

Exhibit 5

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA,
et al.,
Plaintiffs,

v.

META PLATFORMS, INC, and Instagram,
LLC,
Defendants

IN RE: SOCIAL MEDIA ADOLESCENT
ADDICTION/PERSONAL INJURY
PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION

THIS DOCUMENT RELATES TO:
4:23-cv-05448

MDL No. 3047

Case No. 4:23-cv-05448-YGR

Judge: Hon. Yvonne Gonzalez Rogers

Magistrate Judge: Hon. Peter H. Kang

**TRIAL REPORT OF RYAN SHEATSLEY
MARCH 20, 2026**

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

61. For soft-matching models used for integrity purposes, such as enforcing against multiple accounts owned by a user who has violated Meta’s policies, the outputs of the models are stored in tables that record pairwise match scores reflecting Meta’s prediction of the probability that the two accounts belong to the same user.¹³⁴ Meta also has “clustering” integrity models that predict clusters of accounts that are likely to belong to the same user.¹³⁵ Product teams select different precision thresholds depending on the use case.¹³⁶ Where consequences of inaccurate matching are higher, e.g., integrity and safety contexts, Meta applies more conservative thresholds to prioritize high precision.¹³⁷ At times, Meta’s thresholds (i.e., precision and confidence) for enforcing against accounts predicted to belong to the same user who had violated Meta’s policies has been as high as 80-99%.¹³⁸
62. As discussed in Section 5, I examined data that Meta produced from three existing soft-match data tables. Each of these tables records the predictions of a different “SUMA” model that Meta uses for integrity purposes.¹³⁹ The three tables represent data for models for soft-matching Instagram accounts to

¹³⁴ Hartnett Dep. 292:4-11. These models are known as integrity SUMA models. SUMA is an acronym for “Single User Multiple Accounts.” Hartnett Dep. 291:20-292:6.

¹³⁵ Hartnett Dep. 292:12-21.

¹³⁶ Hartnett Dep. 293:16-18.

¹³⁷ Hartnett Dep. 295:14-296:5.

¹³⁸ META3047MDL-047-00945193 (99% confidence for various violations, including grooming); META3047MDL-047-00043014 (95% precision for four violation types). META3047MDL-047-00040062 (80% precision for enforcement on child groomers).

¹³⁹ Blanaru Dep. 17:12-21.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

Instagram accounts (IG-IG below), Facebook to Instagram (FB-IG), and Facebook to Facebook (FB-FB). Specifically, each of these models produced daily predictions of all soft-match connections for all accounts on the respective Meta platforms.¹⁴⁰ Meta produced data representing model predictions from four days for each model for a period of approximately two months for IG-IG and three months for FB-IG and FB-FB.

5 ANALYSIS OF META LOG DATA

63. I have been asked to analyze the logging datasets that Meta produced in this case and to answer specific technical questions about this data. These questions bear directly on how underage reports are generated and processed, how checkpointing decisions are logged and resolved, and how and when accounts are disabled or deleted. This section summarizes the analyses I performed and the respective findings.
64. The data tables produced by Meta detail underage reporting, checkpointing, and enforcement activity. I analyzed these quantitative datasets in depth to understand how underage accounts move through Meta's underage detection system. I analyzed these tables to identify patterns in reporting volume, checkpoint initiation, resolution rates, and enforcement outcomes over time.

¹⁴⁰ Correspondence from Phil Irwin, outside counsel for Meta, Covington & Burling, at 2 (April 18, 2025).

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

been reported, but do have “US” in “responsible_country,” I consider them to be reports about “Potential US” users.

77. For the remainder of my analysis, I refer to the collection of these fields as “geography fields” and US-based filters as “geographic filters.”
78. Below are tables that describe the number of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints about US (and Potentially US, where applicable) users. I have been asked to perform my analysis to include these rows (and will be denoted as “Table 1 (Potential US)”) as a separate table.

Table	US Reports	Potentially US Reports
Table 1	340,960 (17.4%)	1,621,917 (82.6%)
Table 2	376,520 (100.0%)	
Total	717,480 (30.7%)	1,621,917 (69.3%)

Table 4 - Number of Reports about US and Potentially US users

Table	US Enforcements
Table 3	4,540,504 (100.0%)
Total	4,540,504 (100.0%)

Table 5 - Number of Enforcements on US Users

Table	US Checkpoints
Checkpointing Table	2,200,317 (100.0%)
Total	2,200,317 (100.0%)

Table 6 - Number of Checkpoints of US Users

To measure the number of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints at the state-level, I observed that the field “conformed_entity_dimensions.jurisdictions” for Table 1, Table 2, and Table 3 may contain state-level information. In Checkpointing Table, the field “enrollment_conformed_entity_dimensions.jurisdictions” also may contain state-level information. Below are tables that show the distribution of reports,

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

enforcements, and checkpoints by state (where such state information was available).

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	270,958 (37.8%)
US	Table 2	233,801 (32.6%)
US AK	Table 2	36 (<0.1%)
US AL	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US AL	Table 2	209 (<0.1%)
US AR	Table 2	2,102 (<0.1%)
US AR	Table 1	1,145 (<0.1%)
US AZ	Table 1	3 (<0.1%)
US AZ	Table 2	419 (<0.1%)
US CA	Table 2	48,112 (6.7%)
US CA	Table 1	28,353 (4.0%)
US CO	Table 2	3,413 (<0.1%)
US CO	Table 1	1,985 (<0.1%)
US CT	Table 1	1,335 (<0.1%)
US CT	Table 2	2,242 (<0.1%)
US DC	Table 2	48 (<0.1%)
US DC	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US DE	Table 1	69 (<0.1%)
US DE	Table 2	329 (<0.1%)
US FL	Table 2	11,894 (1.7%)
US FL	Table 1	2,802 (<0.1%)
US GA	Table 2	2,424 (<0.1%)
US GA	Table 1	44 (<0.1%)
US HI	Table 2	52 (<0.1%)
US HI	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US IA	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US IA	Table 2	100 (<0.1%)
US ID	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US ID	Table 2	69 (<0.1%)
US IL	Table 2	9,057 (1.3%)
US IL	Table 1	5,740 (0.8%)
US IN	Table 2	246 (<0.1%)
US IN	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US KS	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US KS	Table 2	99 (<0.1%)
US KY	Table 1	9 (<0.1%)
US KY	Table 2	186 (<0.1%)
US LA	Table 1	406 (<0.1%)
US LA	Table 2	1,790 (<0.1%)
US MA	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US MA	Table 2	229 (<0.1%)
US MD	Table 2	455 (<0.1%)
US MD	Table 1	8 (<0.1%)
US ME	Table 2	36 (<0.1%)
US MI	Table 1	7 (<0.1%)
US MI	Table 2	404 (<0.1%)
US MN	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US MN	Table 2	206 (<0.1%)
US MO	Table 2	204 (<0.1%)
US MO	Table 1	3 (<0.1%)
US MS	Table 2	850 (<0.1%)
US MS	Table 1	13 (<0.1%)

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US MT	Table 1	33 (<0.1%)
US MT	Table 2	195 (<0.1%)
US NC	Table 1	8 (<0.1%)
US NC	Table 2	495 (<0.1%)
US ND	Table 2	21 (<0.1%)
US NE	Table 2	67 (<0.1%)
US NH	Table 2	38 (<0.1%)
US NJ	Table 1	3 (<0.1%)
US NJ	Table 2	510 (<0.1%)
US NM	Table 2	37 (<0.1%)
US NM	Table 1	1 (<0.1%)
US NV	Table 1	798 (<0.1%)
US NV	Table 2	2,566 (<0.1%)
US NY	Table 2	1,406 (<0.1%)
US NY	Table 1	10 (<0.1%)
US OH	Table 1	2,192 (<0.1%)
US OH	Table 2	5,359 (0.7%)
US OK	Table 2	174 (<0.1%)
US OR	Table 2	1,214 (<0.1%)
US OR	Table 1	242 (<0.1%)
US PA	Table 1	6 (<0.1%)
US PA	Table 2	428 (<0.1%)
US RI	Table 2	32 (<0.1%)
US SC	Table 2	157 (<0.1%)
US SC	Table 1	2 (<0.1%)
US SD	Table 2	20 (<0.1%)
US TN	Table 2	381 (<0.1%)
US TN	Table 1	5 (<0.1%)
US TX	Table 1	19,116 (2.7%)
US TX	Table 2	30,533 (4.3%)
US UT	Table 1	1,349 (<0.1%)
US UT	Table 2	2,272 (<0.1%)
US VA	Table 1	3,708 (0.5%)
US VA	Table 2	5,630 (0.8%)
US VT	Table 2	67 (<0.1%)
US VT	Table 1	4 (<0.1%)
US WA	Table 2	5,634 (0.8%)
US WA	Table 1	590 (<0.1%)
US WI	Table 2	196 (<0.1%)
US WV	Table 2	65 (<0.1%)
US WY	Table 2	11 (<0.1%)
	Total	717,480

Table 7 - Reports by State

Jurisdiction	Table	Enforcements
US	Table 3	3,419,719 (75.3%)
US AK	Table 3	1,117 (<0.1%)
US AL	Table 3	11,756 (<0.1%)
US AR	Table 3	11,638 (<0.1%)
US AZ	Table 3	15,974 (<0.1%)
US CA	Table 3	210,051 (4.6%)
US CO	Table 3	19,592 (<0.1%)
US CT	Table 3	13,127 (<0.1%)
US DC	Table 3	3,584 (<0.1%)
US DE	Table 3	3,823 (<0.1%)
US FL	Table 3	103,907 (2.3%)
US GA	Table 3	47,794 (1.1%)
US HI	Table 3	4,352 (<0.1%)
US IA	Table 3	3,728 (<0.1%)

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US ID	Table 3	2,775 (<0.1%)
US IL	Table 3	49,670 (1.1%)
US IN	Table 3	13,376 (<0.1%)
US KS	Table 3	3,971 (<0.1%)
US KY	Table 3	7,747 (<0.1%)
US LA	Table 3	22,024 (<0.1%)
US MA	Table 3	11,722 (<0.1%)
US MD	Table 3	18,632 (<0.1%)
US ME	Table 3	1,882 (<0.1%)
US MI	Table 3	22,018 (<0.1%)
US MN	Table 3	7,634 (<0.1%)
US MO	Table 3	12,040 (<0.1%)
US MS	Table 3	12,373 (<0.1%)
US MT	Table 3	2,078 (<0.1%)
US NC	Table 3	26,549 (0.6%)
US ND	Table 3	924 (<0.1%)
US NE	Table 3	3,343 (<0.1%)
US NH	Table 3	1,944 (<0.1%)
US NJ	Table 3	22,674 (<0.1%)
US NM	Table 3	3,194 (<0.1%)
US NV	Table 3	16,436 (<0.1%)
US NY	Table 3	46,173 (1.0%)
US OH	Table 3	38,770 (0.9%)
US OK	Table 3	7,215 (<0.1%)
US OR	Table 3	10,606 (<0.1%)
US PA	Table 3	25,187 (0.6%)
US RI	Table 3	1,987 (<0.1%)
US SC	Table 3	12,077 (<0.1%)
US SD	Table 3	985 (<0.1%)
US TN	Table 3	17,956 (<0.1%)
US TX	Table 3	164,869 (3.6%)
US UT	Table 3	11,571 (<0.1%)
US VA	Table 3	37,518 (0.8%)
US VT	Table 3	1,140 (<0.1%)
US WA	Table 3	19,395 (<0.1%)
US WI	Table 3	8,826 (<0.1%)
US WV	Table 3	2,354 (<0.1%)
US WY	Table 3	707 (<0.1%)
	Total	4,540,504

Table 8 - Enforcements by State

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	2,145,585 (97.5%)
US AR	Checkpointing Table	615 (<0.1%)
US CA	Checkpointing Table	22,999 (1.0%)
US CO	Checkpointing Table	3,187 (<0.1%)
US CT	Checkpointing Table	661 (<0.1%)
US DE	Checkpointing Table	4 (<0.1%)
US FL	Checkpointing Table	71 (<0.1%)
US IL	Checkpointing Table	2,779 (<0.1%)
US LA	Checkpointing Table	11 (<0.1%)
US MT	Checkpointing Table	2 (<0.1%)
US NV	Checkpointing Table	17 (<0.1%)
US OH	Checkpointing Table	620 (<0.1%)
US OR	Checkpointing Table	6 (<0.1%)
US TX	Checkpointing Table	17,511 (0.8%)
US UT	Checkpointing Table	2,283 (<0.1%)
US VA	Checkpointing Table	3,947 (<0.1%)
US WA	Checkpointing Table	19 (<0.1%)

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

	Total	2,200,317
--	-------	-----------

Table 9 - Checkpoints by State

79. Moreover, below is a plot that shows the number of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints about US and Potentially US users over time. The fields “first_create_timestamp” and “report_ds” identify when a report was created in Table 1 and Table 2, respectively.¹⁶⁰ I assume the field “action_time” identifies when an enforcement is actioned in Table 3 because of the name of the field. I assume the field “enrollment_time” identifies when a user is checkpointed in the Checkpointing Table for the same reason.
80. In the plot, the x-axis represents time and the y-axis represents the number of reports, enforcements, and checkpoints per month. Tables are differentiated by color and US vs. Potentially US users are denoted as solid vs. dashed lines, respectively. Note the changes in value among the y-axes.

¹⁶⁰ See META3047MDL-177-00122356

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

(c) IG_Underage_ignore_no_bio_and_no_media

(d) IGUnderageIgnoreNoBioAndNoMediaProfiles

(e) IGUnderageIgnoreNoMediaProfile

(f) IGUnderageIgnoreNoMediaProfiles

(g) UnderageIgnoreNoMediaProfiles

98. I assume that these values refer to the policy Meta applies which ignores reports of accounts because there was either: (1) no bio, or (2) no photos on the account.¹⁷⁴ Below is a table which contains the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to a lack of bio and photos.

Table	No Bio or Photos Auto-Ignored Reports
Table 1 (Potential US)	32,095
Table 1	7,402
Table 2	3,829
Total	43,326

Table 18 - Number of Ignored Reports Due to a Lack of a Bio or Photos

99. Moreover, below is a table that shows the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to a lack of bio and photos by state.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	5,652
US	Table 2	1,879
US AL	Table 2	1
US AR	Table 2	22
US AR	Table 1	49
US AZ	Table 2	1
US CA	Table 1	616
US CA	Table 2	549
US CO	Table 2	50
US CO	Table 1	64
US CT	Table 1	28
US CT	Table 2	29
US DC	Table 2	6
US DE	Table 2	7

¹⁷⁴ See Hartnett Dep. 179:11-180:6 for details surrounding this policy. See Blanaru Dep. Ex. 1 at 1 for similar values that are used here.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US DE	Table 1	3
US FL	Table 1	71
US FL	Table 2	191
US GA	Table 2	61
US IA	Table 2	2
US IL	Table 2	119
US IL	Table 1	184
US IN	Table 2	2
US KS	Table 2	1
US KY	Table 2	1
US LA	Table 1	18
US LA	Table 2	57
US MA	Table 2	5
US MD	Table 2	2
US MI	Table 2	4
US MO	Table 2	16
US MS	Table 2	19
US MT	Table 1	1
US MT	Table 2	4
US NC	Table 2	3
US NJ	Table 2	9
US NV	Table 2	24
US NV	Table 1	17
US NY	Table 2	9
US OH	Table 1	65
US OH	Table 2	110
US OK	Table 2	1
US OR	Table 1	11
US OR	Table 2	39
US PA	Table 2	3
US SD	Table 2	1
US TN	Table 2	1
US TX	Table 1	493
US TX	Table 2	418
US UT	Table 1	25
US UT	Table 2	23
US VA	Table 1	77
US VA	Table 2	108
US WA	Table 2	51
US WA	Table 1	28
US WI	Table 2	1
	Total	11,231

Table 19- Number of Ignored Reports Due to a Lack of a Bio or Photos by State

100. Finally, to identify the number of unique US users that are the subject of these auto-ignored reports, I examined the fields “deprecated_responsible_id_hashed”, “entity_attr_id_hashed”, “entity_attr_id_rid_hashed”, “object_id_hashed”, “object_id_v1_hashed”, “object_rid_hashed”, and “responsible_rid_hashed” in Table 1, which all

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

represent account identifiers.¹⁷⁵ The fields “entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed” and “entity_attr_primary_profile_id_hashed” in Table 2 both represent account identifiers.¹⁷⁶

101. Since there are multiple fields that provide account identifiers, I used the field which had the largest number of unique values (as many reports had empty values for particular identifiers). Below is a table that shows the number of unique users that were the subject of these auto-ignored reports.

Table	Unique Users
Table 1 (Potential US) (object_id_v1_hashed)	10,408
Table 1 (deprecated responsible_id_hashed)	6,262
Table 2 (entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed)	2,917
Total	19,587

Table 20 - Number of Unique Users with Ignored Reports Due to a Lack of a Bio or Photos

102. Additionally, below are state-level jurisdictions of these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	4,826
US	Table 2	1,521
US AL	Table 2	1
US AR	Table 1	39
US AR	Table 2	19
US AZ	Table 2	1
US CA	Table 1	513
US CA	Table 2	367
US CO	Table 1	56
US CO	Table 2	38
US CT	Table 2	21
US CT	Table 1	25
US DC	Table 2	3
US DE	Table 1	3
US DE	Table 2	7
US FL	Table 1	54
US FL	Table 2	153

¹⁷⁵ See 2025.10.06 - Corrected Meta Ltr. re META3047MDL_VOL245.pdf. I assume the memo omitted the word “_hashed” when providing the identifiers for these fields. Moreover, I assume “entity_rid” within the “entity_attr” column refer to “entity_attr_id_hashed” and “entity_attr_id_rid_hashed”. I make the same assumptions on the “object_rid” and “responsible_rid” columns.

¹⁷⁶ See 2025.10.06 - Corrected Meta Ltr. re META3047MDL_VOL245.pdf. I assume the memo omitted the word “_hashed” when providing the identifiers for these fields. Moreover, I assume “entity_attr_primary_profile_rid_hashed” to be an account identifier.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US GA	Table 2	52
US IA	Table 2	1
US IL	Table 2	84
US IL	Table 1	119
US IN	Table 2	2
US KY	Table 2	1
US LA	Table 2	48
US LA	Table 1	14
US MD	Table 2	2
US MI	Table 2	2
US MS	Table 2	19
US MT	Table 1	1
US MT	Table 2	4
US NC	Table 2	2
US NJ	Table 2	5
US NV	Table 2	23
US NV	Table 1	17
US NY	Table 2	4
US OH	Table 1	57
US OH	Table 2	60
US OK	Table 2	1
US OR	Table 1	9
US OR	Table 2	34
US PA	Table 2	2
US TN	Table 2	1
US TX	Table 2	319
US TX	Table 1	412
US UT	Table 1	25
US UT	Table 2	18
US VA	Table 2	58
US VA	Table 1	72
US WA	Table 1	20
US WA	Table 2	43
US WI	Table 2	1
	Total	9,179

Table 21 - Number of Unique Users with Ignored Repots Due to a Lack of Bio or Photos by State

103. My analysis shows the significance of Meta’s policy of automatically ignoring reports of accounts that have no bio or photos. Meta received reports of ~20,000 users that were children, but Meta took no further action to investigate those reports because they were discarded by Meta’s automated system because of a lack of a bio or photos.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

over 18.¹⁷⁷ Below is a table which contains the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to Meta’s Adult Classifier predicting the user to be over 18.

Table	Predicted Over 18 Auto-Ignored Reports
Table 1	83,465
Table 1 (Potential US)	77,785
Table 2	3,483
Total	164,733

Table 22 - Number of Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18

108. Moreover, below is a table that shows the number of reports that are ignored automatically due to Meta’s Adult Classifier predicting the user to be over 18 by state.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	66,221
US	Table 2	2,460
US AK	Table 2	3
US AR	Table 1	235
US AR	Table 2	14
US AZ	Table 2	5
US CA	Table 1	8,710
US CA	Table 2	467
US CO	Table 1	537
US CO	Table 2	2
US CT	Table 1	394
US CT	Table 2	57
US DC	Table 2	1
US DE	Table 2	3
US FL	Table 1	13
US FL	Table 2	85
US GA	Table 2	32
US ID	Table 2	1
US IL	Table 2	60
US IL	Table 1	1,303
US IN	Table 2	1
US KS	Table 2	7
US KY	Table 2	1
US LA	Table 2	5
US MA	Table 2	1
US MI	Table 2	1
US MS	Table 2	3
US MT	Table 2	2

¹⁷⁷ See Hartnett Dep. 175:16-176:15 for details surrounding this policy. See also META3047MDL-146-00072824 at - 072831 (UnderageAdultClassifierIgnore defined to mean “Ignore if our adult classifier predicts them to be over 18”)

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US MT	Table 1	1
US NC	Table 2	6
US ND	Table 2	1
US NH	Table 2	1
US NJ	Table 2	5
US NV	Table 2	37
US NV	Table 1	9
US NY	Table 2	22
US OH	Table 2	19
US OH	Table 1	350
US OR	Table 2	4
US PA	Table 2	7
US TN	Table 2	4
US TX	Table 2	112
US TX	Table 1	4,470
US UT	Table 2	6
US UT	Table 1	363
US VA	Table 1	854
US VA	Table 2	21
US VT	Table 2	1
US WA	Table 2	17
US WA	Table 1	5
US WI	Table 2	1
US WV	Table 2	8
Total		86,948

Table 23- Number of Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18 by State

109. Finally, using the same account identifiers and approach described above, below is a table that shows the number of unique users that were the subject of these auto-ignored reports.

Table	Unique Users
Table 1 (Potential US) (object id hashed)	77,379
Table 1 (object id hashed)	61,912
Table 2 (entity attr entity rid hashed)	1,797
Total	141,088

Table 24 - Number of Unique Users Who Had Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18

110. Additionally, below are the state-level jurisdictions for these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Reports
US	Table 1	49,461
US	Table 2	1,299
US AK	Table 2	1
US AR	Table 2	3
US AR	Table 1	179
US AZ	Table 2	5
US CA	Table 1	5,869
US CA	Table 2	161

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US CO	Table 1	429
US CO	Table 2	2
US CT	Table 1	313
US CT	Table 2	10
US DC	Table 2	1
US DE	Table 2	3
US FL	Table 1	7
US FL	Table 2	59
US GA	Table 2	5
US ID	Table 2	1
US IL	Table 1	1,020
US IL	Table 2	42
US IN	Table 2	1
US KS	Table 2	4
US KY	Table 2	1
US LA	Table 2	5
US MA	Table 2	1
US MI	Table 2	1
US MS	Table 2	3
US MT	Table 2	2
US MT	Table 1	1
US NC	Table 2	5
US ND	Table 2	1
US NH	Table 2	1
US NJ	Table 2	4
US NV	Table 2	24
US NV	Table 1	4
US NY	Table 2	16
US OH	Table 1	289
US OH	Table 2	17
US OR	Table 2	4
US PA	Table 2	3
US TN	Table 2	3
US TX	Table 2	66
US TX	Table 1	3,424
US UT	Table 2	6
US UT	Table 1	260
US VA	Table 2	16
US VA	Table 1	651
US VT	Table 2	1
US WA	Table 1	5
US WA	Table 2	16
US WI	Table 2	1
US WV	Table 2	3
	Total	63,709

Table 25 - Number of Unique Users Who Had Reports Ignored Because Meta Predicted the User to be Over 18 by State

111. My analysis shows the large effect of Meta’s Adult Classifier in ignoring underage reports. Over 160,000 reports were ignored for this reason, targeting roughly 140,000 US (and potentially US) users. Even if Meta’s Adult Classifier were hypothetically 90% correct at determining whether a user

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

Checkpointing Table	PolicyChain: U13 Admittance via Account Centre	93,221	4.2%
Table 3	policy:disable_async_job	101,657	62.3%
Table 3	policy:ig_underage_checkpoint;ig_underage_checkpoint	15,928	9.8%
Table 3	policy:	12,449	7.6%
Table 3	policy:state_manager	3,315	2.0%
Table 3	decision:["Is_there_underage_admission::no_indication","Are_there_underage_photos::Yes above threshold"]	2,575	1.6%

Table 37 - Most Common Checkpointing Reasons

146. Next, the fields “creator_rid_hashed”, “entity_rid_hashed”, and “owner_rid_hashed” identify the user in Table 3.¹⁹⁹ As used in the prior section, I use the fields “entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed” and “entity_attr_primary_profile_rid_hashed” in Checkpointing Table to identify users. Below is a table, using same the approach described above, that shows the number of unique users²⁰⁰ that are checkpointed.

Table	Unique Users
Checkpointing Table (entity_id_hashed)	1,810,035
Table 3 (entity_rid_hashed)	105,175
Total	1,915,210

Table 38 - Number of Checkpointed Users

147. Finally, below is a table that shows the state-level jurisdictions of these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	1,766,761
US AR	Checkpointing Table	415
US CA	Checkpointing Table	18,652
US CO	Checkpointing Table	2,838
US CT	Checkpointing Table	366
US DE	Checkpointing Table	3
US FL	Checkpointing Table	63
US IL	Checkpointing Table	1,763
US LA	Checkpointing Table	11
US MT	Checkpointing Table	2
US NV	Checkpointing Table	15
US OH	Checkpointing Table	390
US OR	Checkpointing Table	5
US TX	Checkpointing Table	13,515
US UT	Checkpointing Table	2,063
US VA	Checkpointing Table	3,156

¹⁹⁹ Ashley Simonsen, Corrected Meta Ltr re META3047MDL_VOL245, Ltr from Counsel for Meta to Counsel of Record (Oct. 6, 2025).

²⁰⁰ I attempted to deduplicate IDs between these two tables—there were no matches among the fields.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US WA	Checkpointing Table	18
	Total	1,810,036

Table 39- Number of Checkpointed Users (via Checkpointing Table) by State

Jurisdiction	Table	Enforcements
US	Table 3	82,436
US AK	Table 3	32
US AL	Table 3	295
US AR	Table 3	210
US AZ	Table 3	381
US CA	Table 3	4,094
US CO	Table 3	283
US CT	Table 3	224
US DC	Table 3	66
US DE	Table 3	79
US FL	Table 3	1,824
US GA	Table 3	1,169
US HI	Table 3	122
US IA	Table 3	89
US ID	Table 3	66
US IL	Table 3	874
US IN	Table 3	345
US KS	Table 3	104
US KY	Table 3	218
US LA	Table 3	509
US MA	Table 3	276
US MD	Table 3	464
US ME	Table 3	36
US MI	Table 3	438
US MN	Table 3	209
US MO	Table 3	252
US MS	Table 3	265
US MT	Table 3	38
US NC	Table 3	680
US ND	Table 3	18
US NE	Table 3	79
US NH	Table 3	43
US NJ	Table 3	547
US NM	Table 3	63
US NV	Table 3	354
US NY	Table 3	1,063
US OH	Table 3	783
US OK	Table 3	193
US OR	Table 3	191
US PA	Table 3	635
US RI	Table 3	38
US SC	Table 3	335
US SD	Table 3	17
US TN	Table 3	435
US TX	Table 3	2,679
US UT	Table 3	220
US VA	Table 3	701
US VT	Table 3	24
US WA	Table 3	409
US WI	Table 3	210
US WV	Table 3	50
US WY	Table 3	10
	Total	105,175

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

Table 40 - Number of Checkpointed Users (via Table 3) by State

148. My analysis shows that users self-admitting that they are underage make up a large share of accounts that Meta checkpoints for being underage—all of the top-five reasons in the Checkpointing Table (representing ~80% of all checkpoints) are related to users who admit they are underage in some way (e.g., “DOBUpdate”, “Admittance via Account Centre”, etc.).²⁰¹

5.5.4 Results on User Account Disables

149. This analysis of Meta’s productions focuses on US users that have been deactivated (often described as being “disabled” in the data) for being underage. Here, I analyze the number of users that were disabled for being underage, based on elapsed time, and specific actions that led to the account being disabled among other details. This section relies on Checkpointing Table. Throughout this section, I apply the same geographic and underage filters described above.

150. **Q1. How many unique US accounts are disabled by Meta for being underage, and how long did it take users to be disabled?**

²⁰¹ Blanaru Dep. 51:3-52:25; Blanaru Dep. Ex. 1 at 4; see also META3047MDL-037-00084734 (“AGE_COLLECTION”).

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

2022-08	36,313 (2.5%)
2022-09	26,578 (1.8%)
2022-10	44,413 (3.0%)
2022-11	34,402 (2.3%)
2022-12	60,945 (4.1%)
2023-01	23,564 (1.6%)
2023-02	11,968 (0.8%)
2023-03	390 (<0.1%)
2023-04	138 (<0.1%)
2023-05	193 (<0.1%)
2023-06	197 (<0.1%)
2023-07	425 (<0.1%)
2023-08	4,435 (0.3%)
2023-09	3,732 (0.3%)
2023-10	241,803 (16.3%)
2023-11	18,734 (1.3%)
2023-12	38,354 (2.6%)
2024-01	28,140 (1.9%)
2024-02	25,059 (1.7%)
2024-03	26,677 (1.8%)
2024-04	1 (<0.1%)
Total	1,481,631 (100.0%)

Table 42 - Number of Monthly Account Disables

153. As used in the prior section, I use the fields “entity_attr_entity_rid_hashed” and “entity_attr_primary_profile_rid_hashed” in Checkpointing Table to identify users. Below is a table, using same the approach described above, that shows the number of unique users that are disabled.

Table	Unique Users
Checkpointing Table (entity_id_hashed)	1,322,210 (100.0%)
Total	1,322,210 (100.0%)

Table 43 - Number of Unique Users Disabled

154. Moreover, below is a table that shows the state-level jurisdictions of these users.

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	1,283,555
US AR	Checkpointing Table	333
US CA	Checkpointing Table	16,841
US CO	Checkpointing Table	2,652
US CT	Checkpointing Table	245
US FL	Checkpointing Table	2
US IL	Checkpointing Table	1,382
US NV	Checkpointing Table	2
US OH	Checkpointing Table	278
US TX	Checkpointing Table	12,116

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US UT	Checkpointing Table	1,959
US VA	Checkpointing Table	2,844
US WA	Checkpointing Table	1
	Total	1,322,210

Table 44 - Number of Unique Users Disabled by State

155. For measuring the time taken to be disabled, I assume the field “enrollment_time” refers to the time a user is checkpointed and “decision_time” refers to the time at which a decision about the checkpointed user is made. Thus, the duration at which a user is checkpointed can be measured by the difference between these two fields. Below is a table which contains the number of disabled accounts, binned by whether the account was checkpointed for less than forty-five days, from forty-six days to six months, from six months to a year, to greater than one year.

Table	≤ 45 days	46 days to 6 months	6 months to 1 year	> 1 year
Checkpointing Table	1,180,858 (80.0%)	243,573 (16.5%)	7,419 (0.5%)	44,289 (3.0%)
Total	1,180,858 (80.0%)	243,573 (16.5%)	7,419 (0.5%)	44,289 (3.0%)

Table 45 - Number of Checkpoints that took N Days to Reach a Decision

156. My analysis shows that a substantial number of underage user accounts remained in underage checkpoints for extended periods before being disabled, during which time their data continued to be fully accessible to Meta’s systems—including for training and improving AI models.²⁰³ Further, after Meta ultimately determined that these accounts were likely operated by users under 13 and deactivated them, the company still retained the data of hundreds of thousands of these accounts for six months to a year before beginning the

²⁰³ Backstrom Dep. 29:23-30:16 and errata sheet.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

Table	DOB Disabled	DOB Cleared	DOB Distillery Cleared
Checkpointing Table	828,458 (80.0%)	201,445 (19.4%)	5,844 (0.6%)
Total	828,458 (80.0%)	201,445 (19.4%)	5,844 (0.6%)

Table 46 - Checkpoint Decisions for Users Who Edited Their Date of Birth

161. Below is a table that shows the number of accounts disabled due to users editing their date of birth to be under 13, broken down by state.

Jurisdiction	Table	Checkpoints
US	Checkpointing Table	783,669
US AR	Checkpointing Table	409
US CA	Checkpointing Table	19,289
US CO	Checkpointing Table	2,789
US CT	Checkpointing Table	388
US FL	Checkpointing Table	4
US IL	Checkpointing Table	1,870
US NV	Checkpointing Table	3
US OH	Checkpointing Table	351
US TX	Checkpointing Table	14,389
US UT	Checkpointing Table	2,064
US VA	Checkpointing Table	3,232
US WA	Checkpointing Table	1
	Total	828,458

Table 47 – Number of Accounts Disabled because Users Edited Their Date of Birth by State

162. Next, to measure the time between when a user was checkpointed and when they were disabled for editing their date of birth to be under 13, I apply the same approach above where I compute the difference between the fields “enrollment_time” and “decision_time”. Below is a table which contains the number of accounts that were disabled for editing their date of birth, binned by whether the account was checkpointed for less than forty-five days, from forty-six days to six months, from six months to a year, to greater than one year.

Table	≤ 45 days	46 days to 6 months	6 months to 1 year	> 1 year
Checkpointing Table	602,081 (73.1%)	176,180 (21.4%)	6,298 (0.8%)	39,176 (4.8%)
Total	602,081 (73.1%)	176,180 (21.4%)	6,298 (0.8%)	39,176 (4.8%)

Expert Report – Highly Confidential




Figure 6 - Histogram of FB-to-IG Softmatch Table Score Values (with 0.555 Threshold)

189. For IG-to-IG Softmatch Table, any ID pair that had all values of the fields “is_suma_2025_MM_DD”²²¹ (where “MM_DD” was either “05_24”, “06_07”, “06_23”, or “07_06”) not equal to 0 (as this indicates that the pair of IDs are not owned by the same user) was included.²²²
190. I call IDs that are soft-matched to a Disabled ID that were not filtered out “Candidate IDs” (as they represent IDs that Meta’s models predict to be owned by the same user).
191. Next, I check if a “Candidate ID” is neither in Very Recent Checkpointing Table (via “rid_hashed”), Very Recent Table 3 (via “creator_id”, “creator_rid_hashed”, “entity_id_hashed”, “entity_rid_hashed”, “owner_id”, and “owner_rid_hashed”), nor Very Recent VAN Table (via

²²¹ “SUMA” stands for “Same-User-Multiple-Account”. See Hartnett Dep. 292:1-3.

²²² Blararu Dep. 54:12-21.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

“creator_rid_hashed”, “entity_id_hashed”, “entity_rid_hashed”, and “owner_rid_hashed”). In this way, such “Candidate IDs” are not checkpointed, not enforced, and have not had an enforcement propagated to them (and therefore, are currently allowed to remain on Meta’s platforms).

192. Finally, I verified that at least one of the IDs²²³ in the pair had a US jurisdiction²²⁴(via “enrollment_conformed_entity_dimensions.jurisdictions” in Very Recent Checkpointing Table for Disabled IDs and via Softmatch Jurisdiction Table for Candidate IDs). I call such IDs “Unenforced IDs” as they represent IDs that are not enforced or checkpointed, but are soft-matched (over a threshold) to an ID that was disabled for being underage, and either has a US jurisdiction or is soft-matched to an ID that does. Finally, across all pairs with an Unenforced ID, I computed the number of unique Unenforced and Disabled IDs. Below are tables that show the results of the filters described above for each of Meta’s soft-match models.

Table	Softmatch Pairs	Pairs over Threshold	Pairs with a Disabled Account	Unenforced Softmatch Pairs	Unenforced Accounts	Disabled Accounts
FB-to-FB Clustering Table	176,564,405	176,564,405	31,476	30,811	15,748	13,106

²²³ Note that Meta described Very Recent Checkpointing Table as “data relating to U.S. Facebook and Instagram accounts.” Accordingly, I consider these users to be US users. See 2025.08.15 Meta Ltr. re META3047MDL_VOL270.pdf. However, I observed that some of these users had values in the subfield “jurisdictions” from the field “enrollment_conformed_entity_dimensions” indicating foreign geography and thus, to be conservative, I filtered them out in my analysis per these steps.

²²⁴ I performed this check for IG-to-IG Softmatch Table and FB-to-IG Softmatch Table. FB-to-FB Clustering Table has a “country” field which is “US” for >99.95% of rows.

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

FB-to-IG Softmatch Table	2,999,628,582	1,282,987,972	57,202	49,483	47,748	21,797
IG-to-IG Softmatch Table	4,613,904,488	2,734,812,541	125,499	119,095	72,320	18,397

Table 5556 - Soft-match Analysis Results

193. Moreover, below are tables of the state-level jurisdictions of Disabled Accounts.

FB-to-FB Clustering Table Disabled Account Jurisdictions	Count
US	1,837
US AK	38
US AL	191
US AR	114
US AZ	455
US CA	1,215
US CO	164
US CT	65
US DC	29
US DE	27
US FL	497
US GA	308
US HI	39
US IA	115
US ID	45
US IL	261
US IN	273
US KS	108
US KY	270
US LA	148
US MA	251
US MD	137
US ME	49
US MI	273
US MN	160
US MO	198
US MS	125
US MT	27
US NC	318
US ND	36
US NE	69
US NH	35
US NJ	151
US NM	59
US NV	68
US NY	1,224
US OH	397
US OK	135
US OR	191
US PA	365
US RI	17
US SC	180

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US_SD	25
US_TN	268
US_TX	682
US_UT	73
US_VA	613
US_VT	26
US_WA	395
US_WI	199
US_WV	134
US_WY	27

Table 58 - FB-to-FB Clustering Table Disabled Accounts by State

FB-to-IG Softmatch Table Disabled Account Jurisdictions	Count
US	1,174
US_AK	43
US_AL	413
US_AR	210
US_AZ	474
US_CA	2,426
US_CO	289
US_CT	163
US_DC	53
US_DE	66
US_FL	1,522
US_GA	939
US_HI	130
US_IA	143
US_ID	82
US_IL	642
US_IN	384
US_KS	196
US_KY	338
US_LA	484
US_MA	301
US_MD	437
US_ME	53
US_MI	526
US_MN	266
US_MO	327
US_MS	276
US_MT	50
US_NC	770
US_ND	44
US_NE	118

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US_NH	50
US_NJ	548
US_NM	97
US_NV	239
US_NY	1,088
US_OH	735
US_OK	261
US_OR	145
US_PA	701
US_RI	54
US_SC	377
US_SD	32
US_TN	553
US_TX	2,060
US_UT	165
US_VA	525
US_VT	23
US_WA	376
US_WI	308
US_WV	93
US_WY	28

Table 59575859 - FB-to-IG Softmatch Clustering Table Disabled Accounts by State

IG-to-IG Softmatch Table Disabled Account Jurisdictions	Count
US	1,093
US_AK	18
US_AL	289
US_AR	115
US_AZ	366
US_CA	2,394
US_CO	211
US_CT	128
US_DC	82
US_DE	62
US_FL	1,339
US_GA	904
US_HI	124
US_IA	67
US_ID	63
US_IL	589

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

US_IN	250
US_KS	119
US_KY	198
US_LA	430
US_MA	254
US_MD	436
US_ME	26
US_MI	422
US_MN	177
US_MO	220
US_MS	211
US_MT	33
US_NC	592
US_ND	25
US_NE	69
US_NH	34
US_NJ	565
US_NM	80
US_NV	245
US_NY	946
US_OH	521
US_OK	147
US_OR	90
US_PA	563
US_RI	43
US_SC	304
US_SD	17
US_TN	380
US_TX	2,020
US_UT	145
US_VA	433
US_VT	12
US_WA	268
US_WI	227
US_WV	42
US_WY	9

Table 6060 - IG-to-IG Softmatch Table Disabled Accounts by State

194. This analysis shows the ability of Meta’s soft-matching models to identify accounts likely to belong to underage users whose accounts Meta has not

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

removed from its platforms. With underage enforcement data from only a three-month period, I found tens of thousands of accounts that Meta had disabled for being underage, which Meta’s systems predicted were linked to tens of thousands more accounts that Meta ignored. This demonstrates a missed opportunity for Meta to use its existing data to detect and remove underage users.

195. Q2. How many estimated accounts would be disabled by Meta if it had propagated soft-link enforcements for underage accounts?

196. This question asks how many underage accounts Meta could have disabled for being soft-matched to an account that was disabled for being underage, if Meta enforced its age policies against soft-matched accounts.

197. I estimate the number of accounts Meta would have disabled by considering the percentage of potential enforcements that are due to soft-matching and multiply this percentage by the total number of enforcements in the past (using a similar methodology as my analysis of possible hard-link enforcements). I define a “soft-match” enforcement to be semantically identical to a hard-link enforcement: an account that is soft-matched to another account that was disabled to be underage. In other words, I consider the number of “Disabled Accounts” computed above when computing the percentage of soft-match enforcements. I assume that soft-matching rates are

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

relatively consistent before April 2025, the earliest date for which Meta produced soft-matching data.

198. Next, below is a table that contains a summary of the percentages that I used to provide my estimates.

Soft-match Table	% Disables	% Enforcements
FB-to-FB Clustering Table	3.0%	0.7%
FB-to-IG Softmatch Table	5.0%	1.1%
IG-to-IG Softmatch Table	4.2%	0.9%

Table 6161 - Soft-match Percentages for each Table

199. Below is a table containing the estimated number of potential accounts that could have been disabled or subject to enforcement through soft-matching on a monthly basis for Table 3 and Checkpointing Table. These figures were derived by multiplying the total number of underage account disables or enforcements per month by the respective percentages displayed above.

Month	Total Disables	Est. Number of Soft-match Disables via FB-to-FB Clustering Table	Est. Number of Soft-match Disables via FB-to-IG Softmatch Table	Est. Number of Soft-match Disables via IG-to-IG Softmatch Table
2020-06-01	826	24	41	34
2020-07-01	1,717	51	85	72
2020-08-01	7,533	226	377	318
2020-09-01	143,515	4,321	7,187	6,066
2020-10-01	22,954	691	1,149	970
2020-11-01	22,015	662	1,102	930
2020-12-01	27,598	831	1,382	1,166
2021-01-01	40,441	1,217	2,025	1,709
2021-02-01	26,866	809	1,345	1,135
2021-03-01	25,209	759	1,262	1,065
2021-04-01	20,222	608	1,012	854
2021-05-01	25,770	776	1,290	1,089
2021-06-01	33,344	1,004	1,669	1,409
2021-07-01	52,135	1,569	2,611	2,203
2021-08-01	34,860	1,049	1,745	1,473
2021-09-01	31,596	951	1,582	1,335
2021-10-01	31,660	953	1,585	1,338
2021-11-01	17,353	522	869	733
2021-12-01	10,628	320	532	449
2022-01-01	10,537	317	527	445
2022-02-01	10,690	321	535	451

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

2022-03-01	29,821	898	1,493	1,260
2022-04-01	21,649	651	1,084	915
2022-05-01	128,304	3,863	6,425	5,423
2022-06-01	79,854	2,404	3,999	3,375
2022-07-01	35,057	1,055	1,755	1,481
2022-08-01	28,636	862	1,434	1,210
2022-09-01	42,848	1,290	2,145	1,811
2022-10-01	35,176	1,059	1,761	1,486
2022-11-01	60,005	1,806	3,005	2,536
2022-12-01	22,196	668	1,111	938
2023-01-01	12,328	371	617	521
2023-02-01	4,118	124	206	174
2023-03-01	3,705	111	185	156
2023-04-01	1,523	45	76	64
2023-05-01	131,675	3,965	6,594	5,565
2023-06-01	29,230	880	1,463	1,235
2023-07-01	32,447	977	1,625	1,371
2023-08-01	31,388	945	1,571	1,326
2023-09-01	15,970	480	799	675
2023-10-01	16,489	496	825	696
2023-11-01	36,871	1,110	1,846	1,558
2023-12-01	28,333	853	1,418	1,197
2024-01-01	26,939	811	1,349	1,138
2024-02-01	24,005	722	1,202	1,014
2024-03-01	103	3	5	4
Total	1,476,139	44,430	73,905	62,373

Table 6262 - Estimated Number of Account Disables due to Soft-matching per Month

Month	Total Enforcements	Est. Number of Soft-match Enforcements via FB-to-FB Clustering Table	Est. Number of Soft-match Enforcements via FB-to-IG Softmatch Table	Est. Number of Soft-match Enforcements via IG-to-IG Softmatch Table
2017-10-01	1,258	8	14	11
2017-11-01	2,431	16	27	22
2017-12-01	57	0	0	0
2018-01-01	50	0	0	0
2018-02-01	61	0	0	0
2018-03-01	112	0	1	1
2018-04-01	164	1	1	1
2018-05-01	161	1	1	1
2018-06-01	16,630	111	185	156
2018-07-01	368	2	4	3
2018-08-01	302	2	3	2
2018-09-01	341	2	3	3
2018-10-01	294	1	3	2
2018-11-01	479	3	5	4
2018-12-01	677	4	7	6
2019-01-01	602	4	6	5
2019-02-01	674	4	7	6
2019-03-01	2,140	14	23	20
2019-04-01	1,446	9	16	13
2019-05-01	1,514	10	16	14
2019-06-01	1,772	11	19	16
2019-07-01	2,586	17	28	24
2019-08-01	2,936	19	32	27
2019-09-01	1,949	13	21	18
2019-10-01	2,109	14	23	19
2019-11-01	2,934	19	32	27

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

2019-12-01	3,839	25	42	36
2020-01-01	5,753	38	64	54
2020-02-01	7,166	48	80	67
2020-03-01	19,729	132	220	186
2020-04-01	12,051	80	134	113
2020-05-01	13,914	93	155	131
2020-06-01	12,648	85	141	119
2020-07-01	11,993	80	134	113
2020-08-01	10,534	70	117	99
2020-09-01	9,684	65	108	91
2020-10-01	44,247	297	494	417
2020-11-01	6,862	46	76	64
2020-12-01	30,739	206	343	290
2021-01-01	34,453	231	385	325
2021-02-01	39,960	268	446	377
2021-03-01	48,618	326	543	458
2021-04-01	31,562	212	352	297
2021-05-01	23,908	160	267	225
2021-06-01	26,932	181	301	254
2021-07-01	46,378	311	518	437
2021-08-01	90,693	609	1,013	855
2021-09-01	86,429	580	966	815
2021-10-01	45,179	303	505	426
2021-11-01	42,529	285	475	401
2021-12-01	35,348	237	395	333
2022-01-01	28,141	189	314	265
2022-02-01	39,794	267	444	375
2022-03-01	65,126	437	728	614
2022-04-01	52,095	350	582	491
2022-05-01	175,801	1,181	1,965	1,658
2022-06-01	561,345	3,773	6,275	5,296
2022-07-01	106,006	712	1,185	1,000
2022-08-01	92,911	624	1,038	876
2022-09-01	64,315	432	718	606
2022-10-01	77,752	522	869	733
2022-11-01	52,925	355	591	499
2022-12-01	84,229	566	941	794
2023-01-01	54,158	364	605	510
2023-02-01	44,604	299	498	420
2023-03-01	35,620	239	398	336
2023-04-01	35,158	236	393	331
2023-05-01	49,713	334	555	469
2023-06-01	44,567	299	498	420
2023-07-01	45,649	306	510	430
2023-08-01	29,974	201	335	282
2023-09-01	21,788	146	243	205
2023-10-01	91,091	612	1,018	859
2023-11-01	28,387	190	317	267
2023-12-01	38,384	257	429	362
2024-01-01	42,163	283	471	397
2024-02-01	48,196	323	538	454
2024-03-01	47,081	316	526	444
2024-04-01	11,434	76	127	107
2024-05-01	10,116	67	113	95
2024-06-01	12,132	81	135	114
2024-07-01	26,353	177	294	248
2024-08-01	40,098	269	448	378
2024-09-01	41,618	279	465	392
2024-10-01	25,054	168	280	236

Expert Report – Highly Confidential

2024-11-01	25,742	173	287	242
2024-12-01	24,117	162	269	227
2025-01-01	19,016	127	212	179
2025-02-01	11,987	80	133	113
2025-03-01	3,592	24	40	33
Total	3,093,427	20,749	34,538	29,141

Table 6363 - Estimated Number of Enforcements Due to Soft-matching per Month

200. This analysis represents an estimate of the magnitude of additional underage accounts that Meta could have detected by using its soft-matching techniques over the period for which Meta had produced data on underage enforcements. Based on the available data, I estimate that Meta could have detected tens of thousands of additional underage accounts on Facebook and Instagram, if it had queried its soft-matching data, as has done for years for disabling accounts for other types of policy violations or for commercial purposes.