI	526
US_MN	266
US_MO	327
US_MS	276
US_MT	50
US_NC	770
US_ND	44
US_NE	118
US_NH	50
US_NJ	548
US_NM	97
US_NV	239
US_NY	1,088
US_OH	735

US_OK	261
US_OR	145
US_PA	701
US_RI	54
US_SC	377
US_SD	32
US_TN	553
US_TX	2,060
US_UT	165
US_VA	525
US_VT	23
US_WA	376
US_WI	308
US_WV	93
US_WY	28

Table 59596061 - FB-to-IG Softmatch Clustering Table Disabled Accounts by State

IG-to-IG Softmatch Table Disabled Account Jurisdictions	Count
US	1,093
US_AK	18
US_AL	289
US_AR	115
US_AZ	366
US_CA	2,394
US_CO	211
US_CT	128
US_DC	82
US_DE	62
US_FL	1,339
US_GA	904
US_HI	124
US_IA	67
US_ID	63
US_IL	589
US_IN	250
US_KS	119
US_KY	198
US_LA	430
US_MA	254
US_MD	436

US_ME	26
US_MI	422
US_MN	177
US_MO	220
US_MS	211
US_MT	33
US_NC	592
US_ND	25
US_NE	69
US_NH	34
US_NJ	565
US_NM	80
US_NV	245
US_NY	946
US_OH	521
US_OK	147
US_OR	90
US_PA	563
US_RI	43
US_SC	304
US_SD	17
US_TN	380
US_TX	2,020
US_UT	145
US_VA	433
US_VT	12
US_WA	268
US_WI	227
US_WV	42
US_WY	9

Table 6062 - IG-to-IG Softmatch Table Disabled Accounts by State

283. This analysis shows the ability of Meta's soft-matching models to identify accounts likely to belong to underage users whose accounts Meta has not removed from its platforms. With underage enforcement data from only a three-month period, I found tens of thousands of accounts that Meta had disabled for being underage, which Meta's systems predicted were linked to

tens of thousands more accounts that Meta ignored. This demonstrates a missed opportunity for Meta to use its existing data to detect and remove underage users.

284. **Q2. How many estimated accounts would be disabled by Meta if it had propagated soft-link enforcements for underage accounts?**

285. This question asks how many underage accounts Meta could have disabled for being soft-matched to an account that was disabled for being underage, if Meta enforced its age policies against soft-matched accounts.

286. I estimate the number of accounts Meta would have disabled by considering the percentage of potential enforcements that are due to soft-matching and multiply this percentage by the total number of enforcements in the past (using a similar methodology as my analysis of possible hard-link enforcements). I define a "soft-match" enforcement to be semantically identical to a hard-link enforcement: an account that is soft-matched to another account that was disabled to be underage. In other words, I consider the number of "Disabled Accounts" computed above when computing the percentage of soft-match enforcements. I assume that soft-matching rates are relatively consistent before April 2025, the earliest date for which Meta produced soft-matching data.

9.4 META'S DATA-RETENTION DELAYS FALL OUTSIDE ACCEPTED SECURITY PRACTICE

363. Failure to delete known sensitive data for long periods (such as 90 days) is counter to security practice. The management of sensitive, high-risk data (e.g., underage social media data, including personal information) is not simply a matter of efficiency; it is a foundational requirement of sound data governance. Effective programs minimize data retention, restrict access to the smallest possible set of individuals or systems, and ensure that sensitive data cannot be misused while it remains in storage. These principles are reinforced in widely recognized standards. For example, NIST guidance recognizes that one of the fastest and most secure ways to "delete" data is simply to destroy the encryption keys that protect it. Without the key, the remaining data becomes unreadable instantly, even though the encrypted bits may still sit on a server for a short period.[494] This method, called cryptographic erasure, allows organizations to make data immediately inaccessible.[495] ISO/IEC 27040 (Storage Security)[496] and ISO/IEC 27001 (Annex A.8.10)[497] stress that sensitive data should be retained for no longer than strictly necessary,

[494] Computer Security Resource Center, cryptographic erase, National Institute of Standards & Technology, https://csrc.nist.gov/glossary/term/cryptographic_erase.

[495] NIST SP 800-88 Rev. 2: Guidelines for Media Sanitization, NIST, 2025, https://csrc.nist.gov/pubs/sp/800/88/r2/final

[496] International Standards Organization, ISO/IEC 27040:2024 (Information technology - Security techniques - Storage security) (2024).
https://www.iso.org/standard/80194.html

[497] International Standards Organization, ISO 27001 Annex A 8.10 – Information Deletion.

protected through segregation from production systems, and subject to secure sanitization as soon as its retention is no longer justified.

364. The prolonged retention of confirmed underage user data — for periods that historically stretched beyond half a year and to this day extend close to five months (even after policy changes in April 2024) — exposes the highly sensitive personal information of underage users to ongoing risk. Such processes are a failure to meet basic data governance standards for security.

9.5 SUMMARY OPINION

365. Meta's handling of data associated with identified under-13 users does not conform to sound security or data-protection practice. Once an account is confirmed or strongly suspected to belong to a minor, Meta continues to retain that user's data for extended periods—often weeks or months—through multiple internal processing stages.[498] These protracted processes for executing the deletion are counter to appropriate security practice.

366. From a technical and risk-management perspective, Meta creates unnecessary exposure and contradicts the basic principle of minimizing retention of known ineligible user data. Established industry and government standards emphasize prompt, verifiable deletion once data is no longer required for

[498] Hartnett Dep. 297:17-301:19, Ex. 6 at 14.

lawful or operational purposes.[499] Meta's multi-stage pipeline—spanning checkpointing, review queues, and scheduled deletion windows—introduces risks of error, loss of control, and potential misuse while providing no corresponding security benefit.

367. In sum, Meta's deletion practices for under-13 accounts reflect a protracted and fragmented process that leaves children's data stored longer than necessary and exposes it to avoidable operational risk. These delays run counter to well-established industry expectations for handling sensitive or ineligible user data.

10 META'S CLAIM THAT SCRIPTED ATTACKS SUBSTANTIALLY IMPACTED THE REPORTING SYSTEM IS NOT SUPPORTED BY THE DATA

368. I have been asked to evaluate the claim that Meta's reporting system has been under attack from automated software, called "scripted attacks" or "bots"[500], and, to the degree that such attacks exist, whether they have had a large and/or lasting impact.

369. Meta stated that they have "experienced scripting attacks that increased the number of reports made through these [reporting] forms. The Company has

[499] International Organization for Standards, ISO 27001:2022: A.8.10; National Institute of Standards & Technology NIST Pub. 800-53 ch. 3 SI-12.

[500] Throughout I will use the term scripted attack and bot interchangeably. Further, consistent with its use in cyber-security, I will refer to the coordinated collection of bots as a botnet.

Table	Reports/Checkpoints that came from other TOS Reviews
Table 1 (Potential US)	40,754 (56.1%)
Table 1	18,250 (25.1%)
Checkpointing Table	13,621 (18.8%)
Total	72,625 (100.0%)

Table A-18 - Reports/Checkpoints Sourced from Internal Review

Table	Unique Users
Table 1 (Potential US) (object_id_hashed)	40,461 (59.4%)
Table 1 (object_id_hashed)	14,124 (20.7%)
Checkpointing Table (entity_id_hashed)	13,615 (20.0%)
Total	68,200 (100.0%)

Table A-19 - Unique Users Reported/Checkpointed via Internal Review

Q6. How long do underage US reports wait in the queue to be reviewed by a human reviewer and what is the number of reports that took longer than 2 days to be reviewed by a reviewer, broken down by state?

Table	Human-reviewed Reports
Table 1 (Potential US)	693,792
Table 1	181,990
Table 2	17,122
Total	892,904

Table A-20- Number of Reports that were Human-Reviewed

Quarter	Table	≤ 2 days	3 days to 1 week	1 week to 1 month	> 1 month
2018Q4	Table 1 (Potential US)	2,396		3	1
2019Q1	Table 1 (Potential US)	50,302	1,246	3,130	611
2019Q2	Table 1 (Potential US)	30,851	7,077	12,098	2,687
2019Q3	Table 1 (Potential US)	43,208	3,251	9,251	
2019Q4	Table 1 (Potential US)	83,001	1,691	156	62
2020Q1	Table 1 (Potential US)	38,689	29,407	6,839	1,417
2020Q2	Table 1	3			14
2020Q2	Table 1 (Potential US)	18,766	4,188	11,958	12,979
2020Q3	Table 1 (Potential US)	7,273	3,310	7,030	10,603
2020Q3	Table 1	9	1	15	34
2020Q4	Table 1 (Potential US)	3,284	2,800	5,916	7,321
2020Q4	Table 1	5	3	8	18
2021Q1	Table 1 (Potential US)	6,045	4,405	7,153	7,219
2021Q1	Table 1	5	4	6	13

2021Q2	Table 1 (Potential US)	12,935	4,023	4,604	5,044
2021Q2	Table 1	7	2	6	7
2021Q3	Table 1 (Potential US)	24,503	782	160	
2021Q3	Table 1	14			
2021Q4	Table 1 (Potential US)	20,480	119	4	67
2021Q4	Table 1	20			
2022Q1	Table 1 (Potential US)	41,488	222	397	256
2022Q1	Table 1	636		1	2
2022Q2	Table 1 (Potential US)	26,845	68	44	
2022Q2	Table 1	402	1		
2022Q3	Table 1 (Potential US)	36,769	68	80	2
2022Q3	Table 1	5,252	22	31	2
2022Q4	Table 1 (Potential US)	13,057	24	23	
2022Q4	Table 1	10,314	6	32	
2023Q1	Table 1 (Potential US)	14,460	27	21	
2023Q1	Table 1	10,654	9	21	
2023Q2	Table 1 (Potential US)	16,507	19	13	
2023Q2	Table 1	13,892	42	15	
2023Q3	Table 1	25,516	113	119	62
2023Q3	Table 1 (Potential US)	7,035	12		
2023Q4	Table 1	36,505	291	54	24
2023Q4	Table 1 (Potential US)	260			
2024Q1	Table 1	54,435	104	10	6
2024Q1	Table 1 (Potential US)	144			
2024Q1	Table 2	184	20	11	57
2024Q2	Table 2	4,064	772	145	1,170
2024Q2	Table 1	23,221	2		
2024Q2	Table 1 (Potential US)	2,751			
2024Q3	Table 2	2,772	478	152	1,081
2024Q3	Table 1 (Potential US)	6,039			1
2024Q4	Table 2	5,568	217	67	364
2024Q4	Table 1 (Potential US)	6,731			
	Total	707,297 (79.2%)	64,826 (7.3%)	69,573 (7.8%)	51,124 (5.7%)

Table A-21 - Number of Reports which Sat in the Queue for N Days for Human Reviewers to Review

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	862
US	Table 2	2,236
US_AL	Table 2	2
US_AR	Table 1	6
US_AR	Table 2	28
US_AZ	Table 2	28
US_CA	Table 1	97
US_CA	Table 2	570
US_CO	Table 1	9
US_CO	Table 2	46
US_CT	Table 2	20
US_CT	Table 1	7
US_DE	Table 2	6
US_FL	Table 1	5
US_FL	Table 2	482
US_GA	Table 2	39
US_GA	Table 1	1
US_IL	Table 2	94